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FOREWORD
The second edition of the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice stands as a monument to the improvement of the truth-
finding process in the adversary system. The Standards can be traced to
1963, when lawyers, professors, judges, and experts in the criminal justice
system pooled their intellect to cause Standards to be promulgated for the
administration of criminal justice. When the first edition was completed, the
American Bar Association Standards were being measured against the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration National Advisory Commission
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Implementation of both the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standards and the National Advisory Commission Stan-
dards brought an empirical reservoir of data into being that was utilized in
preparing the second edition of the American Bar Association Standards.
Today, the Standards for Criminal Justice have been cited by every state
supreme court, the United States Supreme Court, and by nearly every dis-
trict and circuit court in the federal judicial system.
The symposium which has been prepared for the Denver Law Journal is
the culmination of a national effort to make the second edition of the Stan-
dards known to the legal profession and all those who work within the crimi-
nal justice system. Major General Kenneth Hodson and Lynn Edwards
both played a key role in the preparation and implementation of the Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice. Professor B. James George is an authority on
constitutional law and has written widely in the criminal law field. He is
responsible for a great deal of the commentary which supports the Legal
Status of Prisoner Standards. In small part, I was able to participate with
the other authors both in the preparation and implementation of the Stan-
dards. The work which has been done to cause the Standards for Criminal
Justice to be a model for use within the adversary system cannot be emu-
lated better that it has been by the articles contained in this symposium.
DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. ERICKSON
Colorado Supreme Court
Chairman, American Bar Association
Committee to Implement the Standards
for Criminal Justice

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR




It would be difficult, even for members of the legal profession, to appre-
ciate fully the scope and breadth of the American Bar Association (ABA)
Standards for CnminalJustice (Standards) without having at least a brief his-
torical account of the Standards' creation and evolution. This portion of the
Symposium is therefore devoted to a discussion of how, when, and why the
* Major General, U.S. Army-Retired, former Judge Advocate General of the Army, for-
mer Chief Judge of the U.S. Army Court of Military Review, and former Executive Director of
the National Commission to Review Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Elec-
tronic Surveillance. The author was a member of the ABA special committee which developed
the first edition of the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974), and he served in that
capacity from the early planning stages in 1963 through the final approval of the first edition in
1973. He was the chairman of the Special and Standing Committees which prepared the sec-
ond edition of those standards from 1975 through 1980. Much of the material in this article
comes from his recollection of events occurring during this seventeen year period. During this
same time, he served as Vice-Chairman, Chairman, and Secretary of the Criminal Law (later
Criminal Justice) Section. He was a member of the ABA House of Delegates from 1971 to 1979.
The author acknowledges with thanks the major contribution of Mr. Richard P. Lynch to
the preparation of those portions of this article dealing with the Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards Project. Mr. Lynch serves as the project director.
1. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980). In February 1981 the ABA
House of Delegates approved the controversial new standards on the Legal Status of Prisoners,
which will be added as Chapter 23 to the second edition by a supplement. Unlike the other
chapters, the Legal Status of Prisoners standards were not developed originally by the Standing
Committee. They were the product of the ABA's Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Pris-
oners. In 1978, the ABA House of Delegates referred the proposed standards to the Standing
Committee and requested the Standing Committee to reconcile differences between the ABA
draft standards and positions held by the American Correctional Association.
The chapters with their approval dates are listed below. The single digit number appear-
ing in parentheses designates the task force which prepared the initial draft of the revisions.
Chapter numbers omitted have been reserved for future standards.
1. Urban Police Function (February 1979) (4)
2. Electronic Surveillance (August 1978) (4)
3. Prosectution Function (February 1979) (2)
4. Defense Function (February 1979) (2)
5. Providing Defense Services (February 1979) (2)
6. Special Functions of the Trial Judge (August 1978) (1)
8. Fair Trial and Free Press (August 1978) (5)
10. Pretrial Release (February 1979) (2)
11. Discovery and Procedure Before Trial (August 1978) (4)
12. Speedy Trial (August 1978) (1)
13. Joinder and Severance (August 1978) (4)
14. Pleas of Guilty (February 1979) (2)
15. Trial by Jury (August 1978) (1)
18. Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (August 1979) (1)
20. Appellate Review of Sentences (August 1978; amended February 1980)
21. Criminal Appeals (August 1978) (3)
22. Postconviction Remedies (August 1978) (3)
23. Legal Status of Prisoners (February 1981)
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Standards came into being. Furthermore, it will analyze the impact which
the Standards have had and assess their continuing potential for improve-
ments in the administration of criminal justice in America.
The second edition of the Standards was published after the chapter on
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures was approved in August 1979 by the
ABA House of Delegates. Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures was the
last chapter of the first edition of the Standards to be revised. The House of
Delegates' approval of that chapter completed a three-year effort to update
the first edition by the ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards
for Criminal Justice (Standing Committee). This comprehensive revision
was mandated by the ABA's bylaws, which state that "[tihe Standing Com-
mittee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice . . . shall: (1) contin-
uously review the Association's standards for criminal justice;
(2) recommend such changes in, or additions to, those standards as it consid-
ers appropriate .... -2
The Standing Committee's mandate to update the Standards was but a
continuation of an original ten year ABA project to develop standards for
the criminal justice system. That ABA effort began in 1963 and was pro-
posed by Professor Delmar Karlen who served as Director of the Institute of
Judicial Administration located at New York University Law School.
The project began during the annual American Law Institute meeting
held in May 1963 when the ABA, in conjunction with the Institute of Judi-
cial Administration (IJA), proposed to undertake the formulation of "mini-
mum standards" in the field of criminal justice. "The standards were born
in a climate of deep concern over the burgeoning problems of crime and the
correlative crisis in our courts occasioned by overwhelming caseloads, recidi-
vism, and a seeming incapacity of the system to respond to the challenges of
the Sixties."' 3 As a result, the Criminal Law Section and the Judicial Ad-
ministration Section each appointed one committee to consult with the IJA.
4
In 1964, the IJA conducted a pilot study which was supervised by a
committee composed of ABA members named by the Board of Governors,
the Criminal Law Section and Judicial Administration Section. The com-
mittee determined that the proposed project was essential and viable. Sub-
sequently, a twelve member special committee was appointed to coordinate
the approved project. Initially, six advisory committees were appointed to
focus on specific areas in which standards would be written. In 1969 a sev-
enth committee was appointed to draft standards on the function of the trial
judge. In August 1964, the ABA Board of Governors and House of Dele-
gates approved the undertaking of the Standards project, which was funded
by grants from the American Bar Endowment, the Avalon Foundation, and
2. ABA BYLAws § 30.7.
3. Jameson, The Beginng: Background and Development of the ABA Standards for Criminal/us-
tice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 255, 255-56 (1974) (quoting Clark, The Amercan Bar Association Stan-
dards for Criminaljustie: Prescription for an Ailing System, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 429 (1972)).
4. For a detailed discussion of the development of the Standards see Jameson, supra note 3.
4 [Vol. 59:1
1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
the Vincent Astor Foundation.5
Initially, the phrase "minimum standards" was used. The word "mini-
mum" was dropped because the special committee recognized that the stan-
dards were "more aptly described as desirable or acceptable rather than
minimal."'6 Seventeen sets of standards were eventually developed and the
House of Delegates approved these standards over a nine year period. Fi-
nally, in February 1973, the last set of standards was approved.
7
The need for the first edition Standards was evidenced by the "challenges
of the Sixties" previously mentioned. This challenge referred to the "crimi-
nal law revolution" of that decade which commenced with Mapp v. Ohio.8 In
the Mapp case, the United States Supreme Court extended a number of the
United States Constitution's Bill of Rights protections to state and local ac-
tions. Prior to Mapp, those protections had largely been treated as restraints
only on federal action.
Thus, Mapp signaled the downfall of the double standard which had
prevailed in state and federal criminal cases. Mapp, and a swift succession of
landmark cases, held that the fourteenth amendment made nearly all of the
guarantees of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments binding on the
states.
9
Since the Court's rulings were limited to the specific issues of the indi-
vidual cases, they frequently did not provide comprehensive guidance for
reform. Moreover, there were wide differences of opinion within the legal
community concerning their interpretation, impact, and implementation.
The Warren Court was depicted as having unfairly tipped the scales in favor
of the criminal. This opinion found support in the fact that the crime rate
was rising at a much faster rate than the population. Clearly there was need
forpractical guidelines to assist legislators, judges, law enforcement personnel,
practitioners, law schools, and the public in bringing state criminal justice
systems into conformity with the increasing number of sweeping Supreme
Court decisions. The system, in short, had to be updated.
This environment prompted Professor Karlen to propose that the ABA
undertake the development of criminal justice standards. He and his col-
leagues were aware of the success of an earlier ABA program to promulgate
standards for judicial administration in civil cases. These same factors nur-
tured the ABA's interest in undertaking the project and carrying out one of
the ABA's primary purposes: "to promote throughout the nation the admin-
istration of justice and the uniformity of legislation and of judicial
decisions.""°
The pilot committee and the special committee recognized that schol-
arly essays, no matter how erudite, would not suffice as standards. The stan-
5. Id. at 256-57.
6. Id. at 258.
7. Id.
8. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. The Supreme Court rulings virtually mandated that the states examine and revise
their criminal law procedures because when state procedures failed to conform to the Court's
decisions, corrective action became necessary.
10. ABA CONST. art. 1.2.
1981)
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dards needed to be practical, useful, and credible to legislatures, courts, the
legal profession, law schools, and the public. Achieving these goals was cru-
cial; otherwise, the project would not be worthwhile. Chief Justice Burger
actively participated in the achievement of these goals as chairman of an
advisory committee and later, as chairman of the special committee. Judge
William J. Jameson, United States Senior District Court Judge, United
States District Court for the District of Montana, succeeded Chief Justice
Burger (who had succeeded Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard, Chief Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) as chairman of
the special committee and completed the project."
During the early stages of the project, the pilot committee and the spe-
cial committee defined the project's scope, and developed an organizational
structure, method of operation, and general format for the Standards. To
promote uniformity of approach in the preparation of the Standards and to
minimize overlap and duplication, a joint meeting of the special committee
and the chairmen and reporters of the advisory committees preceded imple-
mentation of the project. A portion of that meeting was devoted to an expo-
sition by Herbert Wechsler, Director of the American Law Institute, on the
manner in which the American Law Institute (ALl) Restatements had been
formulated. Although the participants agreed that the ALl approach gener-
ally would be followed in the development and format of the Standards, they
enunciated one philosophical difference: the ALI Restatements were not as-
pirational but rather reflected the actual state of the law. The ABA project
would take a different tack. In view of the wide disparities existing in crimi-
nal procedure, and, in many instances, an absence of any recognized practice
or rule, the committee decided the Standards should promulgate rules of prac-
tice and procedure that would serve as minimally acceptable standards in a
fair system of criminal justice. Thus, the ABA Standards would do more than
report what the law "was"; they would suggest what the law "should be."
This philosophy was later refined by deleting the term "minimum" in favor
of standards that were "desirable and acceptable." The test for each pro-
1I. Chief Justice Burger, whose participation in the Standards project continued until his
confirmation as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, described the project in this
manner:
This project represents, I believe, the single most comprehensive and probably the
most monumental undertaking in the field of criminal justice ever attempted by the
American legal profession in our national history. The Standards represent more than
10 years of intense work, study, and debate by more than 100 of the nation's leading
jurists, lawyers, and legal scholars operating in advisory committees of 10 or 12 each.
The participants were drawn from every part of the country and included state and
federal judges, prosecuting attorneys, defense lawyers, public defenders, law professors,
penology experts and police officials. In addition, the active participants consulted
with scores of other interested and knowledgeable individuals in the criminal justice
field for their advice and assistance. As a result, the Standards reflect the richest reser-
voir of experience ever developed concerning the functioning of our criminal justice
system. The caliber of the participants is illustrated in the fact that one advisory com-
mittee with a membership of 12 embraced a total of some 400 years of intensive expo-
sure to work in the courts and the criminal system. In sum, this project was much
more than a theoretical and idealistic restatment of the law, but rather a synthesis of
the experience of a diverse and highly experienced group of professionals.
Burger, Introductitn." The ABA Sandards for Crtn'wtalJusttce, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 251, 251-52
(1974).
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posed standard would be whether that standard afforded protection for soci-
ety as well as for the individual defendant's constitutional rights.
The manner in which the advisory committees approached their tasks
varied. In cases where law and practice were reasonably well established, as
in Pleas of Guilty, the reporter, after one or more preliminary sessions with
his committee, would propose black letter standards and supporting memo-
randa for the committee's consideration and review. In areas where no rec-
ognized "standard" of practice or procedure existed, the advisory committee
devised a different approach. In developing the standards on the Prosecu-
tion and Defense Functions, for example, the advisory committee, under the
chairmanship of then Judge Burger, conducted detailed interviews of exper-
ienced prosecutors and criminal defense counsel to find out what practice
they followed in a variety of factual situations arising before, during, and
after criminal trial. Thereafter, the advisory committee and the reporter de-
veloped proposed standards reflecting the consensus of views from these "ex-
pert witnesses" and offered their findings as standards.
While still in the planning stage, the pilot and special committees de-
cided not to duplicate on-going projects of other organizations. Conse-
quently, the advisory committee on the Police Function delayed action on its
assigned standards of the Urban Police Function pending completion of the
ALI's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.' 2 The special committee
also decided that it would not attempt to duplicate the ALI's Model Penal
Code or the Model Code of Evidence. Finally, the committee decided that it
would confine itself generally to adult offenders in the criminal process, from
the first contact with the police through sentencing, appeals, and postconvic-
tion remedies. Therefore, the committee did not attempt to develop stan-
dards relating to juvenile justice. 13
In preparing several of the standards, specially qualified consultants
12. ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975). The ALl Model Code
offers a set of specific rules covering the criminal process from the first contact of a police officer
with a suspect through arrest, police custody, investigation, early court appearance, and plea.
Its 121 sections include detailed rules relating to such difficult and controversial issues as stop-
and-frisk, line-ups, search and seizure, preliminary hearings, and plea bargaining. The ABA
Standards on the Urban Police Function do not overlap or duplicate the ALl Model Code. To
the contrary, the Urban Police Function provides policy recommendations, rather than specific
rules of conduct to be followed by individual police officers. The standard attempts to define
the scope of the police function by identifying the principal objectives and responsibilities of
police departments. It gives lengthy consideration to the need for providing the police with
adequate resources. The standard also places a high priority on the formulation of administra-
tive rules to govern the exercise of police discretion, particularly in the areas of selective enforce-
ment, investigative techniques, and enforcement methods. In addition, the standard recognizes
the need for control over police authority and recommends various methods of review. In short,
the standard establishes broad policies for consideration by the police, legislatures, lawyers, and
other public groups which helps determine how the police department should be organized and
how it can efficiently carry out its broad range of functions.
13. Juvenile justice standards were later developed by the Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion/American Bar Association Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, under the
chairmanship of Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. IJA-ABA JT. COMMISSION ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1980).
The ABA House of Delegates approved seventeen of these standards in February 1979; three
additional standards were approved in February 1980. The twenty volume edition of the juve-
nile justice standards was published in 1980.
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were called upon to provide advice with respect to matters outside-the gen-
eral knowledge of the members of the advisory committees. For example,
career police officers, including representatives of the International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police, provided expert guidance. in the preparation of the
standards on the Urban Police Function and Electronic Surveillance. Simi-
larly, experienced probation officers assisted significantly in the drafting of
the standards on probation. Members of the media provided valuable input
for the standards on Fair Trial and Free Press.
When the special committee and its advisory committees and reporters
had completed a first tentative draft of the black letter standards, those stan-
dards and their supporting commentary were printed. More than 12,000
copies were distributed throughout the ABA and its affiliated organizations
for review, comment, and critical analysis. The refined drafts were then sub-
mitted for action to the ABA Board of Governors and House of Delegates.
The latter entity consists of some 350 members representing the ABA's more
than 260,000 members and affiliated organizations. As noted earlier, all sev-
enteen sets of the Standards were ultimately approved by the House of Dele-
gates, and became official ABA policy. '
4
It was not enough, however, to develop and publish useful and practical
standards. The ABA's approval could not guarantee that the Standards
would have significant impact upon the administration of criminal justice.
14. Since I participated in the project from the time it was proposed in 1963 until it was
completed ten years later, I feel that some special mention should be made of those who contrib-
uted significantly to its success, even at the risk of omitting mention of others who devoted so
much of their time to it. The three chairmen provided inspirational leadership (Chief Judge
Lumbard-1936-1968; Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger-1968-1969; and Judge Jameson-
1969-1973). The members of the special committee and its advisory committees included seven
members who were or would be presidents of the ABA, and two other former or future ABA
presidents who were active in the planning and fund-raising (Whitney North Seymour and the
late Orison S. Marden). Four members would ascend to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In addition to Justice Powell (then a practicing lawyer) and Chief Justice Burger (then a
United States Court of Appeals Judge), two of the advisory committees included Abe Fortas
and Harry A. Blackmun, both of whom were later appointed Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court.
Chief Judge Lumbard, however, as chairman of the pilot and special committees during
the early years of the project, stands out as the individual who bore the heaviest burden in
developing the operational concept, defining the scope of the project, and moving it forward in
a timely and effective manner. He was ably assisted by Professor Karlen and by Richard A.
Green, a former assistant U.S. Attorney, who conducted the pilot study and who served as full-
time project director once the project was approved.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., as ABA President-Elect (1963-1964) and as President (1964-
1965), participated actively in devising the organizational structure of the special committee
and its advisory committees. Because of his strong belief in the value of the project and his
position as ABA President, Justice Powell was able to convince busy and highly qualified law-
yers and judges to give of their time and energies to serve as members of the special committee
and its advisory committees. He also served as an active member of the special committee until
1972 when he was sworn in as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
Funding was essential to the success of the project. The American Bar Endowment was
encouraged to fund the pilot project and to allocate an additional $250,000 for the project itself.
This was accomplished through the efforts of then ABA President Powell who was strongly
assisted by former ABA Presidents Judge Walter Craig and Judge William Jameson. Special
committee member David W. Peck, a practicing lawyer in New York City and a former New
York Supreme Court Judge, headed the effort to seek other funds. He was singularly successful
in swiftly obtaining $250,000 in project funding from both the Avalon and the Vincent Astor
Foundations.
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During the period when the ABA's Cr'minalJustice Standards were being for-
mulated, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice, the National Commission on Civil Disorders, and the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence had been
created. Yet, no meaningful effort had been made to carry out the com-
prehensive findings and recommendations of those bodies. Their recommen-
dations languished on library shelves.
The late Louis B. Nichols, then chairman of the ABA Criminal Law
Section, was aware of the national commissions' lack of significant impact on
the criminal justice system. Therefore, in 1968 he proposed that the Crimi-
nal Law Section make a long-range commitment for a nationwide imple-
mentation of the ABA CriminalJustice Standards, except for the standards
relating to Fair Trial and Free Press. These standards were to be the respon-
sibility of a special subcommittee of the ABA's Standing Committee on Pub-
lic Relations, and later the Standing Committee on Association
Communications. The ABA Board of Governors approved the Nichols pro-
posal and the section embarked on an ambitious, successful ten year imple-
mentation program to put the Standards in the market place.
The section was fortunate to obtain the volunteer services of retired
United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Tom C. Clark as chairman
of the implementation committee. He was a tremendous asset and he con-
tinued to head the committee until his untimely death in June 1977. Colo-
rado Supreme Court Justice William H. Erickson, who had served as deputy
chairman and had been actively involved with the Standards and their imple-
mentation, succeeded Justice Clark as chairman. Justice Erickson continues
to chair the implementation activities and he has carried on Justice Clark's
tradition with energy and imagination.
The implementation program involved careful planning, large-scale
fund raising from private and governmental sources, recruiting and training
of staff, distribution of more than 1,800,000 copies of the individual paper-
back Standards, and organizing volunteers from both local and national
levels. The program also included all branches of the government, as well as
religious, labor, professional, and civic groups. -5
After the House of Delegates approved the last two sets of the first Stan-
dards in 1973, Chesterfield Smith, then ABA President, appointed eight
members to a new committee, the Special Committee on the Administration
of Criminal Justice, and designated Justice William H. Erickson as chair-
man. This new committee was charged with monitoring the existing Stan-
dards to determine the need for revision and for additional standards.
During the first several years of its work, the new committee reviewed
all 476 black letter standards in the light of subsequent United States
Supreme Court opinions and other developments in the criminal justice sys-
tem. The review commended the classic composition and painstaking crafts-
manship that went into the Standards; no major deficiencies or drastic need
15. The entire implementation process functioned under the guidance of H. Lynn Ed-
wards, then the ABA Staff Director of the Criminal Law Section.
1981]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
for amendments were revealed. The new committee concluded, however,
that such landmark Supreme Court decisions as Argersinger v. Hamlin, 16 Ga-
gnon v. Scarpelhi', 7 and Morrissey v. Brewer 18 called for several clarifying and
substantive amendments to the existing black letter standards.
Changes in black letter standards, with supporting commentary, were
prepared, but action to submit them to the House of Delegates for approval
was withheld for several reasons. First, the amendments would be of little
utility to the implementation effort unless there were means to make them
available to the holders of the original Standards which had been distributed
nationwide. Even if the mailing lists could be located and brought up to
date, budgetary limitations alone would have prevented such a distribution.
Second, by the mid-1970's, several other "standards" affecting criminal
justice procedure appeared, including the Uniform Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 19 the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, 20 and the re-
vised Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 2' promulgated by the United
States Supreme Court.
The ABA Criminal Justice Section, under the chairmanship of Alan Y.
Cole, made a comprehensive analysis of these "standards" and compared
them with the ABA Standards for CriminalJust'ce. Although the analysis iden-
tified conflicts between the ABA Standards and the other four publications, it
did not conclude which of the competing standards established the best
practice or procedure. Thus, the ABA's implementation effort was signifi-
cantly affected by a plethora of conflicting standards.
The second edition of the Standards attempts to eliminate this confusion.
Not all conflicts, however, have been eliminated because the task forces and
the Standing Committee did not always agree with the provisions of other
16. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Argersinger, the Court concluded that the sixth amendment
forbids imposing a prison or jail sentence on an indigent who has not been afforded the right to
counsel. Standard 4.1 of the first edition of the standards on Providing Defense Services re-
quired assistance of counsel in all cases punishable by loss of liberty "except those types of
offenses for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed." This provision left open the
possibility that a prison or jail term might be imposed even though the defendant was not
afforded the right to counsel. Standard 5-4.1 of the second edition now provides that counsel is
to be provided in all cases where the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment.
17. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Gagnon, the Court outlined due process requirements for the
revocation of probation, and included the right to counsel in certain situations. Included in
these procedures was a requirement for a two-stage procedure, namely, a preliminary hearing to
determine whether there was a violation of parole or probation provisions, and a final hearing
to consider not only this fact question, but if there was a violation, what to do about it. Stan-
dard 5.4 of the first edition of the standards on Probation had not clearly spelled out that a two-
stage procedure was required, nor did it address the question of right to counsel. Standard 18-
7.5 of the second edition included all of the due process requirements of Morrisey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 487 (1972), and Cagnon, plus the right to counsel in all cases. Standards, supra note 1, § 18-
7.5. Although this standard deals only with revocation of probation, it seems clear that revoca-
tion of parole should follow the same procedures.
18. 408 U.S. 487 (1972). In this case, the Court established detailed due process require-
ments for the revocation of parole.
19. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS, UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM R. CRIM. P. 412 (1974).
20. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3001 (1976).
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standards, goals, and codes. The Standing Committee adopted the policy of
citing applicable portions of related standards after each boldface standard.
Further, the commentary to the Standards discusses any conflict and the ra-
tionale for the adoption of the ABA standard when there was a conflict with
any of the related standards. In many cases the reporters drew extensively
on the provisions of related standards in revising the first edition. This was
particularly true with the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure. In adopt-
ing this policy of citing and discussing the related standards, the Standing
Committee intended to provide maximum guidance to legislatures and
courts of various jurisdictions in adopting their own code or rules of criminal
procedure.
It was impossible to maintain the credibility and the utility of the first
edition of the ABA Standards through piecemeal amendment, without assur-
ance that such amendments would find their way to the users. Moreover,
the presence of competing and conflicting standards convinced the commit-
tee that it should seek funds for a comprehensive revision of the original
Standards. These factors were buttressed by the fact that ten years had
elapsed since the original ABA Standards had been prepared. In addition, the
impact of Supreme Court decisions and new competing standards created a
need to assess the first edition's impact with data gained from such experi-
ments as pretrial release projects, speedy trial statutes and court rules, public
defender offices, and police legal adviser units.
II. CREATING THE SECOND EDITION
In December 1976, the Special Committee on the Administration of
Criminal Justice obtained Phase I funding from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA). Matching funds also were provided by
the American Bar Endowment.2 2 By the time the Standing Committee on
Association Standards for Criminal Justice was officially established, many
of the preliminary tasks of the updating project were well underway. A core
staff, task forces, and reporters had been recruited and oriented, and were
ready to function under the policy direction of the nine-member Standing
Committee. The Standing Committee had a balanced composition of de-
fense, prosecution, and judiciary representatives. The membership of each
of the five task forces appointed by the Standing Committee had a similar
composition. The ABA Adjunct Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press,
then operating under the ABA Standing Committee on Association Commu-
nications, served as a special task force to review and recommend changes in
the standards relating to Fair Trial and Free Press.
The task forces and reporters exercised wide discretion in carrying out
their assignments. A Standing Committee ground rule required one advo-
cating a change in a black letter standard to satisfy the Standing Committee
that the change was necessary. This rule was established in part to ensure
that the Committee fulfilled its duties by recommending necessary changes
22. Phase II funding necessary to complete the updating project was also a combination of
LEAA discretionary funds and matching grants from the American Bar Endowment.
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in or additions to the Standards, including changes needed to keep pace with
constitutional amendments, Supreme Court decisions, new ABA policies or
developments in criminal justice. The rule was formulated principally be-
cause the original Standards had proven their worth and established their
credibility in the marketplace. The rule therefore ensured that the Standards
would be modified only when necessary and desirable.
Some of the first edition Standards were not changed at all, many only
slightly modified, and a number substantially altered. The changes de-
pended on what had happened in the past ten years, what each task force
believed the present national norm should be, and what stylistic changes
were deemed appropriate.
The Standing Committee was determined to eliminate overlap and du-
plication within the second edition. The first edition was conceived and exe-
cuted as a compendium of individual standards volumes, drafted over a
period of some nine years. Each volume underwent lengthy circulation in
tentative draft form for comment and feedback. This was followed by re-
finement, presentation to the Board of Governors and House of Delegates,
debate, approval, and finally publication. Despite the circulation process,
the first edition contained a degree of overlap, duplication, and in some in-
stances inconsistencies. 23 The committee attempted to "purge" these dupli-
cations and inconsistencies in the second edition.
24
Because of the tight deadlines established by the LEAA in granting
funds for the project, it was clear that the second edition could not afford the
lengthy post-preparation review that played such an important role in the
23. An example of inconsistency is found in the volumes relating to Pleas of Guilty and the
Function of the Trial Judge on the question of judicial involvement in plea negotiations.
24. It was not always possible to eliminate all inconsistencies. The House of Delegates
acted on each chapter of the Standards separately and on one occasion, its action resulted in an
inconsistency, in philosophy at least, between the standards on Sentencing Alternatives and
Procedures and those on Appellate Review of Sentences. In August 1978, the House of Dele-
gates approved the latter standards, including provisions permitting the government to appeal
an excessively low sentence and the accused to appeal an excessively high sentence. However, in
February 1980, the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law recommended that the
House delete the provision permitting government appeals of low sentences. This recommenda-
tion was based partly on policy, and partly on the holding of the United States Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
The court of appeals held that government appeals of unjustly light sentences under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3576 (1976) violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. See Ad
Hoc Committee of Federal Criminal Code, Report on Govtement Appeal of Sentences, 35 Bus. LAW.
617 (1980) for a full report of the Section's position. The House approved this recommendation,
and the provision permitting government appeals was deleted from the standards on Appellate
Review of Sentences. Between these two actions of the House, however, the House had, in
August 1979, approved the standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, which con-
tained provisions .for an agency to establish sentencing guidelines for judges. The philosophy
underlying these provisions was that sentences which fell below the guidelines could be ap-
pealed by the government; if above the guidelines, the accused could appeal. This philosophy
was consistent with the 1978 action of the House approving the standards on Appellate Review
of Sentences, including the provision for government appeals. It is, however, inconsistent with
the 1980 House action deleting the provision for government appeals. It should be noted that
the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decision of the court of appeals, United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), and supported the position of the task force and Standing
Committee that government appeal of sentences in such cases did not violate the double jeop-
ardy clause.
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first edition. Recognizing the value of participation by national organiza-
tions interested in criminal justice improvement, the Standing Committee
announced its willingness to accept input at the outset. More than fifty or-
ganizations accepted the committee's invitation, 25 and some sent representa-
tives to meetings of the Standing Committee and its task forces. Other
groups, particularly those with large constituencies of ABA members as well
as specialized ABA sections and divisions, created special committees of their
own to examine the Standing Committee's recommendations. In somes in-
stances, these groups invited persons associated with the updating efforts to
meet with them as they considered areas of the Standards germane to their
organizations' interests. Participation by these groups was a valuable part of
the project, and enabled the Standing Committee to meet the deadlines im-
posed by the grant.
After the task forces had agreed on necessary changes, including textual
revisions of commentary to reflect primary and secondary authorities, the
drafts were then presented to the Standing Committee and ultimately to the
ABA House of Delegates. Each entity made the additional changes it
deemed appropriate. Ten of the revised sets of Standards, "chapters" in the
second edition terminology, were approved by the House of Delegates in
August 1978, six in February 1979, and the last one, Sentencing Alternatives
and Procedures, which incorporated the revised standards on probation, in
August 1979.26
Though changes were made during the revision, the significant change
in the format of the second edition is described in the introduction:
[T]he second edition is a multivolume loose-leaf compendium with
the sets of standards arranged as numbered chapters approximat-
ing the sequential order in which a case would proceed through the
criminal justice system-from the initial role of the police through
final postconviction remedies. Unlike the first edition, this loose-
leaf compendium will be periodically updated by supplements as
dictated by significant court decisions, important or widespread
statutory changes or changes in ABA policy .... 27
The ABA hopes that the second edition will have a significant impact
on the law. The New York Times noted the success of the implementation
effort: "In criminal law the Association's publication of Standards Relating
to the Administration of Criminal Justice [has] had an enormous impact on
the development of the law."'28 There are some concrete illustrations which
justify the Times' assessment:
25. Some of the organizations that attended were: the National District Attorneys Associa-
tion, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the American Probation and Parole
Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
26. See note I supra.
27. Standards, supra note 1, introduction at xvii-xviii. The second edition consists of a three
part format: (1) Histot of Standards, which contains the changes between the first and second
edition; (2) Related Standards, which provides a list of other nationally approved standards; and
(3) Commetary, which provides a current discussion of pertinent case law and statutory develop-
ments. Id.
28. Goldstein, American Bar Association is More or Less Ini&ential, N.Y. Times, November 20,
1977 § 4, at 16, col. 4.
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1. As of March 1981, according to Shepard's Criminal Justice Ci-
tations, the Standards have been cited more than 8,900 times by the
United States Supreme Court, federal courts, military courts, and
appellate courts in every state.
29
2. As of May 1980, thirty-six states had revised their criminal
codes, while four states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government had drafted revisions, three states were planning revi-
sions, and six states had drafted revisions which had been aborted.
Criminal code revision has been stressed as the means of imple-
menting the Standards, and the ABA Crimina/Justice Standards were
widely used in the revision efforts.
30
3. Every state has followed the implementation committee's rec-
ommendation to conduct a comparative analysis of state criminal
justice procedures in relation to the 476 policy recommendations of
the first edition black letter ABA Standards.3 ' The analysis enabled
each state to set priorities and goals consistent with budgetary re-
sources for overhauling its procedures.
Whether the second edition will fare as well in the marketplace as its
first edition predecessor will depend, in large part, on the efforts of the
Standing Committee. The Standing Committee, with the approval of the
Criminal Justice Section, was given the responsibility for all Standards imple-
mentation activities. With the sharp reduction of discretionary funds avail-
able from the LEAA, it is clear that the extensive and expensive first edition
implementation effort cannot be duplicated. There is, however, reason to
believe that such a costly effort will not be necessary.
Operating within its limited budget, the Standing Committee, working
through its Adjunct Committee on Implementation chaired by Deputy
Chief Justice Erickson, has taken steps to ensure that the second edition does
not languish on library shelves. For example, complimentary copies of the
four volume second edition were presented to the Chief Justice of each State
Supreme Court by the ABA State Delegate. Pictures of the presentation
ceremonies with explanatory stories appeared in many State Bar Journals
and newsletters. This program, guided jointly by the Standing Committee
and the Adjunct Committee on Implementation, ensured that both the judi-
ciary and the lawyers in each state became aware of the new second edition.
The Standing Committee is also encouraging the editors of leading law re-
views to publish articles about the Standards. This special Symposium Issue
of the Denver Law Journal is a prime example of how the second edition can
be brought to the attention of the legal profession.
Each jurisdiction must decide in what manner it will implement these
Standards, and to what degree. A jurisdiction can translate the Standards into
legislation and/or rules of court. The jurisdiction may also encourage its
judicial officers to use the Standards in deciding cases. These and other meth-
ods have been used in varying degrees in implementing the first edition of
the Standards in all states and in the federal system.
29. 6 Shepard's Criminal Justice Citations (Mar. 1981).
30. Records of the ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
31. Id.
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The judiciary's use of the Standards is the most effective and persuasive
implementation model. When courts cite the Standards they not only recog-
nize their utility, but they also implicitly encourage lawyers to employ the
Standards in preparing their cases and briefs. Thus, the ABA's distribution of
copies to the appellate courts should reap significant benefits.
The second edition preserves the guiding philosophy of the first edition,
a philosophy tested and proven over more than a decade of nationwide im-
plementation. The philosophy dictates that the Standards in the second edi-
tion are neither model codes nor rules, and hence are not drafted in such
language. Rather, they are guidelines and recommendations for legislatures,
courts, and practitioners. The Standards are action-oriented, practical guide-
lines, targeted at achieving a criminal justice system that is fair, balanced,
and constitutionally responsive to contemporary and future needs.
Continuous evaluation, adjustment, and change are vital characteristics
of a criminal justice system which effectively accommodates the dynamics of
growth and cultural evolution. The first edition formulated standards to
serve criminal justice needs as those needs were then perceived. In the inter-
vening years, changes emerged which warranted additional review and de-
velopment work. During the mid-1970's, the Special Committee monitoring
the Standards pinpointed several areas that justified the development of new
standards. One of these areas, the Legal Status of Prisoners, was presented
to the House of Delegates in February of 1981.
Plans for the development of several other standards chapters have been
approved by the Standing Committee, among them Urban Police Function
Part II (police discretion and the use of force) and the Charging Function
(prosecutorial discretion, including the grand jury). Full action to develop
these standards will be undertaken when project funding becomes available.
These new standards, like the Legal Status of Prisoners, will take their place
as full chapters in the second edition upon approval by the House of
Delegates.
Another burgeoning area of the law requiring attention, mental health
issues in criminal law, has become a major Standing Committee project and
ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards will therefore be developed.
III. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS PROJECT
For many years the American Bar Association has maintained an inter-
est in the field of mental health and its relationship to the law. The mentally
retarded, the mentally disabled, and the mentally diseased present special
problems for those charged with the administration of both civil and crimi-
nal law. Moreover, citizens who suffer from various forms of mental defect
have special legal needs. The ABA's interest in the field of mental health
was emphasized with the 1961 publication of the Mentally Disabled and the
Law by the American Bar Foundation. 32 That major study devoted a full
chapter to the subject of mental disability and the criminal law. Since its
32. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1961).
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original publication in 1961, the study has been updated and the American
Bar Foundation is now in the process of producing yet another revision.
Building upon the substantial research done by the American Bar
Foundation, the ABA created a Special Commission on the Mentally Dis-
abled in 1973. This fifteen-member commission is charged with the respon-
sibility for the review and evaluation of existing studies and materials on the
subject of mental disability.3 3 The Commission publishes the Mental Disa-
bility Law Reporter, a bi-monthly publication which provides comprehen-
sive coverage of all important issues in the rapidly expanding fields of mental
disability and developmental disability law. In 1977 and 1978, two special
issues of the Mental Disability Law Reporter were devoted to the publica-
tion of a series of articles dealing with a host of major criminal justice issues
in the mental health field. Those special articles dealt with incompetency to
stand trial on criminal charges, the insanity defense, mental health services
for prisoners, and civil commitment.
3 4
The birth and operation of the ABA's Commission on the Mentally Dis-
abled occurred during the time when the ABA was engaged in a massive
effort to update the first edition of the Standards. For the most part those
standards and the revised second edition remain silent on the major mental
health issues which cause continuing perplexity for all participants, actors,
and institutions engaged in the administration of criminal justice. While
some chapters of the second edition Standards make reference to mental
health matters, 35 the treatment these matters are accorded is minimal. For
some time the Standing Committee and its predecessor entities had recog-
nized the need to promulgate proposed criminal justice mental health stan-
dards for consideration by the ABA's House of Delegates. Nonetheless, a
comprehensive undertaking in this relatively uncharted area of the criminal
law was not possible while the Committee's energies were being devoted to
the major updating project. For all practical purposes that updating project
was completed in 1979 and, at that time, the Standing Committee began
work on the development of a plan to undertake a comprehensive criminal
justice mental health standards development program. A detailed and com-
prehensive project proposal was developed, and in February 1981 the Crimi-
nal Justice Mental Health Standards Project began in earnest. The project's
first phase is a fifteen-month effort which will end on April 30, 1982, and its
goal is to produce by that date "provisional" black letter standards in six
specific areas: 1) police encounters with mentally disabled persons; 2) in-
competency to stand trial; 3) nonresponsibility for crime; 4) special disposi-
tional statutes and mentally disabled convicts; 5) civil commitment of
prosecuted persons; and, 6) an examination of ethical and other guidelines
governing the role of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health
professionals in the criminal process. Each of the areas falls under the scru-
33. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 30 (1980-81).
34. 2 MENTAL DIsABILrY L. REP. 57-159, 615-78 (1977-78).
35. Se Standards,supra note 1, ch. 1 (Urban Police Function); ch. 3 (Prosecution Function);
ch. 4 (Defense Function); ch. 10 (Pretrial Release); ch. 11 (Discovery and Procedure Before
Trial); ch. 14 (Pleas of Guilty); ch. 15 (Trial by Jury); ch. 18 (Sentencing Alternatives and
Procedures); and ch. 21 (Criminal Appeals).
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tiny of one of the project's six task forces. Each task force is chaired by a
member of the Standing Committee and is served by a legal reporter and an
interdisciplinary membership.
The project operates under policy guidance of the ABA's nine-member
Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, and is
financed by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Founda-
tion. Six task forces have been assigned discrete jurisdictional areas. Those
areas and the key issues under examination within those areas are discussed
below.
Task Force One
This task force has been assigned the topic of police encounters with
mentally disabled persons. That title perhaps fails to do justice to the full
scope of this task force's inquiry. Key issues under consideration by the Po-
lice Task Force include: the extent to which explicit statutory authority
should grant police agencies express powers to detain mentally disturbed
persons, the specific criteria which must be met before police may take an
individual into custody because of mental illness, the extent to which aber-
rant behavior which is non-criminal, or, if criminal, merely disorderly,
should result in a non-custodial resolution, and the extent to which the cus-
tody of mentally ill law breakers should fall under the civil rather than the
criminal law. The Police Task Force will also examine desirable training
criteria-at least for large urban police departments-designed to provide
officers with the requisite background to enable them to recognize and cope
with the mentally ill in emergency situations.
Because of police response to mental health emergencies, the task force
will also consider the requisite characteristics of an emergency reception
center and the services that should be offered to persons referred to the
center by police. Finally, Task Force One will examine the extent to which
police officers would be provided with immunity from civil liability resulting
from their good faith actions in emergency mental health situations.
Task Force Two
Task Force Two has been assigned the topic of incompetency to stand
trial. This will be one of the project's most complex areas of inquiry. In
essence, Task Force Two will examine all issues relating to the question of a
defendant's competency or fitness to stand trial for the crime with which
that defendant has been charged.
First, Task Force Two will examine the responsibility of various parties
to the proceedings to raise the issue of competency. For example, the task
force will examine the ethical problems faced by both the defense and prose-
cution in raising the competency issue. Under certain circumstances, for in-
stance, a defense attorney may decide that his client is in fact incompetent,
but nonetheless determine that a trial on the merits, as opposed to a compe-
tency hearing, is in the client's best interest.
Second, the factual bases to be utilized by the court in ordering a com-
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petency examination will be considered. The task force will attempt to draft
a specific standard setting forth the criteria which should be used by the
court in determining the need for a diagnostic competency examination. A
host of issues will face the task force in this inquiry. For example, must a
defendant be committed or would a less restrictive bail procedure enable a
competency examination to take place on an out-patient basis? The task
force will also study issues regarding requisite qualifications of competency
examiners and consider whether a competency examination may be a "dual
purpose" examination.
The content of the competency examination and report will also be con-
sidered. In this area the task force will undertake an extensive review of
"present tests" and the reporting requirements under those tests. The goal of
the task force will be to construct a specific guideline setting forth areas
which must be addressed in a competency examination by the examining
experts. Part and parcel of this inquiry will be a specific delineation of nec-
essary treatment indicated by the examination. In accordance with Jackson v.
Indiana,36 the examining expert must render a prognosis concerning whether
the defendant will improve within a reasonable time. In addition, the task
force will also consider the relationship between an incompetency commit-
ment for treatment and civil commitment.
Task Force Two will also examine specific fifth and sixth amendment
rights as they relate to court-ordered competency examinations. For exam-
ple, to what extent does the right to counsel extend to the diagnostic exami-
nation and may counsel be an active participant rather than an observer? In
addition, issues of confidentiality will be reviewed and the task force will
examine such concomitant issues as psychiatric "Miranda" warnings and the
applicability of exclusionary rules related to information obtained during a
competency examination.
While exploring procedural and due process questions, the task force
will also attempt to draft guidelines for the actual hearing on the issue of
competency. Included in this area will be such issues as the necessity for a
formal hearing, the nature of evidence to be considered at such a hearing,
burden of proof requirements, treatment issues, and the actual content of a
judicial order adjudicating a defendant incompetent.
Post-incompetency commitment treatment will also be considered. The
task force will explore a defendant's right to appropriate treatment as well as
36. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). This case involved a deaf mute, Theon Jackson, who was charged
with robbery in the criminal court of Marion County, Indiana. He possessed virtually no com-
munications skills. As a result, the court held a competency hearing. At the hearing, two doc-
tors stated that Jackson would probably never learn to read or write. Subsequently, the trial
court ordered Jackson committed to a mental hospital until the hospital could certify that Jack-
son was sane. Jackson's attorney argued that committing Jackson to a mental hospital under
the circumstances was equivalent to a "life sentence" without the benefit of a trial. The attor-
ney also argued that this commitment violated Jackson's fourteenth amendment rights to due
process and equal protection.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court decision and held that Jackson could not con-
stitutionally be committed for an indefinite period of time because he was incompetent to stand
trial. Such a person can only be held until the state is able to determine whether it is probable
that the incompetent will attain competency in the future. If the person will not attain compe-
tency, civil proceedings which involve an indefinite commitment must be applied.
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a defendant's right to refuse treatment. Issues to be explored include an
examination of least restrictive alternative matters and the site of
hospitalization.
Finally, Task Force Two will examine issues regarding the duration of
commitment and the perplexing issues surrounding permanently incompe-
tent defendants.
Task Force Three
Task Force Three has been assigned the topic of nonresponsibility for
crime or, in other words, the insanity defense. Perhaps no issue in contempo-
rary criminal law has received as much recent public attention as the topic
of the insanity defense. Nonetheless, the major substantive issue confronting
Task Force Three lies at the heart of our notions about criminal law: blame-
worthiness. It is this fundamental question, the nature of legal guilt and
legal responsibility, which will be examined by Task Force Three. The Task
Force will concentrate on a variety of procedural issues connected with the
use of the insanity defense, such as notice requirements and sanctions for the
failure to comply with such requirements, and diagnostic examinations
sought by the defense and ordered by the court. In addition, the task force
will concentrate on discovery and privilege questions which arise from the
mental examination and, at the actual trial stage, attention will also be given
to issues involving the introduction of evidence of mental disorder and ques-
tions regarding the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion.
Finally, the task force will deliberate regarding jury instructions and forms
of the verdict.
Task Force Four
This task force will concentrate on special dispositional statutes and
mentally disabled convicts. The task force will undertake an examination of
the utility of special dispositional statutes presently in force throughout the
country, that is, sexual psychopath statutes. In addition, the task force will
examine the kinds of mental health treatment available to incarcerated
offenders.
First, Task Force Four will examine the application of special disposi-
tional statutes to persons subject to commitment thereunder because of the
type of crime they committed or because of their mental condition at time of
sentencing.
Second, the task force will develop guidelines for:
a.) the commitment of special defendants to mental health fa-
cilities for diagnosis, observation, and evaluation;
b.) the procedures which must be followed before an offender
may be committed under a special dispositional statute;
c.) the placement of offenders who have been found to fall
within the criteria of a special dispositional statute; and,




In addition, guidelines delineating the rights of persons committed under
special dispositional statutes and guidelines defining the levels and extent of
judicial oversight for such individuals will be developed.
The task force will also consider a number of specific areas regarding
mentally disabled convicts. Those areas included development of criteria
and procedures for the transfer of mentally disabled offenders from correc-
tional institutions to mental health facilities and back to a correctional set-
ting. Guidelines regarding the status and rights of prisoners who have been
transferred to mental health facilities and the effect of such a transfer on
eligibility for parole or other release will also be developed. Task Force Four
will also create guidelines regarding the appropriate administration of
mental health facilities providing treatment for inmates. Finally, the devel-
opment of standards governing the civil commitment of prisoners at the ex-
piration of their sentence will be considered.
Task Force Five
This task force will devote its attention to the civil commitment of
prosecuted persons. The work of this task force will focus on such issues as
examination of interim custody and the disposition of a criminal defendant
immediately after that defendant's acquittal by reason of insanity. For ex-
ample, the task force will consider the duration of interim custody prior to
the time that a commitment hearing must be held. In addition, this inquiry
will attempt to determine whether habeas corpus rights apply and whether
Miranda rights apply.
Also, Task Force Five will concentrate on the development of standards
for commitment of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. The
task force will examine what presumptions arise from a successful insanity
defense, what substantive criteria should be established for commitment,
which party bears the burden of proof in the commitment proceeding, and
what that standard of proof should be.
Guidelines governing commitment hearing procedures will also be es-
tablished. The issues will include requisite notice to the defendant, the ex-
tent to which a right to counsel applies, the extent to which a defendant is
entitled to expert witnesses, and the extent to which hearsay and other evi-
dentiary rules and the privilege against self-incrimination apply.
Guidelines will also be developed regarding the duration of confine-
ment of defendants committed following a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity
verdict. The task force will consider the relationship between the period of
commitment and the potential sentence for the crime with which the defend-
ant was charged. Moreover, the task force will consider requirements for the
periodic review of the patient's commitment and whether the patient may
initiate that review. Procedures for the conditional release of committed
persons, requirements for notification about that release, and the disposition
of committed persons who have completed treatment but whose release is
opposed by the courts will also be examined.
Task Force Five will create guidelines governing civilly committed per-
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sons who have pending criminal prosecutions awaiting the outcome of their
mental health treatment. The task force will attempt to determine whether
such patients should be treated under ordinary civil commitment proceed-
ings. In addition, issues regarding notice of release, power to release, and
procedures for dropping criminal prosecution upon successful completion of
treatment will be examined.
Finally, guidelines should be developed concerning defendants found
incompetent to stand trial who cannot be restored to competency within a
reasonable period of time. 37 The task force will examine whether there are
persuasive and constitutionally permissible reasons for treating such defend-
ants differently from those who face civil commitment.
Task Force Six
This task force is charged with the responsibility for examining the ethi-
cal guidelines governing the role in the criminal process of psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, and community mental health staff members. The task force will
therefore explore the fundamental relationships between mental health pro-
fessionals and their individual and institutional counterparts within the
criminal justice system. This is an especially sensitive and challenging topic.
The task force will attempt to delineate specifically the roles which mental
health professionals should play at the pretrial, trial, and post-trial stages of
the criminal process.
Traditionally, mental health professionals called as experts in criminal
law matters have been psychiatrists. Nonetheless, this task force will attempt
to promulgate guidelines which would provide for the participation of psy-
chologists and other non-psychiatrists as experts.
Moreover, the task force will devote considerable attention to matters
involving interdisciplinary communication within the criminal justice sys-
tem. The purpose of this inquiry is to develop guidelines to assist mental
health professionals in the acquisition of a full understanding of their role as
experts and consultants within the criminal justice system. Concomitantly,
an attempt will be made to promulgate guidelines which will assist attorneys
and other officers of criminal justice institutions in their interactions with,
and understanding of, the role and function of mental health professionals.
Thus, the task force will focus attention on the need for standards of profes-
sional responsibility and performance, interdisciplinary training and cooper-
ative problem-solving, and a delineation of the responsibilities of mental
health institutions.
Because of the nature of this undertaking it is imperative that the task
forces be interdisciplinary in character. That goal has already been achieved
and forty-two task force members have been appointed. Eight psychiatrists,
five psychologists and one medical doctor currently serve on the project. In
addition, each task force is served by at least one member of the ABA's Com-
mission on the Mentally Disabled. Finally, many of the lawyer members of




mental health law issues. This heavy emphasis on the involvement of mental
health professionals recognizes the fact that the eventual promulgation of
standards within this area requires the full participation of psychiatrists and
psychologists. The need for interdisciplinary involvement with the Criminal
Justice Standards' development was made more than evident when the Stand-
ing Committee undertook the task of proposing legal status of prisoners stan-
dards to the ABA's House of Delegates in 1979. Substantial opposition to
those standards was generated by the corrections profession, and the failure
to involve that profession during the initial stages of the standards develop-
ment work resulted in substantial delays. To remedy that kind of oversight,
the Standing Committee has provided for the participation of mental health
professionals in its current project at the outset. That participation is more
than cosmetic and the project's Joint Advisory Committee, in addition to its
three members from the Standing Committee, has three representatives who
have substantial mental health backgrounds. One, Dr. Bernard Diamond, is
a distinguished forensic psychiatrist; another, John McNeill Smith, is a law-
yer who serves as chairman of the ABA's Commission on the Mentally Dis-
abled; and the third, Professor Norval Morris, is a distinguished law
professor and former law dean whose wide-ranging dissertations on the crim-
inal law include a keen interest in the relationships between law and
psychiatry.
By April 30, 1982 the Standing Committee on Association Standards
for Criminal Justice will complete Phase I of this project. The work product
will consist of provisional black letter standards and supporting legal memo-
randa. Those professional standards will represent the initial interdiscipli-
nary decisions of the project's six task forces. While these professional
standards will not represent the views of the American Bar Association, they
will provide the basis for a more concentrated Phase II activity which, by
August 1984, will produce final and voluminous recommendations for for-
mal consideration by the ABA's House of Delegates. The Phase II Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards Project, should it succeed in obtaining
funding, will rely heavily upon the participation of mental health profes-
sional organizations as well as upon the continued participation of individ-
ual psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health professionals.
CONCLUSION
The Standing Committee believes that the second edition of the ABA
Standards for CnminalJusti'ce is a worthy successor to the original Standards.
The second edition preserves and enhances the high quality of the first edi-
tion and represents a just balance between the dynamic and sometimes con-
flicting goals of effective administration of criminal justice: a proper regard
for the constitutional rights of the accused and the protection of society. The
format of the second edition will permit periodic revision to ensure its con-
tinued viability, and the second edition should enjoy the same wide accept-
ance as its predecessor. It should continue to bring great credit to the ABA
for its enlightened leadership in pioneering the development of CriminalJus-
tice Standards when the need was so great, and for the unwavering support of
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its handiwork ever since. This brief description of the evolution of the ABA
Standards will hopefully demonstrate for the reader the extent to which the
Standards represent an association-wide undertaking which has distilled the
learning and experience of the legal profession and which demonstrates
clearly our profession's dedication to fair and effective administration of the
law in the service of the public.

A COMPARISON OF THE FIRST AND SECOND




In today's milieu of commercial hucksters' overkill of the label "New
and Improved," there is an understandable hesitancy to undertake a com-
parison of a first and second edition of a product, notwithstanding the fact
that the second edition may reflect many legitimate changes both new and
definitely improved. The average consumer has become callous and his
skepticism heightened by too many commercial products hardly born before
being replaced in kind by a successor, usually distinguishable only by a
dressed-up package prominently bearing the label "New and Improved."
Sadly enough, in too many instances the consumer is left confused and disil-
lusioned as to precisely what makes these "new and improved" versions
meaningfully different from what they replace.
The American Bar Association's Standards for Cr'minalJusti'ce I (Standards)
are not in commercial competition with anyone or anything. Rather,- as
more fully explained in one of the companion articles in this symposium, the
Standards exemplify a public service motivated by a mammoth commitment
of time, money, and personnel to pioneer, publish, implement, and keep up
to date a complete set of standards relating to the entire spectrum of the
administration of criminal justice.
The second edition truly represents many major improvements over the
first. For one thing, it has a greatly revised format, comprising both utilita-
rian and stylistic revisions. The Standards were intended as valuable tools to
assist in comprehending and participating in the improvement of criminal
justice, and the changes will make the Standards more comprehensible and
useful to laymen and professionals alike. These nonsubstantive changes are
* Mr. Edwards received an A.B. degree (Phi Beta Kappa) from Dickinson College,
earned his J.D. degree (Order of Coil) at the Dickinson School of Law, and is a member of the
bars of Pennsylvania and District of Columbia. Mr. Edwards retired from the staff of the Amer-
ican Bar Association in 1980 after service as the Director of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section
and as Director of the ABA's Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice. Prior to his affiliation with the ABA Mr. Edwards spent 26 years with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation where he held a variety of executive legal positions. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Sandra Lee Thomas, Esquire. Ms. Thomas is a an
laud graduate of Boston University and earned her law degree at Georgetown University. She
is a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia.
The author thanks the staff of the Standing Committee on Association Standards for Crim-
inal Justice for their assistance and acknowledges his reliance on the Commentary to the STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. He also expresses his appreciation to the American Bar
Association and to Little, Brown and Company for their copyright permission.
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fully explained in the introduction to the four-volume set, and are summa-
rized in this symposium's initial article, which chronicles the history and
evolution of the project.
Also, the second edition contains many substantive changes. These
evolved from a thorough evaluation of the entire bold-face text of the first
edition as well as its rich and extensive supporting commentary. More than
a decade had passed since many of the first edition's volumes had been
finally approved and published. Given the dynamic nature of criminal jus-
tice in the decades of the 1960's and 1970's, it is little wonder that the task
forces were confronted with a multitude of appellate court opinions and new
philosophical insights. Add to these the practical experience garnered from
almost ten years of nationwide implementation coordinated by the ABA's
Criminal Justice Section, supplemented by feedback from many experimen-
tal and research projects initiated or stimulated in whole or in part by the
influence of the Standards. Finally, the second edition represents a significant
degree of confirmation and fine-tuning of an impressive number of concepts
that were innovative or tentative in the original product, yet withstood the
rigid stresses of time and testing, and merited restatement with only the com-
mentary updated.
The major substantive changes will be the focus of this article. This
task will be massive, requiring a broad-brush treatment in many areas. In
certain categories, where particularly complex issues or unsettled problems
are undergoing intensive national debate or litigation, the substantive stan-
dards relevant to such will be covered in depth in companion articles in this
symposium issue. I trust the overall result will reaffirm the established clas-
sic stature of the ABA Standards for Cn'mtnalJustice, thus vindicating the confi-
dence of the first edition's host of adherents and winning new converts to the
second edition.
I. CHAPTER 1-THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION
This set of standards-the last of the original eighteen sets to be ap-
proved (1973)---constitutes the first chapter in the revised format. The ra-
tionale for the change in sequence of the chapters is that the chapters should
be arranged in the order in which a case would proceed through the criminal
justice system-from the initial involvement of the police through final post-
conviction remedies.
Despite the increasingly critical role of the police and escalating na-
tional concern about crime, few major substantive changes were warranted
in this chapter. As will be seen, even those additions built upon foundations
solidly laid in the original work.
Standard 1-3.5, entitled "Developing Alternative Responses," reads as
follows:
The development of alternatives to investigation, arrest, and
prosecution should be the responsibility of the entire community
and not of the police alone. However, the police should inform the
community of the need for such alternatives within their area of
responsibility. The choice among alternative responses should be
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based on a careful assessment of effectiveness in dealing with social
problems.
The entire standard is new. Examples of situations where police in-
volvement may not be the best way to respond include problems with the
chronic alcoholic, the mentally disturbed, or parties to domestic disputes; yet
these are among the high-volume social problems which have been tradition-
ally relegated to the police to handle under their general authority to re-
spond to complaints and make arrests. More often than not, the police have
become dumping grounds for such social problems simply because more en-
lightened and effective alternative solutions have not been sought.
It has become clear that police alone cannot successfully handle all so-
cial problems. To illustrate, well intentioned experiments for police referral
of alcoholics to detoxification centers as an alternative to the all too familiar
turnstile justice have failed because some treatment centers have imposed on
the police highly selective requirements that have limited referrals to a small
fraction of the total volume, simply because the treatment centers wanted
only the best prospects for rehabilitation. Other failures have resulted be-
cause detoxification centers were located too far from the police stations that
were to utilize them. In still another example, involving battered wives,
New York City initiated a Family Crisis Intervention Project, but it led to a
lawsuit by wives against the police department, alleging that police were
failing to respond to their requests for protection from assaultive husbands-
that instead of making arrests, police were referring complaints to agencies
in accordance with the project which was predicated upon noncriminal
handling.
Although this single new standard is but a fraction of the entire chapter,
its implementation holds enormous promise of economies and relief for over-
worked, undermanned police; raises expectations of improved allocation of
scarce resources of state and local governments facing impossible budget
problems; and points the way for cooperative planning and meaningful in-
volvement of community leaders and human resource agencies in devising
more permanent solutions to high-volume social problems that are not really
criminal.
Standard 1-5.3, entitled "Sanctions," has been amended substantially,
in that paragraph (b) has been amended to read as follows:
(b) Legislatures should clarify the authority of police agencies
to develop substantive and procedural rules controlling police au-
thority-particularly regarding investigatory methods, the use of
force, and enforcement policies-and creating methods for discov-
ering and dealing with abuses of that authority. Where adequate ad-
ministrative sanctions are in efect, evidence obtained in violation of
administrative rules should not be excluded in criminal proceedings.
The italicized portion is new, and represents an effort in the second edition
to provide a practical alternative to the exclusionary rule except in instances
where the court's examination of the circumstances cannot overcome the un-
constitutional taint on the evidence.
As the commentary to standard 1-5.3 reflects, the Supreme Court in
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recent years has refused to expand the exclusionary rule; to the contrary, a
number of decisions have restricted its applicability, while retaining the ba-
sic doctrine. At the same time, the Court has permitted the clear inference
that it would consider meaningful alternatives. Thus, the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) urged that the search for alternatives be given a high
priority.
2
Both the first and second editions of the Urban Police Function Stan-
dards recognize that the hope of successfully controlling the evil that gener-
ated the exclusionary rule lies in guiding and governing the exercise of police
discretion. Despite the undisputed logic and basic soundness of the thesis
presented by the Standards, progress in the form of visible action by courts,
legislatures, and even police departments has been lamentably slow. Judges
tend to focus in suppression issues only on the actions of the officers rather
than the policy--or lack thereof-of the department relating to the action;
yet there is precedent where the court did go behind the action and con-
cluded that the police department had established guidelines for the officers
which the court accepted as "a careful and commendable administrative ef-
fort . . . ."3 In another case, the refusal of the Court to examine the consti-
tutionality of New York's stop-and-frisk statute, and to confine itself solely to
the officer's actions, may have discouraged legislative efforts to enact stan-
dards for police investigative methods.
4
Legislatures need to persist in taking proper initiatives to encourage po-
lice in the rule-making process. Where there might be police hesitancy be-
cause of uncertainty as to whether police have the authority, legislation
should be passed to clarify the issue, setting benchmarks as needed, and pro-
viding for periodic review.
In the final analysis, police administrators must overcome a traditional
reluctance to formulate and articulate administrative policies covering the
exercise of police discretion as officers confront the myriad problems in inves-
tigations, interrogations, arrests, searches and seizures, and identifications.
An essential part of these policies is a fair set of procedures for ensuring
accountability of police officers to the department and the public for their
actions. The Standards also outline the need for positive approaches to com-
plement sanctions as aids and inducements to control police practices.
Approval by the American Law Institute of the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure5 is an encouraging example of an attempt to find an
alternative to the exclusionary rule. The Model Code, in simplistic terms,
proposes that a motion to suppress be granted only if the violation was "sub-
stantial," or if exclusion is otherwise constitutionally required. As to
whether a violation is substantial, the Model Code provides as one of the
criteria: "whether there ir a generally #ctve system of administrative or other sanc-
tions which makes it less important that exclusion be used to deter such violations. "6
2. ABA REPORT OF POUND CONFERENCE FoLLow-up TASK FORCE (1976).
3. United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (pertaining to pretrial
identification procedures).
4. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
5. ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975).
6. Id § 150.3(3)(e) (emphasis added).
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Although the ABA has not taken an official position on the Model Code, the
Code's recognition of the concept of administrative regulations and sanctions
in relation to the exclusionary rule should provide additional incentives to
courts, legislatures, and the police to implement the concept recommended
in the Standards.
II. CHAPTER 2-ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The first edition of these standards was approved in 1971. They were
formulated contemporaneously with congressional consideration of legisla-
tion which was enacted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,7 commonly referred to as the federal wiretap act. The
first edition closely parallels Title III, but, like all of the standards, is also
intended to provide suggested guidelines for state and local jurisdictions as
well as the federal government.
These standards and Title III have both withstood constitutional and
other challenges in the intervening years. With some exceptions, the second
edition is substantially a restatement of the first, but much stronger because
of confirming and interpretative case law, plus an extensive evaluation of
Title III by the National Wiretapping Commission.8
The pervading theme of the second edition continues to be two-fold:
assisting law enforcement and protecting privacy. Considering the fact that
the Electronic Surveillance Standards and Title III both represented a fron-
tier-clearing effort in a veritable thicket of uncharted legal terrain, the find-
ings of the Commission were a gratifying credit to the structure and
functioning of both.
In formulating the second edition, the decision was made not to include
new standards covering the use of pen registers and similar devices which
record numbers dialed from a monitored phone without intercepting conver-
sations. Rather, the standards were limited to conversations.
One amendment in the second edition was to change the title of Part III
of the Standards from "National Security" to "Surveillance Related to For-
eign Intelligence Activities." This was done to identify more accurately the
precise scope of the standard and reflect the distinction made in United States
v. United States District Court9 (commonly known as the Keith case). In Keith,
the Supreme Court held that the warrant requirements of the fourth amend-
ment applied to electronic surveillance conducted against domestic organi-
zations that have no direct or indirect involvement with a foreign power. In
the interim between the approval of the first and second editions, the For-
eign Intelligence Security Act of 1978 was enacted, establishing procedures
similar to Title III for judicially supervised electronic surveillance involving
foreign security. 10
Standard 2-5.2, dealing with emergency surveillance, was amended to
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
8. NATIONAL WIRETAPPING COMMISSION REPORT (1976).
9. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
10. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1976).
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limit its use to situations "involving substantial and imminent danger to
human life"; thus there was deleted an implicit authorization for emergency
installations in covering meetings characteristic of organized crime as being
too vague and susceptible of abuse by law enforcement officers who should
normally have time to obtain a court order.
Standard 2-5.3 covers the application for an electronic surveillance or-
der. One change in the second edition is to require "a full and complete
statement of other investigative procedures that have been tried and have
failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous."' I Another is to require "a statement of the need for telephone
or telegraph companies, landlords, custodians, or other persons to furnish
information, facilities, or technical assistance, if such is necessary in the exe-
cution of the order."' 2 The first was designed to conform to the basic re-
quirement of probable cause (Standard 2-5.4). The second tracked a 1970
amendment to Title 11113 resulting from the opinion in In re Applicaton of
United States14 holding that telephone company cooperation could not be
compelled by judicial order absent statutory authority.
Another substantive change in the second edition was made in standard
2-5.9 pertaining to extensions. The provision in the first edition authorizing
extensions of initial surveillance orders for not longer than thirty days was
changed to fifteen days; inasmuch as the Standards place a fifteen-day limit
on initial orders, 15 logic would argue against granting more time for an
extension.
Standard 2-5.10, relating to privileged communications, contains a
change of substance from the first edition to expand the scope of the stan-
dard to include all professionals whose conversations are deemed privileged
under applicable state law. Thus it serves as a guideline to correspond with
the expansion of the concept and protections of privileged communications.
III. CHAPTER 3-THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
When the first edition of the Prosecution Function Standards was
adopted by the Association in 1971, it represented the first national effort to
compile uniform guidelines for the professional conduct of prosecuting attor-
neys. The standards contained in the first edition did no more than codify
standards of conduct which were already adhered to by the best advocates,
both prosecution and defense, throughout the country.
Although promulgating and enforcing professional standards are clearly
matters that must be handled by the individual jurisdiction, a national or-
ganization such as the ABA is in an ideal position to establish recommended
standards of conduct to guide the individual jurisdictions as well as individ-
ual practitioners. The standards relating to the prosecution and defense
11. STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 2-5.3(i).
12. Id § 2-5.3(k).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1976).
14. 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970).
15. STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 2-5.8.
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functions, along with the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 16 are just
such guidelines. In the decade of their existence the prosecution function
standards have become the basic ethical guidelines relied on by many
prosecutors.
In preparing the second edition of these standards the ABA reviewed
court decisions and recommendations of other organizations and concluded
that the standards required no fundamental alteration. There are, of course,
changes in the second edition reflecting both evolving concepts of what is
appropriate behavior and significant court decisions affecting this area.
The first of the revised standards (3-1.1), which contains only stylistic
changes from the first edition, outlines the function of the prosecutor and his
or her role as "both an administrator of justice and an advocate." The stan-
dard states that "the duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict." These phrases highlight the important role of the prosecutor as an
officer of the court charged with protecting the rights of the accused as well
as enforcing the rights of the public.
1 7
Standard 3-1.3, dealing with public statements, contains a new para-
graph, 3-1.3(c), which provides that the prosecutor and the police should
cooperate in complying with the chapter on Fair Trial and Free Press in
order to assure a fair trial for the accused.
Standard 3-2.5 reflects a change in policy recommended by the ABA to
permit public access to the "office handbook," except to confidential por-
tions. The handbook is a statement of policies and procedures which should
be kept within each prosecutor's office to promote continuity and clarity of
functioning. Such a handbook would include current rules, statutes, and
judicial decisions, along with detailed descriptions of the criteria governing
the principal duties of the office and standards pertaining to the exercise of
discretion. Standard 3-3.2 deals with the prosecutor's relations with pro-
spective witnesses. Like its predecessor, it proscribes compensation of wit-
nesses (other than experts) for giving testimony, but authorizes
reimbursement of a witness for reasonable expenses, including transportation
and loss of income. Unlike the first edition, this section authorizes reim-
bursement not only for court appearance but also for "attendance for deposi-
tions pursuant to statute or court rule, or attendance for pretrial
interviews." 18 A more important change in this section replaces the first edi-
tion statement that "it is proper but not mandatory" for a prosecutor to
caution a witness concerning possible self-incrimination (whenever there is
reason to believe the witness may be the subject of a criminal prosecution)
with the stricture that a prosecutor "should" so advise a witness. 1 9 This situ-
ation does not constitute "custodial interrogation," which would trigger the
constitutional requirement of such a warning, 20 but the Association has con-
16. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1969).
17. Set id, EC 7-13.
18. The same change has been made in the standards on the Defense Function 4-4.3(a).
19. Cf § 4-4.3(b) ("It is not necessary for the lawyer or the lawyer's investigator, in inter-
viewing a prospective witness, to caution the witness concerning possible self-incrimination and
the need for counsel.").
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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cluded that fairness to the witness requires more than the minimum actually
imposed by law.
A new section has been added to standard 3-3.4, which states that
"[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, no arrest warrant or search warrant
should issue without the approval of the prosecutor." In approving similar
provisions in the National Prosecution Standards, 2 ' the National District At-
torneys Association noted that "[tihe role of the prosecutor is most apparent
in determining whether probable cause exists in preparation of search and
arrest warrants. Review of all applications for warrants prior to their sub-
mission for judicial approval could enhance the efficiency of the criminal
justice process." '22 "Exceptional circumstances" might exist, for example, if
a prosecutor were unavailable at a time when a warrant had to issue
immediately.
A change in standard 3-3.6(b) would amend the duty of the prosecutor
to present exculpatory, as well as incriminating, evidence to a grand jury.
The first edition required the prosecutor to "disclose to the grand jury any
evidence which he knows will tend to negate guilt." Under the revision,
"[n]o prosecutor should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence
which will tend substantially to negate guilt." This change was made to
conform this section to the grand jury standards which were approved by the
ABA House of Delegates in 1977.2
3
Standard 3-3.11 (a), like standard 3-3.6, deals with required disclosure of
exculpatory evidence, but in the context of disclosure to the defense rather
than the grand jury. This paragraph classifies as "unprofessional conduct"
the intentional failure of a prosecutor to disclose to the defense the existence
of evidence which would tend to negate the guilt or reduce the punishment
of the accused. 24 The word "intentional" was added in the second edition.
The definition of what constitutes exculpatory material is adopted from the
decision of the Supreme Court in Brady V. Mary/and.25 The standard adopts
the suggestion of the Supreme Court that "the prudent prosecutor will re-
solve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."
'26
Part IV of these standards concerns the role of the prosecutor in plea
discussions. Standard 3-4.1 remains largely unchanged from the first edi-
tion, though paragraph (b) has been amended to include a recommendation
that a prosecutor make and preserve a verbatim record of plea discussions
with a defendant who has waived counsel. The first edition simply stated
that a prosecutor would be "well advised" to make sure that another attor-
ney was present at such discussion. The requirement of a verbatim record is
a more efficient means of protecting the rights of the defendant and protect-
21. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STAN-
DARDS § 7.3(a)-.3(b).
22. Id § 7.3, commentary at 116.
23. Se Report with Recommendations to American Bar Association, 1977 Annual Meet-
ing, Report 115. The standards relating to the charging process (including grand jury), when
drafted and approved, will become Chapter 9 of the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
24. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-103(B) contains a similar provi-
sion but extends it to evidence that tends to "mitigate the degree of the offense."
25. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
26. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
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ing the prosecutor from charges of exerting undue influence in a situation
which obviously involves very unequal bargaining positions.
27
The first edition standard 4.2 has been deleted following the Supreme
Court decision in North Carolina v. A/ford.28 The deleted standard provided
that a prosecutor could not participate in a disposition by guilty plea if the
prosecutor was aware that the accused persisted in denying guilt or the fac-
tual basis for the plea. The Court in 4/ford held that a guilty plea can be
accepted by a court even when the defendant denies guilt so long as the plea
is voluntarily and intelligently made.
Revised standard 3-4.2 (which appeared as 4.3 in the first edition) con-
tains two substantive changes. Paragraph (b) now states that it is "unprofes-
sional conduct" for a prosecutor to imply greater power to influence the
disposition of a case than he or she actually possesses. The first edition states
only that a prosecutor "should avoid" such implication.
The other change in this section was mandated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Santobe/lo v. New York. 29 Paragraph (c) in the first edition permit-
ted breach of a plea agreement by a prosecutor "unable to fulfill an under-
standing previously agreed upon," provided prompt notice was given to the
defendant. In Santobello the Supreme Court held that when the prosecutor
had breached an agreement to make no recommendation respecting sen-
tence, the defendant was entitled either to withdraw the plea or to be resen-
tenced. Failure to honor such an agreement casts doubt on the voluntariness
of the guilty plea and may result in fundamental unfairness to the defend-
ant. Such a breach would, under the second edition, subject the prosecutor
to discipline by a professional association. Failure to comply with the agree-
ment would be permitted, however, if the defendant fails to comply or if
"other extenuating circumstances are present" (for example, discovery of
new facts by the prosecutor).
Standard 3-5.7, on the examination of witnesses, has been amended by
changing the basis a prosecutor must have for belief in the factual predicate
implied in questions asked of a witness. Paragraph (d) of the first edition
states: "It is unprofessional conduct to ask a question which implies the
existence of a factual predicate which the examiner knows he cannot support by
evidence." The revision would replace the italicized portion of paragraph (d)
with "for which a good faith belief is lacking," a less stringent standard.
The last substantial change in this chapter is contained in Part VI on
sentencing and concerns the role of the prosecutor at sentencing. The re-
vised standard 3-6.1 presents the modern view that a prosecutor should, and
in some cases must, offer a sentencing recommendation to the court. The
previous standard stated that the prosecutor "ordinarily should not" make
such a recommendation unless asked by the court or obligated by a plea
agreement to do so.
27. Standard 14-3.1(a) contains the identical suggestion.
28. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
29. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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IV. CHAPTER 4-THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
The roles played by defense counsel exemplify some of the major diffi-
culties inherent in our adversary system ofjustice. As a "servant of two mas-
ters" the defense attorney must often tread a narrow path between
jeopardizing the interests of the defendant and failing to fulfill professional
obligations as an officer of the court. The ambiguity is summed up in Canon
7 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: "A lawyer should repre-
sent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
An interesting example of the most extreme form the conflict can take
appears in standard 4-7.7, concerning testimony by the defendant. The
standards currently contain no final policy on this matter, as the ABA House
of Delegates was unable to reach a consensus on what position to take with
respect to the duties of a defense attorney whose client wishes to present
perjured testimony. A full, scholarly, and insightful analysis of the profes-
sional dilemma posed by the perjurious client is set forth by Justice William
Erickson in another section of this symposium.
Most criminal cases-as many as ninety-five percent in some jurisdic-
tions-do not go to trial, so a large part of d counsel's professional
attention should go toward ameliorating th condition of the accused outside
the courtroom. Before trial, for example, defense counsel can play a signifi-
cant part in helping an accused maintain employment and other stabilizing
relationships; in plea discussions which result in disposition without a trial
the role of defense counsel can be critical.
Standard 4-1.1, which contains a general outline of the role of defense
counsel, remains essentially unchanged from the first edition. The basic
thrust of the section is to emphasize the obligations of defense attorneys to
maintain the ethical standards required by the profession and not to com-
promise those standards even in the service of a client.
Standard 4-3.5 presents guidelines on handling potential conflicts of in-
terest with which defense attorneys may be faced. Paragraph (b) deals with
the problem of representing more than one defendant. Ordinarily a lawyer
(or lawyers associated in practice) should not represent more than one de-
fendant in a criminal case. In "unusual situations" such multiple representa-
tion may be permissible, but only after careful investigation has revealed: 1)
that no conflict is likely; 2) that all defendants have given informed consent;
and 3) that their consent is made a matter of judicial record. This last re-
quirement was added in the second edition following the Supreme Court
decision in Holloway v. Arkansas.30 There the Court held that although joint
representation is not prohibited, whenever impermissible joint representa-
tion occurs reversal is automatic and no particularized showing of prejudice
is required. This avoids having to make difficult judgments on the actual
impact of conflicts of interest on the representation of a client. The ABA
standard has dealt with this problem by involving the trial judge in the ini-
tial determination of the permissibility of multiple representation. After re-
quiring that consent be made a matter of judicial record, the standard goes
30. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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on to spell out the duties of the trial judge in establishing that consent of the
defendant is truly informed, that is, that the defendant understands the po-
tential for conflict. In some cases, the standard continues, accepting or con-
tinuing employment by more than one defendant is "unprofessional
conduct."
Standard 4-4.3 concerns relations of defense counsel with prospective
witnesses. Like the corresponding section in the Standards relating to the
prosecution function, paragraph (a) now authorizes reimbursement of ex-
penses to witnesses for specified appearances other than in court. A more
significant change in this standard appears in paragraph (b), which concerns
the obligation of a defense lawyer to caution a prospective witness concern-
ing possible self-incrimination and concerning the need for prospective wit-
ness counsel. Original paragraph (b) stated that it was "proper but not
mandatory" for defense counsel to give such advice; the revised standard
states that "lilt is not necessary" to do so. The ABA has concluded that the
giving of such a warning is inconsistent with the duties of a lawyer to a client
as it may have the result of discouraging the witness from speaking with the
defense attorney. The obligation of a prosecutor in this situation is distinctly
different from that of defense counsel; 31 unlike defense counsel, a prosecutor
cannot conceal information concerning law violations and must therefore
take more care to protect the rights of the witness as potential defendant.
While the decision to plead is ultimately for the accused, the so-called
A/ford plea has altered defense counsel's obligations under the Standards.
Standard 5.3 from the first edition has been deleted. That first edition stan-
dard required a defense attorney to notify the court in the event that a de-
fendant insisted on pleading guilty despite the existence of facts which
negated guilt. After the first edition was approved, however, the Supreme
Court decided North Carolina v. 4ford,3 2 which made it clear that a trial court
may accept a guilty plea even though a defendant claims innocence. Failure
of defense counsel to reveal the defendant's private claim of innocence
should not produce a different result. Furthermore, such a revelation will
undoubtedly damage the attorney's relationship with his or her client. As a
matter of practice, it is believed that adherence to original standard 5.3 by
defense counsel was virtually nonexistent.
Standard 4-6.1 deals with the important area of defense counsel's duty
to explore disposition without trial. Paragraph (b) has been amended and
no longer requires the conclusion by counsel that "conviction is probable"
before plea discussions are begun. There may be advantages to the defend-
ant from disposition of a case without trial, and the initiation of discussions
early in the proceedings may result in swift disposition, which is beneficial to
all parties. This paragraph continues the requirement, contained in para-
graph (c) of the first edition, that "ordinarily" the consent of the defendant
should be obtained before plea discussions are engaged in, since the decision
31. See discussion of companion standard 3-3.2 relating to the Prosecution Function p. 31
upra .
32. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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of whether to accept a plea is ultimately one to be made by the defendant.3 3
Another addition to this section is the statement that "[u]nder no circum-
stances should a lawyer recommend . . . acceptance of a plea unless a full
investigation and study of the case has been completed."
Standard 4-7.3, relations with jury, contains a number of modifications.
Among these is a change in the required grounds for communicating with a
jury following the verdict. Under the revision, "[i]f the lawyer believes that
the verdict may be subject to legal challenge" then the lawyer may properly
communicate with jurors (assuming no statute or rule to the contrary).
Under the first edition the lawyer had to have "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve" such challenge available. Further, under the revision, notice to oppos-
ing counsel and the court is not required.
Standard 4-7.6, examination of witnesses, has two changes-one a
change in emphasis and the other a change to conform the standard to ac-
cepted usage. Paragraph (b) concerns cross-examination of truthful wit-
nesses. In the first edition that paragraph cautioned against "misuse" of the
power to discredit or undermine a witness. The second edition, recognizing
that use of such cross-examination may be an important part of a good de-
fense, recommends that the truthfulness of the witness "be taken into consid-
eration." Paragraph (d) of the revised standard requires "good faith belief"
in the factual predicate implied by questions asked of a witness.
3 4
This discussion highlights the major changes contained in the second
edition. Users of the Standards should know, however, that standard 4-7.7 as
it appears in the second edition remains only a provisional standard and has
not been adopted by the ABA House of Delegates. This standard is the
subject of Justice Erickson's article on the perjurious defendant.
V. CHAFTER 5--PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES
This set of standards has been among the most influential of the entire
group, and most states have adopted key elements of them since their initial
approval in 1968. In the period between the first edition (1968) and final
approval of the second edition in February, 1979, the areas of law and proce-
dure covered by this chapter have undergone dramatic change, resulting in
significant substantive revisions in the second edition. As will be seen, how-
ever, these changes serve to reaffirm and strengthen the fundamental prem-
ises upon which the entire first edition rested. Also, they build upon the
extensive growth and acceptance of organized defender programs. Finally,
the changes seek to flesh out an evolving recognition of the need for defend-
ers, as well as assigned counsel, to be absolutely independent of judicial and
political interference.
In order to appreciate better the significance of the changes, the reader
should bear in mind the roots of our common law system of justice, which
comprise these basic assumptions: 1) that an accused person is presumed
33. &e STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 4-5.2, control and direction of the case.
34. Se discussion of companion standard 3-5.7 relating to the Prosecution Function, p. 33
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innocent; 2) that guilt must be proven in an adversary proceeding in which
the prosecutor as charging authority carries the burden; and 3) that the two
adversaries may be aided by advocates capable of rendering effective
assistance.
35
Early in the system, emphasis was only on the right to retain counsel,
without a guarantee that counsel would be provided to those unable to se-
cure it. In 1932, the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabana3 6 first recognized
the constitutional right of an accused to have counsel appointed by the
court. In 1963, in the landmark case of Gideon v. Wathwr'.ht,37 the Supreme
Court took the giant step of holding that the fourteenth amendment fully
incorporated the sixth amendment right and thus required states to provide
counsel for indigent defendants in all serious (felony) cases.
Against the preceding sketchy backdrop, let us now examine the revi-
sions in the second edition.
In the first edition, standard 5-1.1, entitled "Objective," reads that "the
bar should. . . ensure the provision of competent counsel to all persons who
need representation in criminal proceedings . . . ." Reference to the bar
has been deleted in the second edition because the necessity of guaranteeing
legal representation is shared with society as a whole. The revised standard,
however, retains a provision that the bar should educate the public to the
importance of this objective. Also, as revised, this standard stresses "quality"
rather than merely "competent" representation, thus furthering both the
spirit and the letter of the sixth amendment. The choice of the adjective
"quality" contemplates providing to the accused the same caliber of legal
services that a defendant of financial means could retain. The vital issue of
what is adequately effective assistance of counsel has been a subject of sharp-
ening focus since the first edition. Justice William H. Erickson of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court reviewed the emerging case law in the light of its
constitutional underpinnings, and argued that the want of a precise standard
for assessing the competency of defense counsel continues to be a source of
confusion within both state and federal courts.
3 8
Standard 5-1.2 ("Plan for Legal Representation") has been changed
substantially. The first edition stated that either a defender or assigned
counsel system should be utilized in each jurisdiction. The second edition
recommends that both should be available in all jurisdictions. This change
gives recognition to the enormous growth and acceptance of defenders dur-
ing the past decade. Another new provision in this standard states that
"neither defender nor assigned counsel programs should be precluded from
representing any particular type or category of case." Of course, no lawyer
should undertake to provide representation in any case for which he or she
lacks sufficient knowledge or experience to provide "quality" assistance.
However, the thrust of the revision is to overcome prohibitions in jurisdic-
35. STANDARDS, .upra note 1, at 5.4-.5.
36. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
37. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).




tions that automatically disqualify defenders from being counsel in- specified
categories of cases (for example, homicide). The revision is intended to elim-
inate unjustified perceptions of defenders as less capable than private practi-
tioners, a factor which had deterred some lawyers. from seeking employment
in defender offices.
Several substantive changes in standard 5-1.3 ("Professional Indepen-
dence of Counsel for Defense") are designed to emphasize and lend strength
to this important aspect of defense services. Standard 5-1.3 is the same stan-
dard as first edition standard 1.4, but contains important revisions. First, it
states that "the selection of lawyers for specific cases should normally not be
made by the judiciary or elected officials, but should be arranged for by the
administrators of the defender and assigned-counsel programs." This should
help allay suspicion that might arise with judge-appointed counsel that those
appointed may not be fully and independently committed to their clients.
Second, also added to this standard is language recognizing that a board of
trustees can serve as "an effective means of securing professional indepen-
dence for defenders." Third, this new sentence has been added to the stan-
dard: "A majority of the trustees on boards should be members of the bar
admitted to practice in the jurisdiction."
Standard 5-1.5, which deals with funding for defense services, and
which will be discussed below in its other ramifications, has also been
phrased in the second edition to protect against the misuse of the power of
the purse to undermine the vital independence of the system.
In the same way, standard 5-2.4 has been changed to reflect that com-
pensation paid to assigned counsel "should be approved by administrators of
assigned-counsel programs," another insurance against possible judicial con-
trol or influence.
Standard 5-3.1, dealing with the chief defender and staff, includes a
new provision which prohibits the selection by judges of the chief defender
and staff as a means of assuring independence.
The first edition of standard 5-3.2 recognized the possibility of both full-
time and part-time defenders. This was changed and now reads: "Defense
organizations should be staffed with full-time attorneys. All such attorneys
should be prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law." The
change thus recognizes a trend during the period since the first edition, as
well as the inherent difficulties with part-time personnel.
Standard 5-3.3, pertaining to removal of counsel, is new in substance.
By providing that "removal of counsel. . . should not occur over the objec-
tion of the attorney and the client," it seeks to promote further desirable
complete independence.
Standard 5-4.1 ("Criminal Cases") has also been revised. The first edi-
tion stated that counsel should be provided for all offenses punishable by a
loss of liberty "except those types of offenses for which such punishment is
not likely to be imposed . . . ." Following the first edition, the Supreme
Court handed down the landmark opinion in Argersinger v. Hamhn,39 which
39. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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extended the right to counsel in misdemeanor and petty offense cases. The
second edition has thus been revised, and the phrase containing the excep-
tion deleted because it conflicts with Argersinger's requirement that "absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any of-
fense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was rep-
resented by counsel at his trial." 4
A new provision has also been added to this standard, to make clear
that the right to counsel extends to offenses which, although not themselves
carrying a penalty of incarceration, may later be used as a basis for imposing
imprisonment in the event of a second conviction.
Standard 5-4.3 ("Workload") is a completely new standard. It is
designed to limit the caseload of defender organizations as well as that of
assigned counsel to manageable levels. Historically, one of the most trouble-
some impediments to quality representation for the poor has been the exces-
sive caseload of counsel. All too often in defender organizations, attorneys
are asked to assume too many cases, leading to attorney frustration, disillu-
sionment by clients, and weakening of the adversary system.
A new provision in standard 5-5.1 ("Initial Provision of Counsel") is to
make clear that counsel should be provided upon request to persons in need
even in situations where formal custody has not yet begun. For example,
counsel should be available to persons summoned before a grand jury who
believe their testimony might be incriminating. Counsel should also be
available to persons required to participate in pre-arrest nontestimonial
identification procedures. In this new extension, the standard admittedly
goes beyond Supreme Court holdings that the right to counsel attaches at
"critical stages" prior to trial. Reasons for the expansion of the right to
counsel include the fact that counsel's early presence in the case may con-
vince the prosecutor to dismiss unfounded charges or to charge the accused
with a lesser offense. More importantly, earlier provision of needed counsel
to those unable to afford representation would eliminate discrimination be-
tween such defendants and those of financial means.
Standard 5-5.2 ("Duration of Representation") is also a revised stan-
dard. This standard originally stated that counsel initially provided "should
continue to represent the defendant through all stages of the proceedings
unless a new appointment is made because geographical considerations or
other factors make it necessary." Because developments have generated con-
siderable disagreement over the wisdom of that policy, the standard has been
changed in the second edition to provide that counsel continue "throughout
the trial court proceedings," including the filing of post-trial motions where
necessary. The standard, however, does not take a position on whether trial
counsel should also provide representation on appeal, but the commentary




Several significant revisions were made in Part VI ("Eligibility For
40. Id at 37.
41. STANDARDS, Supra note 1, § 5-5.2, commentary at 5.55-56.
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Assistance") in the second edition to clarify and make more meaningful and
practical the provision of defense services.
Standard 5-6.1 retains the first edition basic yardstick of eligibility for
counsel to persons financially unable to obtain adequate representation
without substantial hardship to themselves or their families, but adds a new
provision that "supporting services necessary to an adequate defense should
be available .. .to all persons . .. financially unable to afford necessary
support services." Several cases subsequent to the first edition have held that
financial resources of spouses or relatives should not be considered in deter-
mining eligibility. 42 Although a study indicated that about seventy percent
ofjudges surveyed considered the defendant's ability to post bond to be an
important factor in determining eligibility,4 3 this has been condemned by
some appellate courts.44
Standard 5-6.2 concerns ability to pay partial costs and make reim-
bursement for counsel or services provided. The second edition deletes from
the first edition a statement that "the provision of counsel may be made on
the condition that the funds available for the purpose be contributed to the
system pursuant to an established method of collection." This deletion was
not intended to preclude contributions; rather, it was prompted by an assess-
ment of experience with contribution programs which reflected that admin-
istration costs substantially exceeded minimal collections.
Finally, the second edition made a substantive change in standard 5-6.3
by deleting a provision from the first edition which provided that the eligi-
bility determination "should be made as soon as feasible after a person is
taken into custody," and it should be made by "the judge or an officer of the
court selected by him." The new standard is that eligibility "should be
made by defenders or assigned counsel, subject to review by a court at the
request of a person found to be ineligible." The new standard should help
prevent delay of entry of counsel into the case, and thus will tend to imple-
ment standard 5-5.1, which recommends that "counsel be provided as soon
as feasible after custody begins."
VI. CHAPTER 6--SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
The first edition was approved in two segments, in July 1971 and in
August 1972. The title of the first edition was "The Function of the Trial
Judge"; that of the second, "Special Functions of the Trial Judge". In these
two differences we find the major key to understanding most of the changes
encountered in the second edition, and, although not substantive, such
changes appreciably increase the value and overall utility of this chapter.
The history must be reviewed to understand these changes. In 1969,
after the Advisory Committee on the Judge's Function had been drafting
standards covering the entire area, the nation was beset with a series of in-
stances involving disruptive defendants in criminal trials. The President of
42. Sapio v. State, 223 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Gustavson, 131 Ill.
App. 2d 887, 269 N.E.2d 517 (1971). ee also Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1108, 1114-16 (1973).
43. NATIONAL DEFENDER SURVEY, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 41 (1973).
44. See, e.g., People v. Valdery, 41 I1. App. 3d 201, 354 N.E.2d 7 (1976).
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the American Bar Association requested that priority in attention be given
to guidelines for handling such disruptions. 45 In July 1971, the House of
Delegates approved for publication a set of "Standards Relating to the
Judge's Role in Dealing with Trial Disruptions." Thereafter the committee
returned to its original task, intending when finished to integrate the first
segment into the total report. Thus, when the House of Delegates in August
1972 approved the remaining standards covering the trial judge's function,
approval was given to integrate the earlier segment, provided only necessary
editorial but no substantive changes were made. 46 This was done, and thus
the first edition constituted the only set of ABA Criminal Justice Standards
relating to The Function of the Trial Judge.
Another recourse to history explains the limiting change in title made in
this chapter. The original Standards project divided the criminal justice spec-
trum into eighteen functional areas and assigned a manageable number of
these to each of seven drafting committees. Although their work was closely
coordinated by a parent committee, the most feasible procedure was for each
set of Standards to be completed and submitted for House of Delegates ap-
proval, and thereafter publication, on a piecemeal basis. Thus, some dupli-
cation became unavoidable; yet in other instances the other standards
remained somewhat general when alluding to the trial judge's role in given
situations, and assumed that the user would seek recourse to the volume cov-
ering the judge's function. However, in the area of the judge's role in plea
discussions and plea agreements, the piecemeal process resulted in a conflict
in policy between the Pleas of Guilty and Functions of the Trial Judge stan-
dards. The reconciliation was accomplished in the second edition, as de-
scribed below.
Because of the superior methodology made possible by the project gov-
erning the second edition, chapter 6 probably received the most beneficial
overhaul, yet suffered least in substantive amendments. Two categories of
major deletions from chapter 6 may at first glance suggest wholesale emascu-
lation, but it is necessary to know why they were made.
The larger group of deletions corrected the overlapping and duplication
that was unavoidable in the first edition. These deletions were made because
the particular standard was already articulated in one of the other chapters.
In some of these instances, where that particular chapter did not adequately
define the judge's role, the deleted standard was transplanted to accomplish
the need. In any case, these deletions served to strengthen the entire second
edition.
Now a word of explanation about the other major category of deletions.
The first edition had devoted four standards to areas of the judge's function
relating to facilities and staff. Thus, original standard 2.1 dealt with the
necessity of providing judicial manpower; standard 2.2 concerned adequacy
of courtroom facilities and supporting staff; standard 2.3 articulated the trial
court's obligation to seek or compel adequate support; and standard 2.4 cov-
45. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, Ap-




ered the duty to have the staff properly trained. These standards were more
properly the domain of overall judicial administration, but current stan-
dards had not been formulated when the CrimznalJustice Standards project
began. In the interim, however, the Commission on Standards of Judicial
Administration was created by the ABA, and in 1976 the ABA approved the
Commission's Standards Relating to Trial Courts. Consequently, some of
the standards that were in the first edition were deleted from the second
because they were more appropriate subjects for the judicial administration
standards, and equally applicable to civil as well as criminal trial courts.
Following a similar rationale, the entire topic of procedures regarding
judicial misfeasance, nonfeasance, and disability has been deleted from the
second edition because of the issuance in February 1978 of Standards Relat-
ing to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement, formulated by the ABA
Joint Committee on Professional Discipline.
In view of the rather extensive pruning of the first edition and trans-
planting of many of its standards into other chapters, the decision was made
to rename the chapter by adding the word "Special" to the title. The re-
maining major divisions in Chapter 6 are: Part I, Basic Duties; Part II, Gen-
eral Relations with Counsel and Witnesses; Part III, Maintaining the
Decorum of the Courtroom; and Part IV, Use of the Contempt Power.
It now remains to be seen what substantive changes were made in the
standards now comprising Chapter 6.
Standard 6-3.6 articulates guidelines for the defendant to represent
himself at trial. To the original standard, which remained unchanged, the
following subsection was added: "(b) When a litigant undertakes to repre-
sent himself or herself, the court should take whatever measures may be rea-
sonable and necessary to ensure a fair trial."
The thrust of the original standard was that the right of a defendant to
proceed in the trial of a criminal case without the assistance of counsel is
qualified, not absolute. Since the approval of the first edition, the right was
confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Fareta v. California,4 7 in
federal law,4 8 in rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in
many state constitutions. 49 Faretta also confirmed, however, that a defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be abrogated
unless knowingly and intelligently waived; also, the interest of the public in
an orderly, rational trial is entitled to consideration. The indicated addition
of subsection (b) was designed to establish an affirmative duty on the part of
the trial judge. The second edition retained, without substantive change
from the first edition, standard 6-3.7 pertaining to standby counsel for apro
se defendant.
Standard 6-3.11 covers the matter of attorneys from other jurisdictions
and the increasingly important subject in our ever more mobile society of pro
hac vice admission of attorneys from other jurisdictions. The second edition
47. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976).
49. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
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standard is unchanged, except stylistically, from the first. The standard pro-
vides that a trial judge may deny permission to appear pro hac vice on
grounds that the attorney has engaged in misconduct, or he may grant per-
mission on condition that the petitioning attorney associate with a local at-
torney as cocounsel and that the defendant consent.
On January 15, 1979, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in
the case of Lets v. Flynt.50 Larry Flynt and "Hustler" magazine had been
charged with dissemination of obscene materials to minors. Defendants'
lawyers from out of state were denied the right to appear pro hac vice, where-
upon suit was filed under the Civil Rights Act asserting denial of sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights without a due process hearing. The federal
district court enjoined the continuation of the state criminal prosecution
pending the granted due process hearing. On certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding per curiam that the asserted right to appearpro hac vice is
not one of the constitutionally protected due process rights under the four-
teenth amendment. 5 ' The Court did not address the question of the right of
Flynt and "Hustler" to the assistance of counsel of their choice under the
sixth amendment, although Justice White argued this be granted certiorari
and set for argument.
5 2
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall dissented from the majority,
contending that a lawyer's interest in pursuing his profession is protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
53
Although the majority supports standard 6-3.11 as written, the Crimi-
nal Justice Section's governing council recommended that the ABA Stand-
ing Committee on Criminal Justice Standards give consideration to
recommending to the House of Delegates an amendment to 6-3.11.54 The
thrust of the proposed amendment would be to condition denial of pro hac
vice on a due process hearing and on a finding of courtroom misconduct that
had resulted in either punishment for contempt or censure by a bar discipli-
nary authority, or a pending disciplinary proceeding provided that the mis-
,conduct would provide sufficient basis to disqualify an attorney licensed in
the jurisdiction of the court from representing the defendant. The ABA liti-
gation section favored an even broader policy. The House of Delegates in
August 1980 declined to approve any change.
It is thus apparent that there currently is insufficient consensus to justify
conclusions as to what, if any, change might finally be recommended in stan-
dard 6-3.11. Furthermore, since the Supreme Court has not yet seen fit to
entertain the sixth amendment issue, any wholesale proposed revision may
be premature. The matter remains under active consideration by the Stand-
ing Committee, pursuant to its mandate for continual monitoring of the
standards.
55
50. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
51. Id at 443-44.
52. Id at 445.
53. Id.
54. See Report with Recommendations to the House of Delegates, American Bar Associa-
tion, 1980 Annual Meeting, Report 112A.
55. ABA CoNST. AND BYLAws § 30.7.
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VII. CHAPTER 10-PRETRIAL RELEASE
The issue of bail and the companion issue of crime committed by those
released on bail pending trial are problems that have received the careful
scrutiny of the ABA. These are not new issues and the introduction to chap-
ter 10 of the Standards acknowledges the melancholy history of bail reform:
Unfortunately, the bail reform movement never accomplished all
that was hoped for it. A decade later, our jails remain crowded
with pretrial detainees, many judges continue to impose monetary
conditions, compensated sureties still thrive in many jurisdictions,
and pretrial crime and abscondence remain serious problems. Nor
have experiments with preventive detention been notably
successful.
56
While the central thrust of the ABA's thirty-one separate standards
dealing with Pretrial Release favors bail for persons accused of crime pend-
ing adjudication, the standards also recognize that some restraints on the
defendant's liberty may be necessary. Standard 10-5.9 deals specifically with
pretrial detention and provides a procedure for pretrial detention, which
may be triggered by a finding by a judicial officer on clear and convincing
evidence that: 1) a defendant is likely to flee; 2) a defendant has willfully
violated a condition of release designed to protect the community; 3) a de-
fendant has committed a crime while on pretrial release; or 4) a defendant
has threatened or intimidated, or attempted to threaten or intimidate
witnesses.
The final three triggering events set forth relate to a defendant's danger-
ousness. The Pretrial Release Standards recognize the fact that some de-
fendants on bail pending trial may commit additional offenses and the legal
community shares the concern over this problem with both law enforcement
agencies and the public. The denial of bail is a serious step, however, which
materially decreases a defendant's ability to assist counsel in preparing an
adequate defense. In recognition of that fact, the Standards provide for the
setting of detailed conditions for release, including the setting of any reason-
able restriction designed to assure the safety of the community. 57 The Stan-
dards also provide that violation of those conditions of release can subject the
defendant to arrest and require either the setting of new conditions or the
scheduling of a pretrial detention hearing within five calendar days.
58
The second edition Pretrial Release Standards have been considerably
tightened. When the first edition Standards were adopted in 1968 the nation's
criminal justice system was in the midst of a general bail reform movement.
The Federal Bail Reform Act of 196659 enunciated a firm policy favoring
pretrial release. That policy found affirmation in the ABA's first edition
Standards and reaffirmation in the 1980 second edition.
Still, some noteworthy changes occurred in the second edition. The ma-
jor changes are reflected in two new standards: 1) standard 10-5.3 dealing
56. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 10.5.
57. Id § 10-5.2.
58. Id § 10-5.7.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3141-3143, 3568).
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with pretrial services agencies; and 2) standard 10-5.9 dealing with pretrial
detention, as discussed above. Standard 10-5.3 calls for the establishment of
pretrial services agencies in every jurisdiction. The agencies envisioned in
this standard would be charged with the responsibility for monitoring and
assisting defendants on pretrial release. Such agencies are especially impor-
tant in performing monitoring functions and in reporting violations of re-
lease conditions.
If we are to maintain allegiance to one of our criminal law's fundamen-
tal precepts-the presumption of innocence-we must accept the fact that
there are those who may well commit additional crimes or abscond while
they are on pretrial release. Nonetheless, those incidents can be minimized
through a vigorous implementation of the ABA Standards on Pretrial Re-
lease, standards which afford adequate safeguards for the community's
safety consistent with constitutional requirements.
VIII. CHAPTER 1 I-DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
The first edition, approved in October 1970, began with the statement
that it "proposes more permissive discovery practices for criminal cases than
is provided by applicable law in any jurisdiction in the United States."
6
Second, it proposed a "procedure prior to trial which is designed not only to
accommodate such discovery but to correct certain general dissatisfactions
with criminal litigation."
'6 1
The first edition focused on pretrial procedures as the centerpiece of its
effort. It reasoned that three major impediments to criminal justice could be
largely overcome by reforms in procedure prior to trial. These three impedi-
ments were: 1) the increasingly cumbersome and exasperatingly time-con-
suming motion practice, made even more complex by the recent
multiplication of issues demanding decision prior to trial; 2) the recent ex-
pansion of the right to assigned counsel, causing an influx of lawyers rela-
tively inexperienced in defense work, and aggravated by the concomitant
constitutionally articulated demands of "effective assistance" from such
counsel; and 3) increasing difficulties in achieving finality in convictions be-
cause of greater permissiveness of courts in granting postconviction relief.
6 2
The drafting group admitted having no delusions that the standards it fash-
ioned would be wholly sufficient to eradicate these impediments, yet it
hoped its mechanisms would at least substantially assist in opening the
path.63 As proof of the soundness of the first edition's thrust and success of
its frontier-clearing effort, the second edition, approved in August 1978, re-
tains and extends the approach of the original Standards.
No substantive changes were required or made in the threshold stan-
dard, 11-1. 1, which articulated the procedural needs prior to trial, the objec-
tives, and how those needs can be served by: 1) full and free discovery; 2)
60. STANDARDS (Ist ed. 1970), supra note 45, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
I1.
61. Id
62. Id at 24.
63. Id at 27.
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simpler and more efficient procedures; and 3) procedural pressures for expe-
diting the processing of cases. The commentary observes that when the first
edition was approved, the specific procedures advanced to meet the objec-
tives set forth in what was then standard 1.1 differed from the then current
practice; yet, in the intervening eight years, pretrial procedures have gener-
ally evolved toward that model. Still, there is progress to be made, because
many jurisdictions continue to have limited discovery as well as cumbersome
or slow procedures.
Standard 11-2.1, pertaining to prosecutorial disclosure, has been sub-
stantively changed in the second edition to provide for open-file disclosure
upon the defendant's request. This is a major change from the first edition,
which limited the prosecutor's obligation to a list of specifically enumerated
items. The list has been carried into the second edition, but with the caveat
that the list is only illustrative. The shift to open-file discovery is attributed
to changing attitudes, in part, coupled with greater assurance that protective
orders are an appropriate method for coping with the occasional case in
which pretrial disclosure might jeopardize victims, witnesses, or evidence.
Standard 11-4.4 authorizes protective orders. Also, open-file disclosure is a
more effective way to respond to speedy trial requirements, minimizes the
need for judicial supervision of basic discovery, and avoids the delays of mo-
tion practice and wrangling over the discoverability of particular items. It
also contributes to compliance with other constitutional goals, to the defend-
ant's ability to enter a knowing and intelligent guilty plea, and to increased
finality of convictions by reducing or eliminating error generated by inade-
quate information. 64
Note, however, that open-file disclosure is available only upon a defense
request. Defense needs for, and interest in, prosecution disclosures may vary
widely; thus, the requirement of request helps the prosecutor obtain a clear
idea of information wanted, and avoids wasteful collection of information
not useful to individual defendants.
The original standard limited discovery of a co-defendant's statements
to cases in which the defendant and co-defendant were to be jointly tried;
but that limitation has been omitted from chapter 11 in line with the shift to
open-file disclosure.
6 5
Standard 11-2. 1(b) adds a new subsection (iv) requiring that when the
information is within the prosecutor's possession or control, he shall inform
defense counsel "if the prosecutor intends to offer (as part of the proof that
the defendant committed the offense charged) evidence of other offenses."
This serves to ensure pretrial litigation of an issue that might otherwise inter-
rupt the trial.
66
Standard 11-2.3 provides for additional disclosures upon request and
specification. It adds to original standard 2.3 the requirement that the pros-
ecutor shall disclose, upon request, information about lineups, showups, and
pictures or voice identification of the accused, as well as other procedures
64. STANDARDS, SUpra note 1, at 11.17-.18.
65. Id at 11.21.
66. Id at 11.27.
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described in standard 11-3.1 (a)67 (dealing with the accused). This require-
ment has been added to make certain that all matters which routinely gener-
ate suppression applications will be treated in such a way that collateral
issues can be fully investigated and thoughtfully resolved prior to trial.
68
Standard 11-3.1 contains a significant substantive change from the first
edition. Subsection (a) provides that the prosecutor can obtain the defend-
ant's fingerprints, photographs, handwriting exemplars, or voice exemplars
merely by requesting defendant to appear for that purpose, whereas the orig-
inal 3.1 required all such discovery to be subject to judicial supervision.
Subsection (b) provides for the judicial officer to order the defendant to pro-
vide additional non-testimonial disclosures when the prosecutor meets cer-
tain requirements intended to protect fourth and fifth amendment rights.
Subsection (c) outlines the discovery procedures the judicial officer may or-
der, relating them to subsection (b). Subsection (d) requires the judicial of-
ficer to specify the precise conditions under which such procedures are to be
conducted; thus it is intended to prevent the generation of issues that might
interfere with prompt disposition of the case or jeopardize the finality of
subsequent convictions.
Standard 11-3.2, covering medical and scientific reports, governs
prosecutorial discovery of such made by experts engaged by the defense.
Paragraph (a) conditions prosecutorial discovery on the fact that the defense
has requested and obtained discovery from the prosecution; paragraph (b)
exempts the work product of defense counsel and the communications of the
defendant; paragraph (c) bars the introduction into evidence either of the
fact that disclosures were made or the substance thereof, and also bars the
use at trial of information derived from disclosures except to refute the mat-
ter disclosed.
Standard 11-3.3 deals with nature of the defense. The original standard
called for defense disclosure of the nature of any defense; as revised, it re-
quires the defense to give notice only of witnesses whose testimony bears on
the issues of alibi or mental capacity. Also, paragraph (b), patterned after
rule 423(a) of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, bars the introduc-
tion into evidence of the fact that disclosures were made and the substance of
the disclosures, in addition to barring their use at the trial except to refute
testimony of a witness testifying on alibi or insanity.69
Standard 11-4.8 is new. It is entitled "third-party disclosures," and is
derived from something which had been implicit in original standard 2.5
relating to discretionary disclosures. The new standard clearly distinguishes
the mutual discovery between the defense and prosecutor from third-party
discovery available to either. Third-party disclosures at court direction re-
quire careful judicial supervision to avoid unnecessary intrusion into third-
party privacy interests; thus, there are requirements of reasonableness and
relevance.70
67. Id § 11-2.3(c).
68. Id at 11.33.
69. Id at II.56.
70. Id at 11.69.
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IX. CHAPTER 12---SPEEDY TRIAL
The first edition of this set of standards was given final approval by the
House of Delegates in February 1968. Chapter 12 of the second edition was
approved in August 1978. It is a tribute to the quality of craftsmanship in
the original that no substantive changes in the policy positions comprising
the bold-face standards were needed or recommended. This is not to say
that nothing happened in this subject area during the intervening decade; to
the contrary, a great deal occurred to document the soundness of many of
the pioneering principles set forth in the first edition. The reader is urged to
review the rich updated commentary to chapter 12 for complete
documentation.
A very sketchy summary of the structure of chapter 12, and highlights
of developments between the first and second editions, might be merited. In
1967, almost on the eve of presenting the final tentative draft of the first
edition for approval, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Klopfer v. North Caroh'na.7 1 This landmark case held that the fourteenth
amendment made the sixth amendment guarantee of speedy trial applicable
to the states. The Court in that case did not have before it the precise issue
of which criteria should be used to determine in each case whether the guar-
anteed right has been violated, for Klopler involved an effort by the state to
postpone indefinitely the trial over the defendant's objection. Accordingly,
it was not until Barker v. W14ingo 72 that the Supreme Court prescribed a test to
determine constitutional violations. In the intervening five years, the Court
had issued two opinions on narrower issues of the problem. One held that a
state was not relieved of its speedy trial responsibility just because the de-
fendant was incarcerated in another jurisdiction; 73 the other clarified the
fact that the constitutional right does not extend to time prior to arrest or
formal charge. 74 Except for one statement in the Barker opinion raising a
possible question as to the propriety of the standard's proposed "absolute
discharge" of a defendant whose speedy trial right has been violated, all four
of the Supreme Court's opinions buttressed the first edition. Subsequent to
Barker, the Supreme Court held in Strnk v. United States75 that "[in light of
the policies which underlie the right to a speedy trial, dismissal must remain
• . .the only possible remedy."
'76
To the credit of the trail-blazing work of the first edition, the Federal
Speedy Trial Act of 197477 became law on January 3, 1975. Although the
bill as finally enacted differs from the position of standard 12-4.1 calling for
71. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
72. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
73. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
74. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
75. 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
76. Id at 440.
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976). The Act provides that absolute discharge is at the
option of the court, which must consider the seriousness of an offense, the facts and circum-
stances surrounding dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of jus-
tice. Id § 3162(a)(2).
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absolute discharge, the overall Act is otherwise generally consistent with
Chapter 12.
X. CHAPTER 13-JOINDER AND SEVERANCE
Joinder and severance are procedural issues that affect only a very small
percentage of criminal cases, primarily because they are trial issues and rela-
tively few criminal cases go to trial. Of the cases that do go to trial, only
those involving either multiple offenses or multiple defendants are affected
by joinder and severance rules.
The difficulty in developing rules of joinder and severance stems in
large part from the large number of factors that go into the decision of a
prosecutor or a defendant to choose to join or sever trials. For example, in
one case a prosecutor might decide that a joint trial would be too compli-
cated for a jury to follow, but in another might conclude that the inconve-
nience to witnesses of multiple trials would require joinder. A defendant
who wants to testify as to one charge but not another might prefer separate
trials, while another who wants to avoid the expense, delay, and harassment
of multiple trials might prefer a single trial.
Considered by many lawyers to be the most technically oriented of all
the CnrmiInaijustice Standard, the Joinder and Severance Standards, approved
by the ABA in August 1968, have been among the most successful in provid-
ing guidance to draftsmen of codes and rules in many jurisdictions.7 8 The
revised standards incorporate and extend the approach of the original stan-
dards. The standards in the second edition are, if anything, more interde-
pendent than in the earlier edition. Thus, in any implementation of the
Standard, they should be adopted as an integral unit and their provisions
should be physically located in a continuing sequence.
The revised chapter consists of five parts. Part I, a new section of defini-
tions which are based largely on concepts which appeared in the substantive
sections of the first edition, introduces definitions of "related" and "unre-
lated" offenses. "Related" offenses are tied together in one or more ways
and, as a group, correspond roughly with the class of offenses that have tra-
ditionally been joinable. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure uses different terminology to identify substantially the same concept.
79
Part II deals with joinder and includes matters which were largely con-
tained in Part I of the first edition. It does, however, contain significant
changes from the earlier edition, such as those in standard 13-2. 1, joinder of
offenses. The original standard (.1 ) permitted joinder only of related of-
fenses, while the revised standard would permit unlimited joinder of both
related and unrelated offenses. This expansion, however, is subject to an
absolute right to severance of unrelated offenses, by either prosecution or
78. Report With Recommendations to ABA House of Delegates, 1978 Annual Meeting,
Report 108A at 12.
79. Related offenses are based "on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or




defense, as set forth in standard 13-3.1 (a).8 0
It should be noted that 13-2.1 (a) requires that when offenses are joined
in one accusatory instrument, each offense must be stated in a separate
count. This requirement is based on constitutional concerns arising from the
sixth amendment right to notice of the nature and cause of the accusation.
Standard 13-2.2, joinder of defendants, has been conformed to the
change in standard 13-2.1 by the addition of authority for unlimited joinder
of offenses and by the explicit authorization of applications, by either prose-
cution or defense, to join defendants for trial.
Part III deals with severance. A modification of standard 13-3.1 which
would grant a right of severance to both the prosecution and the defense in
those cases in which unrelated offenses have been joined for trial, is designed
to conform this section to the changes in standard 13-2.1 and has been dis-
cussed above.
Part IV outlines the authority of the court to act on its own motion.
Standard 13-4.1 is derived from first edition standard 3.1(a). The original
standard provided that a judge could order consolidation of charges for trial
if the offenses-and the defendants if there is more than one-could have
been joined in a single charge. The revised standard limits the court's au-
thority to join offenses or defendants sua sponte to cases in which no party
objects, because the parties will be better able than the court to foresee the
risks of prejudice from a joinder of offenses or defendants.8 1
Part V, dealing with the requirement for an adequate record, is new
and contains only one standard. The standard adds the requirement that
the court make a record of its reasons for granting or denying any motion.
The failure of courts to articulate the basis for their decisions on joinder and
severance issues makes it difficult for appellate courts to subject joinder and
severance decisions to meaningful review and for trial courts to understand
the factors that influenced the outcome in previous cases.
XI. CHAPTER 14-PLEAS OF GUILTY
The first edition of these standards was approved in 1968. At that time
the ABA took the position that the practice of negotiating charge and sen-
tence concessions, which accounts for over ninety percent of all criminal dis-
positions in some jurisdictions, served a useful function both for the criminal
defendant and for society. While the second edition of the Standards has de-
leted consideration of the impact of plea negotiation on court dockets as a
factor to be considered in final disposition of a plea,8 2 the practice neverthe-
less has a beneficial impact on administration of the courts by freeing re-
sources which would otherwise be devoted to the conduct of trials. Indeed,
the limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defendant has
grounds for contesting the matter of guilt aids in preserving both the quality
80. Cf UNIFORM R. CRIM. P. 471(d) (allowing joinder of unrelated offenses upon motion
of defendant who makes showing that "failure to try the charges together would constitute
harassment, unless the court determines that . . . joinder would defeat the ends of justice.").
81. S,€ UNIFORM R. CRIM. P. 473(a).
82. Set STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 14-1.8.
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of the trial process itself and the meaningfulness of the presumption of
innocence.
While recognizing the potential benefits of plea negotiations, however,
the drafters of the first edition also recognized that often such discussions
were conducted in a secretive manner that gave the appearance that justice
was not being done. Anticipating the Supreme Court's 1971 declaration in
Santobelo v. New York83 that plea bargaining is "an essential component of
the administration of [criminal] justice," 84 the first edition argued that the
practice should be brought into the open and that effective procedures for
control of the process should be developed. This position has been over-
whelmingly accepted.
The second edition, while retaining the basic philosophy of the earlier
standards, has been amended to reflect changes in the plea negotiation pro-
cess during the past decade. These changes, which will be discussed in some
detail below, include increased standardization of procedures and greater
emphasis on ensuring understanding on the part of a defendant involved in
the process. A major new emphasis in the second edition provides for judi-
cial participation in the plea negotiation process.
Standard 14-1.1 ("pleading by defendant; alternatives"), like its first
edition counterpart, deliberately omits reference to the judge's authority to
refuse a guilty plea. Once a plea is determined to be knowing, voluntary,
and accurate, there normally is no justification for the court to refuse it.
Similarly, these standards do not take a position on whether courts should
have authority to approve charge concessions of a prosecutor.
The second sentence of paragraph (a) requires the defendant personally
to enter the plea. This requirement is a necessary corollary to decisions hold-
ing that a guilty plea must be rejected unless the defendant, in tendering the
plea, intelligently and voluntarily relinquishes certain fundamental constitu-
tional rights.
8 5
The only change from the original edition is a provision that specifically
recommends that the views of the victims be taken into consideration before
a court accepts a plea of nolo contendere. This is consistent with the recom-
mendation that in accepting a nolo plea "the views of the parties . . . and
the interest of the public in the effective administration of justice" 86 should
also be considered.
Standard 14-1.3 ("aid of counsel; time for deliberation") has been
amended in paragraph (b). The Supreme Court has recognized the right of
a defendant to proceed without legal representation.8 7 In order to empha-
size the need for valid waiver of counsel, however, the language of paragraph
(b) has been amended. Paragraph (b) of the original standard referred to a
defendant who is "without counsel"; that phrase has been amended to refer
83. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
84. Id at 260.
85. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459 (1969).
86. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 14.6-.7.
87. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
to a defendant "who has properly waived counsel pursuant to these
standards."
The original standard also stated that paragraph (b) should apply to a
"serious offense." Reference to serious offenses has been deleted in the revi-
sion of paragraph (b) because the values expressed in this standard are con-
sidered fully applicable to both felony and misdemeanor prosecutions.
Adherence to paragraph (b) is not deemed essential in petty offense cases
where there is no possibility of incarceration. a8
Standard 14-1.4 ("defendant to be advised") has been substantially ex-
panded to ensure that a defendant who offers to plead guilty or nolo con-
tendere is given all of the advice constitutionally required and other useful
information as well. In addition to stylistic changes, a number of substantive
changes have been made.
Paragraph (a) of standard 14-1.4 now contains the requirement that the
court address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the
defendant understand the matters under discussion.
Standard 14-1.4(a)(i) provides a more explicit statement of what the
defendant should be told by using the phrase "nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is offered" rather than simply "nature of the of-
fense" which appeared in the first edition. This change was mandated in
certain cases by the Supreme Court decision in Henderson v. Morgan,89 which
held that a plea to second-degree murder was involuntary where the defend-
ant had not been informed that intent to cause death was an element of the
crime.
Standard 14-1.4(a)(iv) is new except for the requirement of a statement
to the defendant that by pleading guilty he or she waives a right to a jury
trial. The second edition requires that the judge make clear the fact that the
defendant also waives other constitutional rights, waiver of which must be
intelligent and voluntary.
Standard 14-1.4(a)(v) is also new and requires that the court notify the
defendant that he or she waives the right to object to the sufficiency of the
charging papers or to illegally obtained evidence (unless such right is
reserved).
Standard 14-1.4(b) is new as well. It is intended to ensure that the de-
fendant understands the procedures and directs the court either to ask the
defendant to restate the information being considered, or to take "such other
steps as may be necessary to assure itself that the guilty plea is entered with
complete understanding of the consequences."
Standard 14-1.4(c), also a new paragraph, directs the court to refuse a
plea when it appears that a defendant who is represented by counsel has not
had effective assistance of counsel.
Three changes have been made in standard 14-1.5 ("determining volun-
tariness of plea"). First, there has been added to the second sentence the
phrase "the defendant," thus making it clear that the court should inquire of
88. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
89. 425 U.S. 637 (1976).
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the defendant, as well as of defense counsel, concerning possible plea discus-
sions and plea agreements. In addition, the second sentence of the standard
now specifically requires that the parties disclose "what [plea] discussions
were had." Finally, the third sentence of the standard has been rewritten.
In the first edition, this sentence stated that the court should advise the de-
fendant that charge and sentence recommendations that are a part of a plea
agreement are not binding on the court. This provision was misleading,
however, because the defendant, according to original standard 3.3(b), was
accorded an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea in which charge and
sentence concessions, recommended by the prosecutor and initially con-
curred in by the court, were later rejected. As revised, the third sentence
contains a cross-reference to standard 14-3.3(g), with the recommendation
that the defendant be advised consistent with this provision. Standard 14-
3.3(g) sets forth the circumstances in which withdrawal of a plea is allowed
when charge or sentence concessions recommended by the prosecutor are
disapproved by the court.
Standard 14-1.6 ("determining accuracy of plea") has been revised to
require the finding of a factual basis for the nolo contendere plea as well as
for the plea of guilty. Paragraph (b), which is new, states that the judge may
require the defendant to make a statement concerning the commission of the
offense when such a statement is necessary in order to establish a factual
basis. Paragraph (c), which is also new, requires that special care be taken in
those circumstances in which the defendant enters a plea but denies
culpability.
Several refinements have been made in standard 14-1.8 ("consideration
of plea in final disposition"). The first emphasizes that a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere should not, by itself alone, be considered by the court as a
mitigating factor in imposing sentence. This represents the shift in the sec-
ond edition to greater consideration of the factors relating to an individual
defendant in disposition of a plea. Although the first edition was silent on
the effect of a plea on the severity of the sentence imposed, the major factor
to be considered was "the effective administration of criminal justice." By
contrast, the factors in the second edition are "the protection of the public,
the gravity of the offense, and the needs of the defendant." Thus, although
congestion in criminal court calendars in many parts of the country remains
a significant problem, these standards no longer express the view that it is
permissible to grant charge and sentence concessions to defendants solely for
the purpose of processing cases through the system.
A minor substantive change in standard 14-2.1 ("plea withdrawal")
provides that "the court should allow" withdrawal of a plea before sentence
where the defendant's reasons are fair and just and the prejudice to the pros-
ecutor is minimal. The first edition stated that "the court in its discretion
may allow" withdrawal of such a plea. This change in emphasis reflects the
belief that prior to sentencing, when there is a basis for the defendant's mo-
tion and an absence of compelling prosecutorial reason for its denial, with-
drawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere normally should be allowed.
Three clauses, none contained in the first edition, have been added to
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standard 14-2.2 ("withdrawn plea not admissible"). First, the standard now
provides that "any statements made by the defendant in connection with
entering such a plea of guilty or nolo contendere" may not later be used
against the defendant if the plea is either not accepted or withdrawn.
A second new clause provides an exception to this general rule. Thus,
the standard permits statements of a defendant made while entering an un-
accepted or withdrawn plea to be admitted against a defendant in a subse-
quent "criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statements
were made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence
of counsel." This change parallels the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 9°
The third new clause, "or civil action or administrative proceeding,"
was added to make this standard consistent with other standards dealing
with the inadmissibility of plea discussions and plea agreements when the
underlying plea is either not accepted or is withdrawn.
There are several changes in standard 3.1 ("propriety of plea discussions
and plea agreements"), the first of which makes it clear that "[tihe prosecut-
ing attorney may engage in a plea discussion with counsel for the defendant
for the purposes of reaching a plea agreement." This revision reflects the
widespread acceptance of plea discussions between prosecution and defense.
Also, a new subparagraph has been added which recommends that the
views of victims and law enforcement officials be considered before the pros-
ecutor enters into plea agreements. This is regarded as an essential require-
ment, lest victims and police lose their respect for the criminal justice system
and become unwilling to cooperate fully when needed.
Standard 3.3 ("responsibilities of the judge") has undergone considera-
ble changes, many of which, however, involve nothing more than the incor-
poration of provisions which had appeared in the first edition of the
Function of the Trial Judge. Several paragraphs of the standard, however,
are almost entirely new.
The thrust of these new provisions is to allow a limited role for the judge
in the plea-negotiation/plea-agreement process. The parties may request to
meet with the court either to present or to discuss a plea agreement. If the
court consents to a plea conference, appropriate persons may be required to
testify, including the defendant and alleged victim. Finally, when a plea
agreement has not been reached, the judge may inquire of the parties
whether plea discussions have taken place and, if not, may adjourn the pro-
ceedings to enable such discussions to occur. These provisions are contrary
to the first edition, which stated that "[t]he trial judge should not participate
in plea discussions."
In the original edition, the defendant was permitted to withdraw a
guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere whenever the court tentatively con-
curred in contemplated charge or sentence concessions and later changed its
mind. This revised edition contains a much more detailed provision related
to plea withdrawal when anticipated concessions are not received. The stan-
90. FED. R. CRIM. P. lI(e)(6).
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dard contemplates that the defendant will be expressly advised when the
plea is entered whether withdrawal of the plea will be permitted if the
charge or sentence concessions are rejected.
XII. CHAPTER 15--TRIAL BY JURY
The first edition was approved in 1968, and the second edition in Au-
gust 1978. During that decade, much occurred to provide experience and
data to assist in supporting a number of substantive changes in the original
standards. The total product represented by this particular chapter is an
especially valuable reference which could not help but serve as a constant
tool for judges, prosecutors, and defenders alike.
The introduction to the first edition9 ' begins by telling the reader that
the Trial by Jury standards start with the threshold question of when there
should be a right to jury trial and conclude with the question of when im-
peachment of the jury's verdict should be permitted. The introduction em-
phasized the importance of guidelines as to when the jury can or must be
used, how jurors are selected, how the trial should be conducted to facilitate
the jury's proper role, how to assist the jury's deliberations and yet have
essential controls, and whether the jury's verdict need be unanimous. De-
spite the fact that the bulk of criminal cases are processed without jury trial,
usually the most controversial and far-reaching involve jury trials. In many
which do not wind up in a jury trial, the very fact that the potential of a jury
trial looms in the picture will often be a critical factor in disposition. Also, of
course, article III and the sixth amendment to the Constitution preserve the
right of jury trial.
The second edition retains the major structure of the first edition, ex-
cept for the deletion of original Part III pertaining to Juror Orientation and
Compensation. The two standards under that heading were eliminated in
deference to the fact that since the approval of the first edition, the ABA
Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration had formulated stan-
dards relating to Trial Courts which were approved by the House of Dele-
gates in 1976, and which appropriately embraced the subject for both civil
and criminal cases.
92
Major changes were made in standard 15-1.1 ("right to jury trial"), the
keystone of the chapter, so that it now reads as follows:
Jury trial should be available to a party, including the state, in
criminal prosecutions in which confinement in jail or prison may
be imposed. The jury should consist of twelve persons, except that
a jury of less than twelve (but not less than six) may be provided
when the penalty that may be imposed is confinement for six
months or less. The verdict of the jury should be unanimous.
In this brief standard, the significant revisions include: 1) deletion of an
earlier recognition of the propriety, barring constitutional restriction, of de-
nial of jury trial for "petty offenses"; 2) deletion of acceptance of trial of
91. STANDARDS (1st ed. 1968), supra note 45, TRIAL BY JURY, at 1-2.
92. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, at DT-3 1.
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
lesser offenses without a jury; 3) limiting the use of juries of less than twelve
to petty offenses; 4) imposing a minimum of six members for any jury less
than twelve; and 5) elimination of the possibility of less than unanimous
verdicts, except where parties properly consent. Each of these substantive
revisions merits examination of its rationale.
When the first edition was already in page proofs, the United States
Supreme Court decided Duncan v. Louisiana,93 holding the sixth amendment
right to jury trial applicable to states through the fourteenth amendment. In
effect this meant entitlement to jury for "serious crimes" but not "petty of-
fenses." It did not precisely draw the line between those categories, but indi-
cated that in the federal system petty offenses are those punishable by no
more than six months in prison and $500 fine. 4 In 1970, Baldwin v. New
York 95 confirmed the matter by holding that no offense could be considered
petty if imprisonment of more than six months could result.
96
As revised, the standard no longer recognizes the propriety of denying
jury trials in lesser offenses, even if the accused is accorded a right to trial de
novo upon appeal. The main reason for the change in posture of the stan-
dard was the adoption in 1976 of a new policy that there should be a right of
jury trial in all criminal prosecutions in which the penalty of jail or prison
may be imposed. It was contended that such punishment should rest on a
finding of guilt satisfying the conscience of the lay citizenry.
The change in the standard regarding size of the jury is primarily to
accommodate decisions of the Supreme Court that were handed down be-
tween the first and second editions.
9 7
As to the matter of unanimous verdicts, the revised standard was man-
dated by a change in ABA policy in 1976, based upon the recommendation
of the ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration. Given
that the Standards are suggestive rather than mandatory, however, and given
that the Supreme Court has clearly recognized that states need not require
unanimous verdicts,98 the change will probably be of limited persuasion.
Standard 15-1.2, covering waiver of trial by jury, contains only one sub-
stantive change from the first edition, namely to include approval of the
prosecutor as one of the conditions for waiver. It should be noted that stan-
dard 15-1.2 still permits waiver by an oral statement for the record; this is
consonant with the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, but contrary to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Related to the subject of standard 15-1.2 is standard 15-1.3 dealing with
waiver of either a full or unanimous jury. The change made here is to add a
provision for waiving the requirement of a unanimous verdict by the defend-
ant. A requirement of prosecutorial concurrence has not been included be-
93. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
94. Id at 161.
95. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
96. Id at 73-74.
97. &., e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
98. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
[Vol. 59:1
COMPARISON OF EDITIONS
cause the same considerations as exist with standard 15-1.2 are not present.
Waiver under this standard is a possibility in three situations: 1) pretrial; 2)
during trial; or 3) when one or more jurors have been excused either during
trial or during deliberation.99
Part II articulates standards relating to selection of the jury. Standard
15-2.1, dealing with selection of prospective jurors, retains without change
the basic principle that names of those who may be called "should be se-
lected at random from sources which will furnish a representative cross-sec-
tion of the community."
Subsections (c) and (d) of standard 15-2.1 have been revised from the
first edition to take advantage of interim experience and to make more spe-
cific the grounds for eligibility of individual prospects for jury service, as well
as the grounds for excusing persons and granting temporary deferrals. For
example, one revision extends eligibility to those who have a criminal record
but are not "serving a criminal sentence or on probation or parole, and are
not defendants in a pending prosecution for an offense other than an infrac-
tion"; thus, unlike the first edition, standard 15-2.1 would not per se exclude
a convicted felon no longer incarcerated or on probation or parole. How-
ever, trial judges should look with favor on prosecutors' challenges for cause
of any particular prospective juror with a felony record who, as an individ-
ual, does not appear to be acceptable as a prospective juror.
Standard 15-2.2 concerns the list of prospective jurors, and contains
three revisions of the first edition standard: 1) dropping the requirement
that the parties must request the list as a condition to receiving it; 2) ex-
panding the information included; and 3) designating the time period within
which the parties must receive it.
Standard 15-2.4 deals with voir dire examination. A very substantial
change has been made in the second edition, in that the standard now makes
it clear that direct questioning by counsel is a right. The crucial part reads:
"Interrogation of jurors should be conducted initially and primarily by the
judge, but counsel for each side should have the opportunity, subject to rea-
sonable time limits, to question jurors directly, both individually and as a
panel. . . . It is the responsibility of the judge to prevent abuse of voir dire
examination."
One other standard in Part II deserves mention. Standard 15-2.6 con-
cerns peremptory challenges, and in the first edition it simply read: "The
number of peremptory challenges and the procedure for their exercise should
be governed by rule or statute." To this, the second edition added two sub-
sections as follows:
Standard 15-2.6. Peremptory challenges
(a) Peremptory challenges should be limited to a number no
larger than ordinarily necessary to provide reasonable assurance of
obtaining an unbiased jury, but the trial judge should be author-
ized to allow additional peremptory challenges when special cir-
cumstances justify doing so.




(b) The procedure for exercise of peremptory challenges should
permit challenge to any of the persons who have been passed for
cause.
These changes conform standard 15-2.6 to the policy established by the ABA
in 1976 in the Judicial Administration Standards on Trial Courts, thus sug-
gesting greater uniformity in limiting the number of such challenges by pro-
viding a flexible guideline based on the factors set forth.
Part III concerns special procedures during jury trial. Standard 15-3.1,
covering custody and restraint of defendants and witnesses, contains a revi-
sion in paragraph (b) which now reads: "The trial judge should not permit a
defendant or witness to appear at trial in the distinctive attire of a prisoner,
unless specifically waived by the defendant." The revision specifically pro-
vides for waiver in order to comport with Estelle v. W/lliams.'° ° The stan-
dard also is in harmony with Ilhinois v. AI1en, 1° 1 which was handed down
after the publication of the first edition.
Standard 15-3.6, relating to jury instructions, contains one significant
revision in that the following has been added: "Instructions to the jury
should be not only technically correct but also expressed as simply as possi-
ble and delivered in such a way that they can be clearly understood by the
jury." This section implements the ABA's increasing concern that jury in-
structions are too legalistic and too often unintelligible to a lay jury. This
concern was also heightened by findings of a research group which reported
studies of jurors in Florida, indicating, among other things, that an average
of only 70% of the instructions tested were comprehended.'
0 2
In all other respects the additional portions of the first edition standard
on this vital subject area remain the same, although the commentary of the
second edition contains excellent data summarizing developments in the
state of the art during the intervening ten years.
Part IV, covering jury deliberations and verdict, represents the final
substantive change in Chapter 15. This occurs in standard 15-5.1 which cov-
ers the taking by jurors of materials into the jury room. A new clause has
been added to permit copies ofjury instructions to be sent to the jurors at the
judge's discretion if both parties consent. The rationale favoring this change
in the standard is that access to written instructions generally helps the ju-
rors to refresh their recollections as to issues, as well as to the applicable law,
if they sense a need for such.
XIII. CHAPTER 18--SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
The first edition of this set of standards was approved in August 1968.
A separate volume relating to probation was approved in August 1970. Both
of these, for reasons of logic and interrelatedness, have been merged into
chapter 18, which received final ABA aproval in August 1979. This chapter
has proven to be one of the most important in the entire series of Criminal
100. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
101. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
102. Strawn & BuchananiJury Confusiro A Threat ioJusttice, 59 JUD. 478, 482 (1976).
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Justice Standards, for it deals with the ultimate question of the criminal justice
process-what happens to the convicted or guilt-pleading defendant?
In the decade between the first and second editions of the standards
comprising chapter 18, much has happened in that subject area. There is
probably no other area of criminal justice that has sparked as intense a de-
bate over fundamental assumptions. The debate has included the basic
questions of the purpose of sentencing, the length of sentences, where the
decision to sentence should lodge, how to deal with disparities in sentencing,
and whether parole should be abolished.
Notwithstanding this ferment, chapter 18 is characterized by continuity
rather than change. The response has been conservative for two reasons: 1)
the continuing validity of the premises that shaped this first edition; and 2)
the greater need for reform in practice than in theory.
Despite the ABA's conservative posture against scrapping basics of the
original edition, there remain valid criticisms of contemporary sentencing
practices, including: 1) the pervasiveness of sentencing disparities; 2) the ex-
cessive length of sentences; 3) the standardless character of the discretion
given to sentencing courts; 4) the informal nature of the presentence investi-
gation as well as the limited penetration of due process safeguards into the
sentencing process; and 5) the dangers of using the uncertain standard of
rehabilitative progress as a measure for determining the length of confine-
ment. Consensus has largely supplanted the debate on these matters, and
the evidence amply documents unrealistic expectations placed on the "indi-
vidualized treatment model" of sentencing.'
0 3
It would be confusing and counterproductive to attempt to catalog all
of the individual changes made in chapter 18. This particular chapter ex-
ceeds 550 pages. The updated commentary is encyclopedic in its compre-
hensive treatment and rational disposition of the myriad developments in
the sentencing area during the period between editions. It would likewise be
a disservice to purport to summarize its contents in any manner which might
imply that there is no need to study carefully the material in its entirety. In
fact, the very nature and importance of the problems in sentencing should
make such a study vital to interested representatives of the legislative, judi-
cial, and executive branches, as well as to members of the public who have
entertained and voiced concerns in this field. Consequently, in this section,
the effort will be limited to highlighting major retentions as well as changes
and suggesting the more significant rationale supporting such.
Part I articulates ABA policy as to where the sentencing authority
should lie. Despite the ferment of a decade since the first edition, chapter 18
reiterates the ABA policy against jury sentencing and reaffirms its stand that
sentencing properly should remain essentially a judicial function. 10 4 Thus,
standard 18-1.1 explicitly provides that "the jury's role should not therefore
extend to the determination of the appropriate sentence." Added, however,
is this qualifier: "These standards do not deal with whether the death pen-
103. STANDARDS, Supra note 1, at 18.6.
104. Id § 18-1.1.
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alty should be an available sentencing alternative and, if so, who should
participate in its imposition."'
0 5
Part II of chapter 18 outlines the statutory structure of sentencing and
articulates the principles and policy positions which the Standards recom-
mend. Part III covers the sentencing guideline drafting agency recom-
mended in Part II and incorporates what the ABA endorses as essential
principles to guide the drafting agency in providing needed assistance to sen-
tencing courts in the exercise of their discretion. Because these two parts are
interdependent, they will be considered together.
Standard 18-2.1 restates the recommended limited role of the legislature
carried over from the first edition, including the ABA's long-standing policy
against legislatively mandated sentences. The use of the word "limited" is a
change in emphasis rather than philosophy, yet deemed essential in light of
the recent trend toward determinate sentencing, for judicial and parole offi-
cials should be vested with discretion to respond to the substantial variety of
offense and offender combinations that inevitably arise. 10 6 This standard
also reiterates the ABA's recommendation that "[a]ll crimes should be classi-
fied by [the legislature] for the purpose of sentencing into a small number of
categories which reflect substantial differences in gravity. For each such cat-
egory, the legislature should specify the sentencing alternatives available for
offenses which fall within it. The penal codes of each jurisdiction should be
revised where necessary to accomplish this."' 0 7 This is an essential starting
point for reform in any jurisdiction. The major substantive change in stan-
dard 18-2.1 is to recommend that legislatures establish a centralized sentenc-
ing guideline drafting agency to develop specific sentencing criteria.
Standards 18-3.1 through 18-3.5 (Part III) are designed to provide for
the guideline drafting agency proposed in Part II and are completely new,
except to the extent that they incorporate principles enunciated in Part II.
Basically, the agency is to be in the judicial branch. Its authority is to "pro-
mulgate presumptively appropriate sentencing ranges within the statutory
limits,"10 8 in order to shape judicial discretion, not replace it with mechani-
cal rules.
Standard 18-3.1 also outlines essential criteria to apply to whatever sen-
tencing guidelines are drafted, such as recognition that deserved punishment
need not always consist of institutional confinement; hence guidelines should
embrace a variety of alternatives, including probation, "split sentences,"
fines, restitution, community service, and other intermediate sanctions.
These guidelines should focus on more than the fact of conviction, and
should seek to relate appropriate combinations of offense-offender character-
istics to presumptive sentencing ranges. They should also seek to reflect cur-
rent community consensus about the relative gravity of offenses.
Standard 18-3.2 details a set of principles to guide both the drafting
agency and the sentencing court in exercising their respective discretions. It
105. Id
106. Id at 18.27.
107. Id § 18-2.1(a).
108. Id § 18-3.1(a).
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also includes numerous illustrative factors-mitigating as well as aggravat-
ing-to assist the sentencing court in applying such difficult elements to ap-
plicable guideline ranges in appropriate cases.
Although standard 18-3.2 is new in articulating an ABA policy advocat-
ing legislative authorization for, as well as guidance in structuring discretion
for, both sentencing guidelines and the sentencing function, the principles
recommended are not all new. Some are well-established ABA policies car-
ried over from the first edition, while others are modifications of earlier posi-
tions adjusted to accommodate intervening case law or other developments
deemed authoritative. It is significant to note that standard 18-3.2's rejec-
tion of the offender's need for rehabilitation or treatment as a justification
for incarceration is a major substantive change from the first edition. How-
ever, this rejection of the "rehabilitation model" should not be construed as
the ABA's rejection of rehabilitation as a proper goal for corrections, but it
does mean that chapter 18 takes the position that the concepts of punish-
ment and treatment should be kept separate; thus, the length of confinement
in the sentence should not relate at all to any consideration of
rehabilitation. 109
Standard 18-2.4 articulates principles governing a range of sentencing
alternatives between supervised probation and total confinement. Here, the
only change is to accord greater emphasis to community service orders and
restitution. Since the original edition there has been a noteworthy legislative
trend toward use of intermittent confinement °" 0 and community service as
an alternative to prison for the nondangerous offender. Similarly, restitution
as a sanction is currently receiving unprecedented attention as a byproduct
of the shift in focus to crime victims.
Sentences involving total confinement, including special enhanced
terms for habitual or dangerous offenders, are addressed in standard 18-2.5,
and two noteworthy substantive modifications from the first edition have
been made. First, as previously indicated, rehabilitation has been deleted as
a justification for total confinement. Second, the standard has been modi-
fied to track the concept developed by the National Commission for Reform
of Federal Criminal Law (Brown Commission) which proposes federal crimi-
nal code provisions covering enhanced terms for special offenders."'
The first edition has recognized that, notwithstanding some public per-
ceptions to the contrary, sentences within the United States tend to be exces-
sively long. This was attributed in part to a natural legislative desire to
authorize sufficiently harsh or long penal terms where the offender was
deemed dangerous, habitual, or what some might label a professional crimi-
nal.11 2 Despite legislative motives, sentencing courts, lacking more precise
legislative guidance, tended to gravitate toward the statutory midrange of
109. Id at 18.63-67.
110. At least 17 states have legislation authorizing intermediate sanctions, and 42 states and
the proposed federal criminal code now authorize work release programs for felons. Id at
18.104-.105.
111. Id. at 18.118.
112. STANDARDS (1st ed. 1968), supra note 45, § 2.5(b).
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the authorized term where the offender appeared to lack either mitigating or
aggravating factors.
To confront this problem, the first edition advocated a two-tier statu-
tory sentencing structure, with longer sentences designed for offenders
deemed to fall in the special categories. The first edition conditioned en-
dorsement of the two-tier statutes on adequate legislative provisions to delin-
eate the special offenders, yet the chapter 18 Task Force found evidence that
existing statutes reflect such shortcomings as overbreadth, vagueness, and
improper criteria. Moreover, there have been increasing signs of difficulty or
impossibility in assessing dangerousness, which have created serious
problems.
Standard 18-2.5(b) now states: "that a sentence in excess of a specified
percentage of such maximums could not be imposed in the absence of a
specific finding by the court that the offender constituted a dangerous or
persistent offender as defined by it." Also, this standard specifies that, rather
than the legislature shaping its penal code to focus on special offenders, it
should incorporate in the statute instructions to the sentencing guideline
agency to develop the essential criteria for use by the sentencing court in
distinguishing such special offenders from the broader spectrum of offenders.
It should be noted that there is one very troubling type of special of-
fender legislation still existing in about half of the jurisdictions in the United
States, which the framers of chapter 18 admittedly have not addressed ade-
quately through its revisions. These are the so-called sexual psychopath stat-
utes. The commentary to standard 18-2.5 summarizes the broad spectrum of
problems, indicating that they transcend the procedural concerns with
which the standards primarily deal.' 13 Since publication of the second edi-
tion, however, the ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for
Criminal Justice has received private foundation funding and has already
launched Phase I of a major project which envisions as its final product a
comprehensive set of criminal justice standards in the mental health area. 1
14
Standard 18-2.8, entitled "organizational sanctions," is a completely
new addition to chapter 18, except for the incorporation of parts of the first
edition standard 2. 7 (g) authorizing special enhanced-fine schedules for cor-
porations. It is quite comprehensive and deals with the numerous special
problems of imposing sentences for crimes committed by organizations, com-
monly referred to as "white collar" crimes. The widespread surfacing of ille-
gal corporate conduct during the decade following the first edition created
the need to articulate standards to cope with special problems not ade-
quately embraced in sentencing persons, as distinguished from organiza-
tions. Some of the problems stem from the magnitude of the offenses, their
national and even international aspects, their longstanding, continuing na-
ture, and the nature and numbers of victims. Examples of such crimes are
consumer fraud, environmental harm, domestic and foreign bribes as inci-
dents of doing business, endangerment to workers, and securities fraud. A
113. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 18.131-136.




highlight summary of the approach taken by this new set of standards will
serve to indicate aspects of the uniqueness and complexity of the problems.
Standard 18-2.8(a) sets the stage by stating that "[tihe interests of soci-
ety and the need for fairness to the defendant require greater coordination of
criminal and civil remedies and greater flexibility in the discretion accorded
sentencing authorities to fit the punishment to the crime." Examples of ex-
isting sentencing alternatives that require such legislative clarification and
codification are: restitution, special enhanced-fine schedules, disqualifica-
tion of corporate officials from office in the specific organization, notice of
conviction to persons affected, and continuing judicial oversight.1 15
Finally, standard 18-2.8 contains three conditions to which all of its
enumerated sanctions are made subject: 1) restitution, special fines, and
continuing judicial oversight should not be imposed in cases, such as arise
under antitrust or securities laws, where statutory provisions for civil actions
seeking equitable relief, money damages, or civil penalties exist "to accom-
plish the remedial or deterrent purposes of such sanctions"; 2) the imposition
of such sanctions should be preceded by a full adversary hearing as outlined
in standard 18-5.4, using the "preponderance of the evidence" standard as
the burden of proof; and 3) appellate review as to the reasonableness of pen-
alties and conditions imposed will be available "to the same extent it applies
to other sentences generally under these standards."
Part IV focuses on the use of total confinement. Most of the standards
are restatements of the first edition, modified only by stylistic changes or
minor fine-tuning to accommodate the second edition's new concept of sen-
tencing guidelines. However, one standard is new and involves major policy
positions on the controversial subjects of indeterminacy and whether parole
should be eliminated. This is standard 18-4.1, which provides as follows:
Excessive indeterminacy now characterizes many penal codes and
tends to produce both unwarranted disparities among offenders
and unnecessary anxiety on their part about the time of their re-
lease. However, because both "indeterminate" and "flat time" sen-
tencing structures in their extreme forms are seriously defective, the
legislature should exercise caution in curtailing indeterminacy in
order to prevent determinate sentencing reforms from increasing
the average time actually served by most offenders. In particular,
two precautionary principles should be observed in any penal code
revision:
(a) An early release mechanism independent of the sentenc-
ing court should be retained to achieve a variety of purposes
which require an agency having a general oversight capacity;
and
(b) It is desirable that the proportion of indeterminacy in the
sentence increase as the sentence's length increases. To imple-
ment this principle standard 18-4.3 proposes criteria with re-
spect to the degree of indeterminacy recommended for
sentences of increasing length.
Chapter 18 endorses a compromise position with respect to indetermi-
115. See STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 18.161-.163.
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nacy and to the continued use of parole agencies. The sentencing court,
acting in accordance with sentencing guidelines, will establish a sentence
which will fix the range of indeterminacy; the parole authorities, acting pur-
suant to a separate but compatible set of guidelines promulgated by them,
will determine the offender's release. It is assumed that a presumptive re-
lease date-to minimize undesirable uncertainty-will be set by the parole
agency at an early point in the offender's confinement.
Part V deals with the informational basis for the sentence. Although
this segment contains what appear to be only modest revisions to the first
edition version, an examination of these revisions and the rationale therefor
will indicate that their implementation could have tremendous impact upon
reforming the sentencing process.
Standard 18-5.1 enumerates the general principles that should govern
presentence reports. Subsection (b) adds to the first edition a statement that
the legislative authorization for the court to call for a presentence investiga-
tion and report in every case, and the requirement for such in certain catego-
ries (enumerated in the original standard), should be observed "unless the
defendant or defense counsel waives production of the report and the court
specifically finds that it has sufficient information to exercise the discretion
accorded to it."
Another substantive change is the addition of subsection (c) which re-
quires that all material information in the report should be factual and veri-
fied by its preparer, who should be available at the presentence conference to
respond to challenges to the verification. According to the standard, the in-
ability to establish verification should cause the court to refuse to consider
that information at the sentencing hearing.
Subsection (d) also is new, and consists of detailed standards covering
the format, contents, and written presentation of presentence reports. It in-
cludes both short-form and full reports as well as guidelines for when each is
appropriate. Related to (d) is subsection (e), also new, which covers the pre-
cise preparation and format of presentence reports in jurisdictions where a
guideline drafting agency exists. This includes requirements that informa-
tion about the offender and offense, as well as mitigating or aggravating
factors, be expressly keyed to the guidelines criteria. Chapter 18 has added
yet another subsection which seems to be targeted to the parole agency
which chapter 18 favors retaining:
(f) The format of the presentence report should be designed with a
view to the likelihood of its use by dispositional agencies other than
the sentencing court that are dependent on the information devel-
oped at sentencing. In turn, the report should also apprise the sen-
tencing court of the likely impact of any guidelines utilized by the
agency administering early release upon the case of the offender
before the court.
These additions were motivated by several factors. First, the recom-
mended guideline system requires careful integration of the data gathered
with the criteria specified in the guidelines. Second, it was considered essen-
tial that the probation officer make an independent evaluation of the offense
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and all aggravating as well as mitigating factors. A third consideration was
that the "general retreat from a rehabilitative model" which has occurred
since the first edition necessitates reconsideration of the nature and scope of
the presentence inquiry.
Part VI, pertaining to sentencing procedures, requires only brief men-
tion regarding the changes between the first and second editions. The most
significant substantive revisions occur in standard 18-6.4 which covers the
sentencing proceeding, which is to be held "[a]s soon as practicable after the
determination of guilt and the examination of any presentence reports." Ba-
sically, the revisions are designed to incorporate minimum procedural stan-
dards for the sentencing hearing. Standard 18-6.4 also provides for a
hearing-not to become a minitrial--on "all material factual disputes aris-
ing out of any presentence reports or the evidentiary proffers of the parties."
Another substantive modification is the suggestion in standard 18-6.4(c) that
the court use "the preponderance of evidence" standard on all controversial
issues, although standard 18-6.5 adopts a more rigorous "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence standard for sentencing hearings involving exceptional offend-
ers subject to special long-term guidelines.
Part VII covers standards dealing with "Further Judicial Action," such
as authority to reduce sentences, 1 6 modification of sentences not involving
confinement or involving partial confinement; 1 7 modification of sentences
involving fines, nonpayment, or other violations of sanctions; 18 and finally,
revocation of probation.'l 9 The last mentioned is new, incorporating appli-
cable standards from the first edition probation standards, but containing
substantial modifications to accommodate the United States Supreme Court
decision of Gagnon v. Scarpe/h,'1 20 which came some years after the first edi-
tion. In brief, this case extends to probation revocations the same procedure
made mandatory for parole revocations by Momns v. Brewer.'
2'
The final segment of chapter 18 is Part VIII, entitled "Development of
Sentencing Criteria," which continues the first edition endorsement of sen-
tencing councils, but modifies the standard to indicate they should fill a role
as a "useful supplement" to the guideline drafting agency.
XIV. CHAPTER 20-APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
The first edition was given final approval by the House of Delegates in
February 1968. The second edition, represented by this chapter and bearing
the same title, was approved in August 1978, with three major policy or
substantive changes. First, standard 20-1.1 (b) and (d) provided for appeal of
sentences by either the prosecutor or the defendant, or both. Furthermore,
the power to initiate prosecution appeals was reserved in an officer with
statewide responsibility for the administration of criminal justice. Second,
116. Id. § 18-7.1.
117. Id § 18-7.3.
118. Id § 18-7.4.
119. Id § 18-7.5.
120. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
121. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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standard 20-2.1 modified the position in the first edition by eliminating the
provision that the highest court in a three-tiered court system should not
review appeals of sentences. Third, standard 20-3.3(b) prohibited a sentenc-
ing review court from imposing a harsher sentence than that appealed from
when the defendant alone appeals; such increases, permitted by the first edi-
tion, were eliminated as a counterbalance to the change in standard 20-1.1
permitting prosecution appeals designed to seek an increase in sentences
deemed too lenient. However, on February 4, 1980, the House of Delegates,
at the initiation of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
approved a resolution opposing government appeal of sentences on the
ground that they are too lenient; 12 2 thus, the 1978 approval of the change in
standard 20-1.1(b) and (d) was reversed, and the second edition has been
revised to reflect that.
In the remaining analysis of this chapter, we will take a closer look at
the major changes that had been proposed, and also examine the overall
philosophy and thrust of the concept of appellate review of sentences during
the decade between editions.
The premise upon which the first edition was based remains as firm as
ever for the second edition. The goal of the chapter is to remedy the dispar-
ity between the substantial procedural protections afforded defendants in
the guilt determination phase of the trial and the traditionally weaker pro-
tections available in the sentencing phase.
The standards emphasize that a system of sentence review would pro-
vide a means by which grossly excessive sentences can be corrected. Sen-
tence review would also force the important sentencing decisions more into
the open, thus exposing errors and at the same time building a needed base
for the prevention of future mistakes. More importantly, such a system
would help greatly to eliminate many needless technical appeals which, ab-
sent a system of sentence review, are all too often a covert attempt to induce
reversals to rectify unduly harsh sentences.
Part I enunciates the general principles. It was here that the changes in
standard 20-1.1 were addressed. The first edition took no official position on
the matter of government appeal of sentences; however, in the commentary,
there is indication that both the task force which drafted the standards and
the Special Committee which completed the drafts entertained doubts and
even some more certain feelings that there might be constitutional problems
based on double jeopardy. 12
3
The restrictive portion enunciated in standard 20-1.1(d) of the second
edition was designed to place the power to authorize a prosecution appeal in
someone other than the prosecutor who tries the case; thus it would provide
a safeguard against the possibility of a retaliatory cross-appeal by the gov-
ernment on the sentence which might create an undesirable cloud on a de-
fendant's decision whether to seek review of the conviction itself. This
restriction was analogous to the Senate version of the proposed Federal
122. Report with Recommendations to ABA House of Delegates, 1980 Midyear Meeting,
Report 119; Summary of Action of the ABA House of Delegates, 1980 Midyear Meeting 13.
123. STANDARDS (lst ed. 1968), supra note 45, APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 3, 56-57.
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Criminal Code, then undergoing consideration in the Congress, which would
allow the United States to appeal a sentence only if the Attorney General or
a designee authorized it in a specific case.'
24
On August 6, 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in the case of United States v. DiFrancesco125 that prosecution ap-
peal of a sentence under the Organized Crime Control Act violated the
double jeopardy provisions of the constitution.' 26 Notwithstanding the rec-
ommendation of the Standing Committee to defer action until the Supreme
Court disposed of the DiFrancesco case' 27 which it had accepted on certio-
rari, 128 the House of Delegates in February 1980 approved a resolution
which "as a matter of principle, opposes government appeal of sentences on
the grounds that they are too lenient."1 29 Accordingly, paragraphs (b) and
(d) of standard 20-1.1 have been revised.
Interestingly, on December 9, 1980, the Supreme Court decided the
DiFrancesco case, reversing the Second Circuit and holding that government
appeal does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment. 130
In connection with the issue of prosecution appeals, it is appropriate to
consider the change in the second edition relating to the powers of the re-
viewing court. Standard 20-3.3(b) provides that when an appellate court
reviews a sentence on appeal by a defendant, the court should not be permit-
ted to impose a sentence more severe than the sentence appealed from. Simi-
larly, if a reviewing court remands such a case for purposes of resentencing,
the trial court must not impose a sentence more severe than the sentence
originally imposed.
The first edition provided that a power to increase sentences should ex-
ist in defendant appeals, the rationale being that it is as appropriate to cor-
rect an excessively low sentence as an excessively high one. However, when
the second edition was being formulated, and the decision was made to in-
clude provision for government appeal, a corollary decision was also made to
eliminate the first edition provision on increases when only the defendant
appeals. These two changes, however, were not made interdependent; thus,
when the ABA reversed the change permitting prosecution appeals, the
change in standard 20-3.3(b) remained. Standard 20-3.3(b) would not bar
an increase in the sentence if the prosecution had properly taken an appeal
on grounds other than leniency, such as, for example, that the sentence is
invalid as a matter of law.
The remaining change in chapter 20 which merits consideration oc-
curred in standard 20-2.1, which refers to the reviewing court. It now pro-
vides: "Each court that is empowered to review the conviction should also
124. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
125. 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), revd, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
126. Id. at 786.
127. Report with Recommendations to ABA House of Delegates, 1980 Midyear Meeting,
Report 111.
128. 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
129. Id, Report 119.
130. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
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be empowered to review the disposition following conviction. Specialized
courts should not be created to review the sentence only." Eliminated from
the first edition was the suggestion of precluding appellate review by the
highest court in jurisdictions having a three-tiered court system. The reason-
ing for the change is that a prime objective of appellate review of sentences is
to reduce disparity by developing a uniform approach within jurisdictions.
As a practical matter, where a jurisdiction has intermediate appellate courts,
the likelihood of sentence review being exercised by the highest court would
be minimal; still, it was believed beneficial to permit the prerogative to
remain.
XV. CHAPTER 2 1--CRIMINAL APPEALS
The first edition of the standards on Criminal Appeals was approved in
August 1970; the second was approved in August 1978. The appeal stage in
the criminal process had received little intensive consideration when the first
edition Standards were formulated. In the eight years between editions, crim-
inal appeals occupied a much greater position in the workload of appellate
courts. The revisions in chapter 21 reflect the byproducts of this increased
prominence of criminal appeals. Nonetheless, the substantive changes re-
quired were comparatively few, and even those did not warrant disturbance
of the fundamental norms pioneered in the first edition.
The threshold standard is standard 21-1.1, which affirms uncondition-
ally the right of convicted criminal defendants to one level of appeal; how-
ever, as modified in the second edition, standard 21-1. 1(b) adds the phrase
"[o]rdinarily a decision to take an appeal is made by the defendant" to the
single statement of the first edition that "fain appeal is not a necessary and
integral part of every conviction." There may be some categories of criminal
convictions in which appellate review is required by interests of society
deemed to transcend choices of the defendants. For example, the apparent
trend in death penalty statutes is to include provisions for automatic
appeal. 131
It needs to be emphasized, however, that the concept of elective appeal
in the standard presupposes that such an election will be predicated on rea-
sonably arguable, rather than frivolous, grounds. There is general accept-
ance today that too many appeals are being taken without a reasonable
basis. Such problems are addressed in other parts of chapter 21.
Standard 21-1.3, covering limitations on defendants' appeals, final judg-
ments, and interlocutory appeals, contains substantive changes. It recog-
nizes a wider range of issues on which interlocutory appeals may be proper.
Use of interlocutory appeals is a difficult matter in any context, but there are
special aspects of the problem in criminal cases. In general, the standard
adheres to the principle that it is preferable to complete proceedings in the
trial court before questions are taken to a higher court. The standard recog-
131. In its decision upholding the constitutionality of recently enacted statutes authorizing
imposition of the death penalty, the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized, as one
factor, the safeguard of automatic appeal in those acts. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06,
222-24 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258-59 (1976).
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nizes three categories of decisions as meriting exceptions to this general prin-
ciple: 1) where the defendant's rights can be vindicated only through
interlocutory appeal, such as to avoid double jeopardy or to have a review of
an adverse decision as to bail pending trial; 2) where questions exist concern-
ing the competence of the trial court to hear a pending case; and 3) where
trial courts want to certify questions they deem worthy of appellate review
before trial. In the view of this standard, none of these exceptions carries the
concept of interlocutory appeal as a matter of right; rather, such should be
discretionary with the appellate court.
The standard continues to oppose interlocutory appeals in a fourth cat-
egory of issues commonly decided by pretrial rulings in trial courts. This
provision has been made more explicit in the second edition by standard 21-
1.3(c) which states as follows:
Where the only contested issues in a prosecution can be raised and
determined by decisions on pretrial motions, such as motions to
suppress evidence, motions to exclude confessions, and motions
challenging the sufficiency of the charging papers to state an of-
fense, a procedure should be established to permit entry of a final
judgment of conviction, on the basis of a guilty plea or a stipula-
tion of the facts necessary for conviction, without foreclosing subse-
quent appeals on the contested issues.
Standard 21-1.4 pertains to prosecution appeals and contains a valuable
modification to reflect clarification by recent Supreme Court cases in the
application of the double jeopardy clause. This modification occurs in para-
graph 21-1.4(a) to make clear that appeal by the prosecution is proper on
certain trial court rulings whether made before trial or after the fact-finding
process of the trial is concluded. The timing of the trial court's decision
should not control appealability. As long as the procedure does not raise
constitutional questions under the double jeopardy clause of the constitu-
tion, appeal by the prosecution should be permitted. Several United States
Supreme Court opinions subsequent to the first edition have been incorpo-
rated in the modifications to subsection (a).
132
Standard 21-2.3 covers unacceptable inducements and deterrents to
taking appeals. Paragraph (b) is new and contains substantive changes. It
enumerates the following as examples of unacceptable inducements for de-
fendants to appeal:
(i) absence of any risk that a financial obligation may be imposed
on an appellant who pursues a frivolous appeal;
(ii) automatic release from custody, on bail or recognizance, fol-
lowing a sentence to a term of confinement; and
(iii) automatic detention of the appellant who is confined pend-
ing appeal in a facility substantially different in quality and regi-
men from those in which inmates serving sentences are normally
held.
New subparagraph (i) was intended to reflect a growing realization that
132. See, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420
U.S. 358 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
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even indigent defendants may have certain financial resources with which to
pay for certain services. Thus, this new provision would authorize an appel-
late court to assess certain costs against a defendant who, although meeting
the technical eligibility for indigency, nevertheless has funds. For example,
the defendant may have savings from inmate work that was compensated,
and such assessment of costs or a portion may have been justified because of
aspects of frivolity in his appeal. Thus, the standard is designed to confront
in part at least a "nothing to lose" attitude of some indigents. The formula-
tors of this amendment were acutely conscious that numerous Supreme
Court opinions in the past decade have had the effect of substantially remov-
ing the obstacles of indigency as a constraint on criminal appeals. ' 3 3 In the
wake of those decisions, the number of such appeals has risen sharply. Thus,
the thrust of subparagraph (i) is to provide a counterincentive which will be"
consistent with the equal protection constitutional guarantees. A Supreme
Court opinion in 1974 lends support to this approach.
1 34
Paragraph 21-2.3(c), which enumerates examples of unacceptable deter-
rents to defendants' appeals, has been modified to reflect subsequent deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court.'3 5  Thus, it conforms to
constraints on the sanctions on reprosecution which the Court has articu-
lated. Defendants with substantial grounds for appeal from a conviction
should not be deterred from appealing because of the possibility that if they
succeed they face renewed prosecution that could result in a heavier
sentence.
Standard 21-2.5 deals with release pending appeal and stay of execu-
tion. Paragraph (d) contains a substantive change designed to limit the
scope of its counterpart in the first edition, and now reads as follows: "Dila-
tory prosecution on an appeal through acts or omissions of appellant or ap-
pellant's counsel should be grounds for termination of the release of
appellant pending appeal." Even if the release was appropriate when the
appeal commenced, the decision is subject to reconsideration on the above
grounds, but the change in the paragraph was intended to limit terminations
to cases in which fault for delay lies with the defendant or counsel represent-
ing the defendant.
XVI. CHAPTER 22-PosTcoNvicrTION REMEDIES
The first edition of the Postconviction Remedies Standards, approved
in 1968, provided procedural guidelines in an area of great and increasing
need. As the introduction to that edition observes, postconviction review
had become an established part of the criminal process within "the past few
years." It was a byproduct, in part, of the changes in criteria governing
criminal prosecutions wrought by the Supreme Court of the United States.
133. &e, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1956); ef Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (state need not provide appeal for indigents
and if appeal is provided for, state does not necessarily have to provide counsel).
134. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).




The standards in the second edition, approved in 1978, are substantially
similar to the originals, but they enjoy a considerable body of support from
their decade in the marketplace. As we examine chapter 22, we shall see
that there have been some noteworthy improvements made, some of sub-
stantive dimensions, and some primarily designed to clarify or emphasize
principles already in the first edition.
Before examining specific changes, an overview of the scope of this seg-
ment of standards might be helpful. First and foremost, these particular
standards are intended to be purely procedural, as distinguished from any
attempt to articulate either substantive criminal law or related principles of
constitutional law. Thus, one should not expect to find in either the first or
second editions any effort to define the grounds for postconviction relief.
Another basic concept in the Standards is that the procedure should be
capable of handling all postconviction claims in a single form. Yet the Stan-
dards do not recommend that all postconviction litigation be consolidated in
a single statewide court, or that an officer of the government with statewide
jurisdiction need represent the respondent. The Standards aim for the princi-
ple of finality, and, to help achieve that, the Standards contain guidelines to
prevent abuse of process, and to provide for denial of relief when abuse is
proved. 136
Finally, the standards articulate guidelines for preparation of applica-
tions for postconviction relief and for resources available to applicants, for
standardized application forms, for helping to ensure against false applica-
tions, and for guiding courts as to imposition of financial liability on appli-
cants in cases where the applicants are adjudged to have taken undue
advantage of postconviction remedies.
Highlights of the changes made in chapter 22 will now be addressed,
together with the rationale prompting them.
Standard 22-1.3 pertains to the proper parties to postconviction pro-
ceedings, one of whom is referred to as the respondent, defined in standard
22-1.3(a) as "the entity in which name the original prosecution was brought,
for example, State, People, Commonwealth, or the United States of
America." Paragraph (b) has been modified to permit either a statewide
officer or the local prosecutor to appear as counsel for the respondent. The
first edition fixed this responsibility in all cases on a statewide official, who
might in turn delegate functions to local prosecutors.
Standard 22-1.4, dealing with jurisdiction, venue, and assignment of
judges, has been revised in paragraph (a) to permit proceedings for postcon-
viction relief to be vested in any trial court of general criminal jurisdiction,
as opposed to the single statewide court called for in the original Standards.
Standard 22-2.2 covers prematurity of applications for postconviction
relief, and postponed appeals. Subsection (a) has been revised to permit flex-
ibility in the time for processing an appeal from the prosecution phase of a
case when an application for postconviction relief is filed before such appeal
has been concluded. This change is designed to encourage consolidation of
136. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 22.5.
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postconviction claims and claims of error in proceedings leading to
conviction.
Standard 22-3.1 pertains to preparation of applications for postconvic-
tion relief, as well as to resources available to applicants. The first edition
version of this standard accepted as a premise that most potential applicants
for postconviction relief would be confined in prison and would be com-
pelled by circumstances to commence proceedings without assistance of
counsel and with only limited legal materials. The revision proceeds from
the entirely different premise that counsel should be available, either
through attorneys practicing as part of in-prison programs or through super-
vised law students. The fundamental principle of the standard has been
broadened to cover the situation of persons not in confinement, although the
need for legal services is most acute within custodial institutions.
Despite numerous decisions, the Supreme Court has not established a
right to counsel beyond the first level of appellate review of convictions; thus,
there is no right to counsel recognized under the fourteenth amendment for
inmates, or for persons not in custody, who contemplate postconviction pro-
ceedings. '3 7 Nonetheless, standard 22-3.1 concludes that there should be a
system supported by public funds to make professional advice and profes-
sional assistance available.
Recommendations for publicly supported legal assistance notwithstand-
ing, the standards provide in 22-4.7(a)(iii) that the applicant bear some risk
through the potential of a postjudgment assessment of costs or the like,
which would serve to deter a prospective applicant from indiscriminate filing
in disregard of professional advice of the type contemplated. The power of
the court to assess costs represents a change in the second edition. With the
emerging pattern of compensating inmates for work in prisons, even those
who otherwise lack financial resources can be held accountable for some part
of the postconviction litigation expense. A comparable principle is con-
tained in the chapter on Criminal Appeals. "8
Standard 22-5.3(a), concerned with processing appeals, adopts the phi-
losophy of the revised chapter on Criminal Appeals' 3 9 that there should be a
diversified and flexible processing of appellate cases. The standard encour-
ages appellate courts to consider all pertinent legal issues on their merits
insofar as possible, in order to reach a final determination of the entire crimi-
nal case.
Standard 22-6.1 deals with finality of the judgment of conviction and
sentence. The original standard concerning abuse of process has been modi-
fied here to take into account criminal procedure rules that regulate the time
for presenting certain defenses or objections in the course of prosecution pro-
ceedings. Where an applicant raises in a postconviction proceeding an issue
which might have been, but was not, presented in a timely manner in the
proceeding leading to judgment of conviction, the burden is placed on the
137. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974);
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
138. STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 21-2.3(b)(i).
139. Id §§ 21-3.1-3.4.
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applicant to show cause for the failure to comply with the rules of
procedure. 140
The final standard in chapter 22 involves a change which deserves men-
tion because of some intervening case law. Standard 22-6.3 covers renewal
of prosecution against a successful postconviction applicant. Paragraph (b)
provides: "Credit should be given toward service of the minimum and maxi-
mum terms of any new prison sentence for time served under a sentence
successfully challenged in a postconviction proceeding."
If the original sentence under the invalidated judgment was for less
than the statutory maximum applicable to the renewed prosecution, the
question arises whether a more severe sentence can be imposed. The pro-
phylactic rule of North Carohna v. Pearce'4 ' largely controls this question.
Thus, the provision in the original standard for a ceiling on sentences has not
been carried forward into the second edition.
CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, the second edition of the ABA Standards for
Crimina/Justice is marked by both continuity and change. Many of the stan-
dards are either unchanged or changed only stylistically. On the other hand,
many of the second edition standards reflect major substantive changes. The
changes are due, in large part, to the case law between the first and second
editions.
Despite what are hoped to be major advances in the Crimina/Justice Stan-
dards, we do not pretend that they are in any sense the last word in criminal
justice. Just as the first edition was revised to benefit from advances between
the first and second editions, the second edition will, no doubt, eventually be
supplanted by a third. The best we can hope for is that, in practice, the
implementation of the second edition Standards results in the desired im-
provements, and that our experience with the second edition Standards pro-
vides a firm base from which to design a better third edition.
140. Id at 22.62-.63.
141. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
1981]

THE PERJURIOUS DEFENDANT: A PROPOSED
SOLUTION TO THE DEFENSE LAWYER'S
CONFLICTING ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS TO
THE COURT AND TO HIS CLIENT
WILLIAM H. ERICKSON*
INTRODUCTION
In a criminal case, defense counsel has a dual function: officer of the
court and trained legal advocate for his accused client. The roles conflict
when the lawyer learns that his client intends to offer false or otherwise mis-
leading testimony. How does the defense lawyer reconcile his obligations
and duties to the court with those he owes to his client? Legal experts have
offered various solutions, none of which have been enthusiastically accepted.'
The purpose of this article is to explore the nuances of, and offer a solution
to, the ethical dilemma faced by a defense lawyer who is confronted with a
client who intends to commit perjury.'
The American adversary system of criminal justice is not inquisitorial,
but accusatory. 2 Evidence is presented to the judge or jury by trained advo-
cates according to established rules, so that conflicting factual issues may, be
resolved and truth emerge as the final product.
3
Chief Justice Burger, in a now well-known metaphor, has compared the
American adversary system to a tripod or three-legged stool. 4 The judge,
prosecutor, and defense lawyer form the three legs of the tripod. Each must
be equally strong and must fulfill his separate duties if the tripod of justice is
to maintain its stability and strength. 5 Adding strength to the tripod are the
* Deputy Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court. Chairman, American Bar Association
(ABA) Special Committee on the Administration of Criminal Justice 1973-1976; Chairman,
ABA Committee to Implement the Standards for Criminal Justice, 1977-1981; Chairman, ABA
Adjunct Committee on Implementation of Criminal Justice Standards, 1981-1982; Judicial
Member-at-Large, ABA Board of Governors, 1976-1979. The author gratefully acknowledges
the research and writing assistance provided by Ted Allegra and Kathryn Nielson.
1. A lawyer's belief that his client intends to commit perjury must be based upon his
independent investigation of the evidence or his client's statement of a clear intent to commit
perjury. Mere inconsistency in the client's story is not sufficient to support the lawyer's belief.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 7.7, commentary at 276 (1st ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as STANDARDS (1st ed.)].
2. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
3. Set generally United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
4. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Second Plenary Session, American Bar
Association Annual Meeting (July 16, 1971). See generally Burger, The Special Skills of Adwcacy:
Are Specialized Training and Certhfication of Adzxats Essential to Our System ofjustice?, 42 FORDHAM
L. REV. 227 (1973).
5. Set Erickson, Standards of Competeny for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Care, 17 Am. CRIM.
L. REV. 233 (1979); Erickson, TM History oft/e TripodofJutsite, 64 Mi.L L. REv. 79 (1974).
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American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice which re-
late to the functions of the trial judge, the prosecution (Prosecution Stan-
dards), and the defense (Defense Standards), 6 and the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code of Professional Responsibility).
7
In our legal system there are many deterrents to the introduction of
false or improper evidence at trial. First, the ABA Prosecution Standards
and the Code of Professional Responsibility emphasize that the prosecutor's
function is to seek justice, not merely to convict. 8 Well-established precedent
forecloses the prosecutor from using false or perjured testimony in the pur-
suit of a conviction. 9 Second, evidentiary and exclusionary rules screen out
unreliable evidence and prevent overzealous law enforcement. 10 Finally, the
Defense Standards classify intentional misrepresentation of fact or law to the
court as unprofessional conduct.'" The defense lawyer who knowingly uses
false evidence deflects the truth finding process as much, if not more, than
the overzealous police officer or prosecutor. The misconception that the de-
fense lawyer is the alter ego and mouthpiece of the accused, speaking with
the erudition of a lawyer but espousing only the views of his client, has been
put to rest.
12
6. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as PROSECUTION
STANDARDS OR DEFENSE STANDARDS].
7. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE].
8. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 3-1.1(C); ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-
103(B). See also People v. Elliston, 181 Colo. 118, 508 P.2d 379 (1973); People v. Walker, 180
Colo. 184, 504 P.2d 1098 (1973).
9. The United States Supreme Court has strongly condemned the prosecution for offering
false evidence and has set aside convictions obtained by the use of evidence known to be false:
More than 30 years ago this Court held the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a
state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103. There has been no deviation from that established principle.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213; cf. Alcorta v. Texas, 355
U.S. 28. There can be no retreat from that principle here.
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
10. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); see also Oaks, Stud:ng the Exclusion-
aqy Rule in Search and Seiure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
11. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-7.5. When an accused client or attorney
presents false documentary evidence or affidavits to the trier of fact, the courts are in general
agreement in barring such evidence. See, e.g., Utz v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 100, 130 P.2d 377
(1942); In re Trimble, 226 Ind. 187, 79 N.E.2d 213 (1948); In re Ellis, 155 Kan. 894, 130 P.2d 564
(1942); In re Kenner, 178 La. 774, 152 So. 520 (1931); State v. Fisher, 103 Neb. 736, 174 N.W.
320 (1919). In addition, the signature of a lawyer on a pleading submitted to the court consti-
tutes certification that, to the best of his information, knowledge, and belief, it is truthful. See,
e.g., COLO. R. Clv. P. 11. The criminal defense lawyer's duty not to use false testimony of
persons other than the defendant is also well-established. See, e.g., People v. Schultheis, No. 80-
SC-299 (Colo. Oct. 19, 1981); Herbert v. United States, 340 A.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 1975); People
v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 96, 372 P.2d 656, 672, 22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 680 (1962). See aLso M. FREED-
MAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 32 (1975).
12. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-1.1, commentary at 4.9. Chief Justice Burger
advocates this principle:
The popular misconceptions about the functions of lawyers in criminal cases flow
from many sources including misconduct of some lawyers themselves . . . and a mis-
placed sentimentality which has put some lawyers in doubt as to their function.
One result of these fallacious and blurred conceptions of the advocate's function is
the public image of the criminal lawyer as the servile 'mouthpiece' or the alter ego of
the accused or one who does for the accused what the accused would do for himself if
he had the legal skills . . . [This] is totally incompatible with the basic duty of a
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The Defense Standards describe the role of the modern defense attorney
as the accused's professional representative---counselor and advocate-but
not alter ego.1 3 The Standards stress establishment of a close lawyer-client
relationship through private, confidential communications.' 4 The Standards
also specify that it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer who is interview-
ing a client to encourage less than candid responses.' 5 The attorney should
probe for all legally relevant information without seeking to influence the
response. 16
The tension between the defense lawyer's role as an officer of the court
and his duty to act as a zealous advocate and representative of his accused
client creates the lawyer's dilemma. Any solution to this dilemma which fails
to protect the integrity of the truth-finding function of the adversary system
ofjustice is inadequate. This article will examine the different approaches to
the ethical dilemma which confronts defense counsel when the client intends
to commit perjury, and will propose a practical, ethically acceptable
solution.
I. THE ETHICAL DILEMMA
A conflict between defense counsel's ethical obligations to the court and
those to his client surfaces when the accused client insists upon testifying in
his own defense and makes known his intent to commit perjury. The De-
fense Standards recognize that a defendant has certain rights-to decide the
plea which should be entered, whether trial will be to a jury or to the court,
and whether to testify in his own defense.' 7 As a result, defense counsel can
strongly advise the client not to testify, but cannot prevent the client from
testifying and committing perjury.
On the other hand, after consulting with the client, defense counsel is
the "captain of the ship" and thus the final arbiter for general trial tactics,
lawyer as an officer of the court and contrary to the traditions and ethics of the legal
profession.
A lawyer . . . advocates but does not identify with his client. The alter ego or
mouthpiece school of thought, which is happily a minute fraction of the legal profes-
sion, would carry this perverted notion to the point of complete identification of law-
yer with client, i.e., the lawyer as an extension of the accused himself with a
community of interest, motivation, and goals, bound to engage in falsehood and chi-
cane at the command of the client. These concepts have long been rejected. . . and
find no acceptance among honorable members of the bar.
The lawyer. . . should be. . . a professional advocate with a highly important
but nonetheless limited function, .e., limited and circumscribed by the rules of the
system and the ethics of the profession. At the trial stage his duty is to put the prosecu-
tion to its proof, to test the case against the accused, to insist that the procedural
safeguards be followed and to put forward evidence which is valid, relevant and help-
ful to his client. On appeal his function is to point to trial errors, if such there be, and
expound the applicable rules of law. In short, he is to 'put his client's best foot
forward.' . . . Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Bur-
ger, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
13. DEFENSE STANDARDS, suepra note 6, § 4-1.1.
14. Id. §4-3.1.
15. Id. § 4-3.2.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 4-5.2(a). The United States Supreme Court has not specifically recognized a de-
fendant's constitutional right to testify in his own behalf. Set Robinson, The Perjwvy Diemma i an
Adversary System, 82 DIcK. L REV. 545, 554-61 (1978).
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strategy, and witness selection.' 8 If the attorney and client disagree on sig-
nificant matters of trial tactics, the Standards direct the attorney to make a
confidential record of the circumstances, his advice and reasons, and the con-
clusion reached.' 9
The perjury issue assumes ethical dimensions when defense counsel
knows that his client intends to offer false testimony. The lawyer's dilemma
arises from his duty as an officer of the court not to offer false testimony and
his concomitant duty to his client to preserve confidential communications
and to discover all relevant facts known to the accused in order to prepare an
effective defense.20 The first component of the dilemma is created by coun-
sel's obligation to determine "all relevant facts known to the accused."'2 1 It
is axiomatic that counsel is unable to prepare a. good case if ignorant of
essential facts; thus, the foundation for the requirement that defense counsel
investigate and obtain all relevant facts is rooted in the sixth amendment's
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 22 The lawyer's obligation to pro-
vide the client with an effective defense depends on the client's willingness to
disclose all relevant facts, no matter how prejudicial or embarrassing. Ac-
cordingly, protecting client confidences is one of the attorney's most sacred
obligations2 3 and is "so essential to effective representation and to the proper
functioning of the legal system that the obligation is protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.
'"24
The second component of the dilemma is created'by the lawyer's oath,
which is uniformly required for admission to the bar. In Colorado, the pro-
spective lawyer pledges: "I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and
honor, and will never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice or
false statement of fact or law. .... "25 Thereafter the lawyer is an officer of
the court whose official conduct "should be characterized by candor."
'2 6
Moreover, in most states, every lawyer is bound by the professional stan-
18. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-5.2.
19. Id.
20. Professor Monroe H. Freedman has described the lawyer's position as a "trilemma."
Set M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 27-42. Substantially the same material from Professor
Freedman's book is reprinted in Freedman, Perjiy." The ,awyer Tninma, 1 LITIGATION 26
(1975).
21. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 27, (quoting STANDARDS (1st ed.), supra note 1, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.2(a)).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted this provision in several landmark cases. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In some jurisdictions, the right to counsel
has been interpreted to require that counsel present an accused as a witness if the accused
wishes to testify, even if counsel knows the testimony will be false. See, e.g., State v. Trapp, 52
Ohio App. 2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (1977).
23. ABA CODE, supra note 7, Canon 4.
24. Robinson, supra note 17, at 548. See aLr, ABA CODE, supra note 7, EC 4-1.
25. CoLO. R. CIv. P. 220.
26. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 27 (quoting ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
No. 22). See also ABA CODE, supra note 7, EC 9-6; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953).
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dards contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 2 7 which also
forecloses the use of perjured testimony and protects a client's privileged
communications to his lawyer.
28
Therefore, defense counsel faces seriously conflicting obligations when
he becomes aware that a client intends to commit perjury. Which obligation
is paramount: The duty of candor to the court or the duty to preserve invio-
late client confidences? If the defense attorney reveals to the court the cli-
ent's intent to commit perjury, conviction and enhanced punishment are
likely. On the other hand, if the defendant's intent is not revealed, the attor-
ney participates in deceiving the court and the jury.
II. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE DEFENSE LAWYER
A. ABA Code of Professional Responsibibiy
The American Bar Association adopted the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility in 1969, effective January 1, 1970.29 Recognizing that the for-
mer Canons of Professional Ethics 30 were "generalizations designed for an
earlier era,"3 ' the Code of Professional Responsibility sought to provide
"clear, peremptory rules in the critical areas relating most directly to the
duty of lawyers to their clients and to the courts."'32 The Code's mixture of
Canons, Disciplinary Rules, and Ethical Considerations, 33 however, often
fails to prescribe a precise course of conduct for criminal lawyers.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4) dictates that a lawyer shall not "know-
ingly use perjured testimony or false evidence."'34 While this provision, at
27. Colorado has adopted the Code as the standard of professional conduct for lawyers
licensed to practice in Colorado. COLO. R. Civ. P. 223.
28. Set ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(B)(1), DR 4-101.
29. ABA CODE, supra note 7, at Preface. The Code replaced the Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted by the ABA in 1908. These Canons were originally derived from the first or-
ganized code of professional ethics, which was adopted in 1887 by the Alabama State Bar Asso-
ciation. The Alabama code, in turn, was based on a series of lectures by Judge George
Sharswood at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1854. Sharswood's lectures empha-
sized an attorney's differing roles to the client, the public, the state, and to his "professional
brethren." Set Armstrong, A Centuy ofLegal Elthics, 64 A.B.A.J. 1063 (1978).
30. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics, as amended (1908).
31. ABA CODE, supra note 7, at Preface.
32. Armstrong, supra note 29, at 1069 (quoting from the 1965 annual address to the Ameri-
can Bar Association by former ABA President Lewis Powell).
33. The provisions of the Code are divided into Canons, Disciplinary Rules, and Ethical
Considerations, each of which is described in the Code as follows:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of profesional conduct expected of lawyers in relationships with the public,
with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general con-
cepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objec-
tives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a
body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific
situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in
character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework
of fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regard-
less of the nature of their professional activities.
ABA CODE, supra note 7, at Preliminary Statement.
34. Id. DR 7-102(A)(4). Various court decisions have held that a rule of this type overrides
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first glance, may seem to be unambiguous, the related Disciplinary Rules
and Ethical Considerations do not indicate how defense counsel should com-
ply with the rule if his client insists upon taking the witness stand and testify-
ing falsely.35 In fact, Ethical Consideration 7-26 complicates this ambiguity
by expanding a lawyer's obligation not to use perjured testimony or evidence
in situations where he "knows, or from facts within his knowledge, should know,
that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured."
36
Other provisions of the Code provide no clarification. Disciplinary Rule
4-101 states the general rule prohibiting a lawyer from revealing the confi-
dences and secrets of his client. 37 Subsection C of DR4-101, however, makes
an important qualification: "A lawyer may reveal . . . the intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime." 38
Does perjury committed during the course of a client's testimony consti-
tute a crime within the meaning of DR 4-101(C)? The plain meaning of the
rule would indicate that perjury, since it is a crime, would fall within the
exception. Professor Freedman, however, has argued to the contrary. 39 He
bases his position on the extreme prejudice that can result from informing a
judge of the defendant's intention to lie under oath, since that judge may
later hear the case and sentence the defendant. 40 In addition, statutory en-
actments in some jurisdictions preclude prosecution for perjury when the
defendant's false statement was a denial of his guilt at trial.4 1 Regardless of
whether perjury is a crime to which the rule applies, it is important to note
that the exception is discretionary. It provides only that a lawyer may reveal
the intentions of his clients to commit a crime; it does not dictate
revelation.
4 2
a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Schultheis, 618 P.2d
701 (Colo. App. 1980), rev'd, No. 80-SC-299 (Colo. Oct. 19, 1981); see also In re Branch, 70 Cal.
2d 200, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969); People v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 372 P.2d 656, 22
Cal. Rptr. 664 (1962); People v. Lewis, 75 11. App. 2d 560, 393 N.E.2d 1380 (1979); State v.
Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (1977).
35. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 29. See also Lawry, Lying, Confident.'t and/he Adversay
System ofjoustce, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 653; Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977).
36. ABA CODE, supra note 7, EC 7-26 (emphasis added.)
37. Id. DR 4-101(A), (B). The rule provides:
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client
(A) 'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the profes-
sional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
See generally Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978); In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534
F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976).
38. Id. DR 4-101(C). See generaly State v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
39. Freedman, Professional Responsiibty of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Ques-
tions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
40. Id. at 1476-78.
41. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-507 (1973).
42. But see ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965) (interpret-
ing ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, (1908)), which indicates that a lawyer must dis-
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Similarly, the rule relating to frauds upon the court fails to provide ade-
quate guidance to a lawyer who discovers that his client has committed
perjury:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: [h]is
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except
when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
4 3
The straightforward requirement that attorneys report client frauds upon
the court, 44 however, is also muddled by a qualification. Under DR 7-
102(B)(1), if defense counsel learns of his client's fraud through "a privileged
communication," he need not inform the court. 45 The Code, however, fails
to provide any clear definition of which communications are so privileged.
46
Moreover, DR 4-101(C)(2) allows a lawyer to reveal confidences or secrets
whenever "permitted" under the Disciplinary Rules.4 7 It is uncertain, how-
ever, which confidences and secrets falls within the "privileged communica-
tion" clause in DR 7-102(B)(1), so as to permit their disclosure. 48
close even the confidences of his clients if "the facts in the attorney's possession indicate beyond
a reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed."
43. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(B)(1). Cf. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAW-
YERS, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT rule I I(d) (1971): "Subject to whatever qualifications may
exist from the confidential privilege that exists between a lawyer and his client, the lawyer
should expose without fear before the proper tribunals perjury, subornation of perjury and any
professional misconduct."
44. The use of perjured testimony or false evidence is generally regarded as a fraud upon
the court for the purposes of DR 7-102(B)(1). Set ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT rule 3.3 at 128 (Proposed Final Draft May 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as ABA MODEL
RULs].
45. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(B)(1). As originally adopted, the rule did not
contain any exception; it was added in the 1974 amendments to the Code. Hence, it may be
argued that the purpose of the original wording of the provision was to make disclosure
mandatory in all situations. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 20; A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS
IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 147 (1976). Further, the ABA STANDARDS, referring to the
original draft of DR 7-102(B)(1), state that the provision "is construed as not embracing the
giving of false testimony in a criminal case." STANDARDS (1st ed.), supra note 1, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Supplement at 18. Therefore, even before the amend-
ment the clause did not apply to the criminal defense lawyer. Set M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11,
at 29. One ABA Opinion states that
[t]he tradition (which is backed by substantial policy considerations) that permits a
lawyer to assure a client that information (whether a confidence or a secret) given to
him will not be revealed to third parties is so important that it should take precedence,
in all but the most serious cases, over the duty imposed by DR 7-102(B).
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975).
46. A. KAUFMAN, supra note 45, at 147.
47. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(C)(2).
48. A. KAUFMAN, supra note 45, at 147. "Confidences and secrets" are defined in ABA
CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(A). Set also note 37 supra. The ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility has attempted to resolve this uncertainty through circular reasoning:
"The balancing of the lawyer's duty to preserve confidences and to reveal frauds is best made by
interpreting the phrase 'privileged communications' . . . as referring to those confidences . ..
that are required to be preserved by DR 4-101." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975).
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B. The Defense Standards Proposal
Proposed section 4-7.7 of the Defense Standards49 provides another an-
swer to the ethical dilemma. When a lawyer discovers that his client intends
to commit perjury, he must strongly advise his client not to offer the false or
misleading testimony. If the defendant insists on taking the stand and testi-
fying falsely, defense counsel must seek to withdraw from the case. The mo-
tion to withdraw should not specify the basis for withdrawal and the
intended perjury should not be revealed to the court. If withdrawal is not
feasible because trial is imminent or has commenced, or if the motion to
withdraw is denied, defense counsel should limit direct examination of the
defendant to those areas where counsel believes that the defendant's answers
will not be perjurious. The lawyer should avoid direct examination on mat-
ters which defense counsel believes the defendant will offer perjurious testi-
mony. He should merely ask the defendant if he wishes to make any
additional statement concerning the case to the judge or jury. Defense coun-
sel should then make a record, out of the presence of the jury, of the fact that
his client is taking the stand against his advice. 50
In an attempt to accommodate conflicting ethical duties, the Defense
Standard properly stresses the lawyer's duty not to present known false testi-
mony. 5 1 Nonetheless, the proposal presents significant difficulties. 52 The
constitutional and practical deficiences of implementing section 4-7.7 have
come to light in recent efforts to prepare a new code of ethical conduct.
53
The defendant could assert the denial of the effective assistance of coun-
sel 54 because the lawyer is prohibited from developing the perjured testi-
mony on direct examination, or advocating acceptance of the testimony in
closing argument. Similarly, the fact that a lawyer is subject to disciplinary
sanctions for presenting false testimony forces the lawyer to take a position
adverse to his client.
55
In addition, section 4-7.7 presents several practical problems. First, if
the trial is about to commence or has already begun, the court will in all
likelihood deny the motion to withdraw.
Second, since the defense lawyer is prohibited from disclosing his rea-
sons for withdrawal, denial of the motion is inevitable. Inquiry by the court
49. The 1980 version of the STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE only contains a proposed
standard relating to the perjurious defendant. The ABA House of Delegates has deferred adop-
tion of proposed section 4-7.7 until the ABA Special Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards reports its final recommendations. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-7.7, edito-
rial note at 4.95. The proposed standard, however, is substantially similar to the 1971 version.
The most significant change is that the 1980 version adds a provision which states that "it is
unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to [the defendant's] perjury or use the per-
jured testimony." DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-7.7(c).
50. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-7.7.
51. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(A)(4).
52. See Lefstein, The Cnial Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinkng the Defense Lawyer's
Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1978); Robinson, supra note 17.
53. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 44; AMERICAN LAWYERS CODE OF CONDUCT (Dis-
cussion Draft June 1980).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
55. Lowrey v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstettler, J., specially concur-
ring); State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
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into the lawyer's motives for withdrawal forces the lawyer either to disregard
his confidential relationship with his client or to stand mute. In either event,
the court will conclude that the defendant intends to commit perjury and
therefore, will consider the defendant's conduct an obstruction of justice.
Upon conviction, an enhanced sentence can be anticipated.
Third, section 4-7.7 does not state what the defense lawyer should do if
the prosecutor objects to defense counsel's narrative question. 56 Moreover,
the prosecution is permitted to emphasize the defense lawyer's failure to de-
velop the client's testimony. As a result, the focus of the trial shifts from a
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged, to
an inquiry into the defendant's perjury.
Finally, if the lawyer is permitted to withdraw, the defendant may use
the same tactic with new counsel to obtain unlimited continuances. The
delays which could result from such a procedure are intolerable. After hav-
ing been "educated" by his former lawyer's refusal to present perjured testi-
mony, the defendant may begin his relationship with new counsel with a
false statement of the facts. If this "truthful" testimony is all that is known,
the new counsel is not involved in presenting known false evidence to the
court. The ends of justice, however, are subverted because the defendant is
still presenting false testimony.
A brief analysis of Lowrq v. Cardwell5 7 highlights the deficiencies of sec-
tion 4-7.7. The defendant in Lowrey was charged with first-degree murder.
During a trial to the court, the defendant took the stand and offered what
defense counsel believed to be perjured testimony. Counsel then requested a
recess and, without stating his reasons, moved to withdraw. The motion was
denied. Thereafter, counsel did not develop his client's testimony and did
not rely on the testimony in closing argument. The trial judge found the
defendant guilty of second-degree murder.
In reversing the defendant's conviction and remanding for a new trial,
the court of appeals concluded that the defendant was denied a fair trial
because defense counsel's action amounted to an unequivocal announcement
to the judge that his client was testifying falsely. In a special concurrence,
Judge Hufstettler stated that the defendant was denied the effective assist-
ance of counsel:
[W]hen defense counsel moved to withdraw, he ceased to be an
active advocate of his client's interests. Despite counsel's ethical
concerns, his actions were so adverse to [the defendant's] interests
as to deprive her of effective assistance of counsel. No matter how
commendable may have been counsel's motives, his interest in sav-
ing himself from potential violation of the canons was adverse to
his client, and the end product was his abandonment of a diligent
defense.
58
The Defense Standards approach constitutes an effort to limit the effect
56. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 37.
57. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
58. Id. at 732 (Hufstettler, J., specially concurring).
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of perjured testimony. The flaws in section 4-7.7, however, compromise the
integrity of the truth-finding process.
C. The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The ABA Special Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
is presently drafting a new set of ethical rules-the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Model Rules). 5 9 The Commission, commonly known as the
Kutak Commission,6° was created in 1977 after the ABA Board of Gover-
nors accepted the recommendation of the late President William B. Spann,
Jr., to "thoroughly and systematically rethink not only the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, but also the entire range of issues in ethical lawyer-
ing."6 ' The fourth draft of the Model Rules is now being considered; 62 its
approach differs markedly from that of former codes. Various social, eco-
nomic, and technological changes in the legal system during the past decade,
which are reflected in such areas as lawyer advertising and specialization,
have caused the Commission to recognize the need for more definitive rules.
To reach that end, the Commission has taken "the underlying structural
thrust of the Code of Professional Responsibility-its bifurcation of discipli-
nary rules and ethical considerations-to its next logical step by drafting
rules that are the foundation of good professional conduct ... .
In approaching the lawyer's dilemma, the Model Rules identify the
need for the attorney, as an advocate, to insure candor to the tribunal.
64
Although the Model Rules recognize that a criminal accused has a right to
the assistance of an advocate, a right to testify in his own defense, and a right
of confidential communication with counsel, 65 the Kutak Commission main-
tains that an accused should not have a right to assistance of counsel in
committing perjury. 66 In the Commission's view, the law imposes obliga-
tions and restraints on lawyers which may conflict with the client's ultimate
objectives. 67 Therefore, the Commission asserts that an advocate has an ethi-
cal and legal obligation to avoid implicating himself in the commission of
59. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 44.
60. Robert J. Kutak of the national firm of Kutak, Rock and Huie is chairman of the ABA
Commission. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. of Yale Law School is the reporter.
61. Kutak, Comnhg. The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 47 (1980).
62. This draft has not been approved by the ABA and does not presently constitute ABA
policy.
63. Kutak, supra note 61, at 47.
64. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 44, rule 3.3 at 124. The Model Rules recognize that
the lawyer is an officer of the court and must always conduct himself in accordance with the
law. "Given this duty, never, under any circumstances, may a lawyer knowingly proffer per-
jured testimony and thereby participate in a fraud against the court." Burger, Standards of Con-
ductfor Prosecution and Defense Personnel, 5 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 11, 12 (1966). See also Frankel, The
Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
65. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 44, rule 3.3 at 126.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 129.
Although a lawyer's paramount duty is to vigorously pursue the client's interests, "that
duty must be met in conjunction with, rather than in opposition to, other professional
obligations." Thorton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. App. 1976). "An attorney
owes his first duty to the court. He assumed his obligations toward it before he ever
had a client. His oath requires him to be absolutely honest even though his client's
interests may seem to require a contrary course. The [lawyer] cannot serve two mas-
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perjury or other falsification of evidence.60 Such an obligation overrides the
lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential.
Rule 3.3(a)(4) of the Model Rules provides that "a lawyer shall not
knowingly. . . offer evidence that the lawyers knows to be false. If a lawyer
has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer
shall take reasonable remedial measures."
'6 9
When a criminal defendant seeks to offer testimony that the lawyer
knows to be false, the proposed rules provide that the attorney should at-
tempt to dissuade the client from giving perjurious testimony. 70 If this con-
frontation occurs before trial and the dissuasion fails, the lawyer should seek
to withdraw from the case. 7' The Commission recognizes, however, that
withdrawal may not always be possible, "because trial is imminent or be-
cause the confrontation with the client does not take place until the trial
itself, or because no other counsel is available."' 72 If the court does not per-
mit withdrawal, the Model Rules require a lawyer to disclose his client's
perjury to the court. "It is for the court then to determine what should be
done-making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a
mistrial or perhaps nothing."
73
If the client controverts the lawyer's version of their communication af-
ter the lawyer's disclosure, and the issue of whether the client has committed
perjury arises, the Commission recognizes that a mistrial may be unavoida-
ble since the lawyer cannot represent the client in the resolution of the per-
jury issue. 74 If a client attempts to produce several mistrials in the same
manner, the Model Rules provide that such actions are "a deliberate abuse
of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the right to further
representation."
75
Although the Model Rules envision that an advocate must disclose per-
jury in all instances when it occurs, Rule 3.3(a) provides that the obligation
ters and the one [he has] undertaken to serve primarily is the court." In re Integration
of the Nebraska Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (1937).
Id.
68. Id. at 126.
69. Id. at 124. Commentary to rule 3.3 compares this rule to the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
[T]he first sentence of this subparagraph is similar to DR 7-102(A)(4), which provides
that a lawyer shall not "knowingly use" perjured testimony or false evidence. The
second sentence of Rule 3.3(a)(4) resolves an ambiguity in the Code concerning the
action required of a lawyer when he discovers that he has offered perjured testimony
or false evidence.
Id. at 128.
70. Id. at 126.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 127. The Model Rules recognize that a practical time limit on the obligation to
rectify the presentation of false evidence is required. Id. "The conclusion of the proceeding is a
reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation." Id. Further, rule 1.6(b)(3) pro-
vides: "A lawyer may reveal [information relating to representation of a client] to the extent the
lawyer believes necessary: . . . to rectify the consequences of a a client's criminal or fraudulent
act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used. ... Id., rule 1.6(b)(3), at
37. Rule 1.6(b)(3) modifies DR 7-102(B)(1) by making the disclosure of a fraud committed in
the course of representation optional rather than mandatory.




is subordinate to constitutional requirements. 76 The qualification addresses
the situation in some jurisdictions in which the right to counsel in criminal
cases is construed to include a right that counsel not disclose perjury by the
accused. 77 Further, the duty to disclose perjury under Model Rule 3.3(a)
arises only when a lawyer "knows" that the offered evidence is false. The
rule permits, but does not require, an attorney to refuse to offer evidence.
that he "reasonably believes is false."'7 8 This rule would presumably give the
lawyer more discretion to refuse to offer testimony than the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility presently allows.
79
D. The American Layer's Code of Conduct
In 1979, at the request of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(A.T.L.A.), a commission of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers
Foundation was formed to prepare a new code of conduct for lawyers.
80
Professor Freedman serves as the reporter for the project, and released the
first discussion draft of the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Code of
Conduct) for public comment in June of 19 8 0 .
61
The general philosophy of the Code of Conduct is that the lawyer's pri-
mary duty is to the client; it rejects any proposal to weaken the protection of
an accused client's rights, including the proposition that a lawyer should
reveal a client's secrets "except in the most extreme circumstances."18 2 The
philosophy set forth in the Code of Conduct is an extension of Professor
Freedman's assertion that the "lawyer must hold in strictest confidence the
disclosures made by the client in the course of the professional relation-
ship."'83 He concludes that, between confidentiality to the client and candor
to the court, the former is significantly more important.8 4 In his view, the
lawyer has a duty to attempt to dissuade a client from committing perjury,
8 5
but if the defendant insists upon taking the witness stand to testify falsely,
"the obligation of confidentiality, in the context of our adversary system,
apparently allows the attorney no alternative to putting a perjurious witness
on the stand without explicit or implicit disclosure of the attorney's knowl-
edge to either the judge or the jury."'86 Consequently, the lawyer should
76. Id.
77. Id. at 127. See, e.g., Ohio v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (1977).
78. See ABA MODEL RuLEs, supra note 44, rule 3.3(c) at 124.
79. Id. at 128. See ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-I02(A)(4), which prohibits the lawyer
from offering evidence the lawyer "knows" is false. A number of court decisions, however, sup-
port the approach of the Model Rules in this regard. See In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 449 P.2d
174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969); In re Atchley, 48 Cal. 2d 408, 310 P.2d 15 (1957); Thornton v.
United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. App.), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976); Illinois v. Brown, 54
Ill. 2d 21, 294 N.E.2d 285 (1973). The belief required by rule 3.3(c) is a "reasonable" one. See
Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) for the proposition that an unsubstantiated
suspicion is insufficient. See also Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
80. AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT ii (Discussion Draft June 1980) [hereinafter
cited as CODE OF CONDUCT].
81. Id.
82. Id. at v.
83. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 27.
84. Id.
85. Freedman, supra note 39, at 1478.
86. Id. at 1477-78. Professor Freedman was subjected to personal attack after he presented
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place the client on the stand, elicit testimony on direct examination, and
then argue the testimony to the jury as skillfully as he possibly can.8 7 In
Professor Freedman's opinion, any contrary position would be inconsistent
with "the maintenance of the adversary system, the presumption of inno-
cence, the prosecutor's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
. . . and the obligation of confidentiality. .. .
Two alternative sets of rules regarding the lawyer-client confidential re-
lationship are provided in the Code of Conduct. 89 Both are more protective
of confidentiality than either the present Code of Professional Responsibility
or the proposed ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Section 1.2 of
Alternative A provides:
Without the client's knowing and voluntary consent, a lawyer shall
not directly or indirectly reveal a client's confidence, or use it in
any way detrimental to the interests of the client, except as pro-
vided in Rules 1.3 to 1.6, and Rule 6.5. (Rules 1.3 to 1.6 permit
divulgence under compulsion of law; to prevent imminent danger
to life; to avoid proceeding before a corrupted judge or juror; and
to defend the lawyer or the lawyer's associates from formally insti-
tuted charges of misconduct. Rule 6.5 permits withdrawal in non-
criminal cases when the client has induced the lawyer to act
through material misrepresentation, even though withdrawal
might indirectly divulge a confidence.). 9°
Alternative A prohibits using a client's confidence in a way detrimental to
the interests of the client. In all instances in the Code of Conduct, the inter-
ests of the client are determined by the client after having been counseled by
the lawyer.9 1 Further, Alternative A permits, but does not require, divul-
gence of a client's confidences in certain situations, but rejects the previously
recognized exception which permits lawyers to violate confidentiality to col-
lect an unpaid fee. 9 2 In addition, if there has been inadequate opportunity
for consultation with the client, the Code of Conduct provides that "the law-
yer should act in accordance with the lawyer's reasonable understanding of
what the client would perceive to be in the client's interest."
'9 3
Alternative B is even more protective of confidentiality between lawyer
and client:
Without the client's knowing and voluntary consent, a lawyer shall
not directly or indirectly reveal a client's confidence, or use it in
any way detrimental to the interests of the client, as the client per-
the substance of this position in a paper to the Criminal Trial Institute of the District of Colum-
bia. Several judges complained to the Committee on Admissions and Grievances of the District
Court of the District of Columbia, urging that disciplinary action be taken against him. After
four months of proceedings, the committee announced its decision to "proceed no further in the
matter." Robinson, supra note 17, at 552 n.52.
87. See Robinson, supra note 17, at 552. See also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 31.
88. Freedman, supra note 39, at 1482.
89. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 80, § 1.2.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 106. See also id. §§ 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, and Preamble at 4.
92. Id. at 106. The Code of Conduct claims that the reason for such an exception-the
lawyer's financial interest-"is not sufficiently weighty to justify impairing confidentiality." Id.
Set also ABA CODE, supra note 7, at DR 4-101(C)(4).
93. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 80, at 103.
1981]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
ceives them, or as the lawyer reasonably understands the client to
perceive them if there is inadequate opportunity for consultation.
94
Neither alternative permits divulging a client's confidence in cases of
future or continuing crimes. 95 In fact, under the Code of Conduct, a disci-
plinary violation is committed if an attorney refrains from presenting a cli-
ent's false testimony in the ordinary manner, or refrains from using that
testimony in summation to the jury.
96
A major objection to the Code of Conduct is that the obligation of con-
fidentiality should not apply to a client's statement that he intends to com-
mit perjury. The attorney-client privilege has not historically extended to
the client who seeks legal assistance in the commission of a future crime.
97
Further, the position espoused by Professor Freedman is a "significant exten-
sion and corruption of the defense attorney's role,"9 8 since it encourages an
attorney to actively assist in presenting known perjured testimony. This role
had been summarily rejected in the first edition of the Defense Standards:
It has even been suggested, but universally rejected by the legal
profession, that a lawyer may be excused for acquiescing in the use
of known perjured testimony on the transparently spurious thesis
that the principle of confidentiality requires this. While no honora-
ble lawyer would accept this notion and every experienced advo-
cate can see its basic fallacy as a matter of tactics apart from
morality and law, the mere advocacy of such fraud demeans the
profession and tends to drag it to the level of gangsters and their
'mouthpiece' lawyers in the public eye. That this concept is uni-
versally repudiated by ethical lawyers does not fully repair the
gross disservice done by the few unscrupulous enough to practice
it.
9 9
In this regard, the approach to the client-perjury issue recommended by the
American Lawyer's Code of Conduct does not adequately address the law-
yer's obligation to insure candor to the court.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The Defense Standards suggest that every jurisdiction establish an Ad-
visory Council of eminent trial lawyers to assist attorneys in resolving ethical
questions:
94. Id.
95. But rule 3.6 of the Code of Conduct states: "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly partici-
pate in creating perjured testimony, other false evidence, or a misrepresentation upon which
another person is likely to rely and suffer material detriment." Therefore, although an attorney
may not "knowingly participate" in creating perjured testimony, if the perjured testimony is a
result of the client's decision, the attorney does not commit a disciplinary violation by develop-
ing the client's direct testimony and arguing it to the jury. Id. at 110, Illustrative Case 1(j).
96. See id. at 109, Illustrative Case 1(i).
97. C. MCCORMicK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 95 (2d ed. 1972); Robinson,
supra note 17, at 547 n.10.
98. Lefstein, supra note 52, at 674. There is, however, some evidence that practicing attor-
neys favor Professor Freedman's approach. Id. at 675.




Advisory councils on professional conduct
(a) In every jurisdiction an advisory body of lawyers selected
for their experience, integrity, and standing at the trial bar should
be established as an advisory council on problems of professional
conduct in criminal cases. This council should provide prompt and
confidential guidance and advice to lawyers seeking assistance in
the application of standards of professional conduct in criminal
cases.
(b) Communications between a lawyer and such an advisory
council should have the same privilege for protection of the client's
confidences as exists between lawyer and client. The council
should be bound by statute or rule of court in the same manner as
a lawyer is bound not to reveal any disclosure of the client except
(i) if the client challenges the effectiveness of the law-
yer's conduct of the case and the lawyer relies on the guidance
received from the council, and
(ii) if the lawyer's conduct is called into question in an
authoritative disciplinary inquiry or proceeding. l ° °
To date, no jurisdiction has adopted the standard relating to Advisory
Councils. 10 1 The concept, however, can be used to reach a practical and
ethically sound solution to the lawyer's dilemma.
0 2
Under the Advisory Council concept, when defense counsel learns, prior
to trial, that his client intends to commit perjury, he must submit a written
statement to the Council, documenting to the extent possible the facts which
establish the basis for the conclusion that the accused client intends to offer
false testimony. The statement should also set forth the efforts which defense
counsel has made to persuade the client not to testify falsely. If the Council
determines that the written statement substantiates the lawyer's belief that
his client intends to commit perjury, the Council then shall recommend to
the court that the lawyer be allowed to withdraw. The Council's recommen-
dation should appear on the outside of a sealed file which contains a docu-
mented and complete record of the Advisory Council's proceedings. The file
is then delivered to the court. If the Advisory Council recommended that
the lawyer be permitted to withdraw, the court must grant the motion and
advise the defendant regarding subsequent procedures and that the sealed
materials may be used for impeachment at any subsequent trial. Thereafter,
the defendant has a new right to appointed or hired counsel.
10 3
If the defendant elects to adhere to the same version of the facts, his new
100. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 4-1.4. The Advisory Council idea is borrowed
from England, where a somewhat similar body has existed for some years. See R. WALKER &
M. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 226 (4th ed. 1976). See also Hoolihan, Ethical Stan-
dards for Defence Counsel, STUDIES IN CRIM. L. & PROC. (Canadian Bar Association 1973);
Schroeder, Some Ethical Problems in Cnminal Law, L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 87 (1963).
101. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 4-1.4, commentary at 4.18.
102. Ideally, an Advisory Council should be established in each judicial district within the
state.
103. The Advisory Councils will advise lawyers on a broad range of ethical problems, such
as threats by clients against his lawyer, conflicts of personality, and conflicts of interest. There-
fore, the court will be unaware of the defendant's prior intention to commit perjury. At this




counsel would have no basis for knowing that the defendant intends to com-
mit perjury, and the case would proceed to trial. The Advisory Council's file
would remain sealed unless the defendant elects to take the witness stand.
At that point, the court is authorized to open the file and review its contents.
If the file establishes that the defendant intended to commit perjury at his
first trial, the contents would be disclosed to both prosecution and defense
counsel. When the defendant testifies, the prosecution may use the informa-
tion contained in the file for impeachment. 10 4 Defense counsel is permitted
to fully develop his client's testimony on direct examination, and may advo-
cate acceptance of his client's testimony in closing argument, because his
client's credibility is for the jury to determine, and the attorney is not spon-
soring testimony known to be false. The defendant's credibility, of course,
will be weighed against his prior inconsistent statements to his former law-
yer, which the prosecutor will use for impeachment purposes. In this way,
the truth-finding goal of the adversary system is not compromised.' 0 5
If the new counsel discovers, prior to trial, that the defendant intends to
commit perjury, he must also submit a written statement to the Advisory
Council, documenting the facts which establish the proposed perjury. Upon
receipt of a second file which recommends withdrawl, the court must open
both files to determine if the defendant's intention to commit perjury is the
basis for withdrawal in both cases. If such is the case, the court will not
permit counsel to withdraw, and the defendant will be deemed to have
waived his privilege to testify in his own behalf. 10 6 The defendant's privilege
thus gives way so that the lawyer is not required to develop and argue known
false testimony. 10 7 Such a procedure prevents use of the same ploy for unlim-
ited continuances. The judge may also consider the mendacity of the de-
fendant in sentencing. 10 8 Again, the truth-finding goal of the adversary
system is not compromised because the defendant is prohibited from offering
perjured testimony.
The ethical dilemma created by the perjurious defendant may also arise
in another setting. If defense counsel does not learn of his client's intended
perjury until trial is imminent or has commenced, he must still make a mo-
tion to withdraw under the Council system. Defense counsel cannot specify
the reasons for his motion, but should request a brief recess to present the
ethical dilemma to the Advisory Council. The trial court must grant the
recess so that the Advisory Council procedure can be followed. If the Coun-
cil recommends withdrawal, the trial court, under the doctrine of manifest
104. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Either the prosecution or the defense
must then be permitted to call the first defense counsel as a witness, in order to preserve the
defendant's right of confrontation under the sixth amendment. See California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970). Moreover, the admission of the first lawyer's statements contained in the file
may be subject to a hearsay objection by the defendant.
105. Set DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, at Introduction.
106. Id.
107. The lawyer vouches for the authenticity of the evidence he submits at trial. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 97.
108. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 40 (1978).
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necessity,' 0 9 must grant defense counsel's motion to withdraw and declare a
mistrial.
The establishment of an Advisory Council is within the rule-making
power of the highest court of each state. I 10 For example, in Colorado, the
Supreme Court has both constitutional and statutory authority to promul-
gate rules governing practice and procedure in criminal cases.'I' The De-
fense Standards generally provide that the communications between a
lawyer and the Advisory Council have the same privilege for the protection
of the client's confidences as exists between the lawyer and client.' 12 There-
fore, the rule in each jurisdiction which creates an Advisory Council must
also provide for a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege to permit
impeachment as a means of protecting the integrity of the truth-finding goal
of the adversary system.' 3 Consequently, a limited waiver of the attorney-
client privilege is justified when the court is authorized to open the sealed file
and reveal its contents to the prosecutor for impeachment purposes.
1
14
It should be kept in mind that the lawyer's dilemma occurs infrequently
in practice. Accordingly, the intricacies of the proposed solution are justi-
fied. The Advisory Council solution resolves the ethical dilemma which has
been analyzed and reanalyzed so often.
IV. CONCLUSION
The common law adversary system as a means for ascertaining the truth
of a criminal charge can survive only if both prosecution and defense counsel
present reliable evidence to guide the trier of fact. Truth-finding is deflected
whenever perjury is committed. As officers of the court, lawyers have a pri-
mary duty to preserve the integrity of the adversary system by preventing
the court or jury from being misled by the presentation of false or perjured
testimony. Even the attorney-client privilege must bend when the sanctity
of the oath is disregarded by an accused client proferring false evidence. The
obligations of defense counsel to the court and to his client are in direct
conflict under the current ABA Code. The author's solution to the dilemma
balances the ethical considerations in such a way that the lawyer is not
forced to advocate the acceptance of perjured testimony. Perjury is exposed
with the least possible invasion of the attorney-client privilege.
109. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1970); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
110. J. PARNESS & C. KORBAKES, A STUDY OF THE PROCEDURAL RULEMAKING POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES (American Judicature Society 1973).
111. COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 21; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2-109 (1973).
112. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 4-1.4, commentary at 4-1.8.
113. The attorney-client privilege is a substantive right. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-
107(b) (1973). It is within the province of the judiciary, however, to determine the procedural
limitations imposed on the privilege. See, e.g., People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275
(1978).
114. The rule should be tightly drafted to prevent the disclosure of any privileged commu-
nications unrelated to the perjury between the client and lawyer or between the lawyer and the
Advisory Council. Additionally, the rule should permit either the prosecutor or the defense
lawyer to call the first defense lawyer who was confronted with the dilemma to testify as to the
facts which were before the Advisory Council.
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The bulk of the Standards for Criminal JusticeI (Standards) relates to the
conduct of criminal proceedings and the professional activities of lawyers
and judges. In contrast, at either end of the spectrum of the criminal pro-
cess--law enforcement administration and corrections-the roles of legal
professionals are less well defined and the claims of professionals in the other
concerned professions to remain free from domination by judges and attor-
neys carry considerable weight. Nevertheless, citizens have clear legal rights
during both the inception of criminal investigations and the enforcement of
criminal sanctions. These legal rights merit effective implementation
through courts and administrative organs. On these matters the organized
bar is competent and obliged to speak. Both the first and second editions of
the Standards have addressed selected law enforcement problems in the chap-
ter on Urban Police Function.2 It was not until the second edition Standards
were far along in preparation, however, that a decision was reached to pre-
pare standards relating to the legal status of prisoners.
Indeed, that decision was arrived at rather late in a sequence of Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) activities which had their inception in an address
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, delivered at the 1969 ABA annual meet-
ing, where he urged the legal profession to focus its concern and abilities on
the administration of the nation's correctional systems.3 A few months later,
the ABA House of Delegates created a Commission on Correctional Facili-
ties and Services which, among its several reports and monographs, pro-
duced a first tentative draft of standards relating to the legal status of
prisoners.4 When the Commission and the Section of Criminal Justice
presented the draft to the House of Delegates in 1978, the House referred it
to the Standing Committee to resolve points of conflict with correctional
authorities. The committee in turn developed three successive drafts. The
fourth tentative draft was modified in several respects before final adoption
by the House in February 1981, when the draft became a new chapter
* Chairperson, ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice;
Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTIcE (2d ed. 1980).
2. Id. ch. 1.
3. Burger, A Proposal: A National Conference on Correctional Problems, MONOGRAPH
3, ABA SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILrrIES, Edited Proceedings 1 (1969,
Dallas, Texas) (luncheon address presented at the annual ABA meeting to the Sections on Indi-
vidual Rights and Responsibilities, Criminal Law, Bar Activities, Judicial Administration, and
the Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control).
4. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION PROJECT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL STA-
TUS OF PRISONERS (Tent. Draft No. 1), 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 377 (1977).
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twenty-three of the Standards.5
The Legal Status of Prisoners Standards6 (LSOP) constitute but one of sev-
eral national and international bodies of rules or standards. The United
Nations has undertaken to implement the premise that no person should be
subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 7 The
United States National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals in 1973 issued detailed standards bearing on correctional adminis-
tration," and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws covered many of the same concerns in its Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act. 9 Since 1975, the American Correctional Association and the Commis-
sion on Accreditation for Corrections have published ten volumes of stan-
dards to govern accreditation of correctional facilities. Three of those
volumes bear substantially on the problems dealt with in the ABA Stan-
dards. '0 Most recently, the United States Department of Justice issued stan-
dards governing prisons and jails for use in federal penal administration.II
Thus, during the 1980s there is no dearth of guidelines for correctional ad-
ministration and judicial evaluation of the country's penal facilities.
This article surveys the legal and administrative status of prisoners
under the several contending standards, noting in the process the points on
which the ABA Standards diverge substantially from other bodies of
principles.
I. PRINCIPAL RIGHTS OR CLAIMS OF PRISONERS
A. Basic Principle
It must be stressed that the ABA's choice of the word "status", rather
5. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS (Approved
Draft, 1981) [hereinafter cited as LSOP].
6. Id
7. Declaration on the Protection ofAll Persons From Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punshment (G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. Doc. A/34/273 Annex passim [June 6, 1979]);
International Covenant on Civil and Pohlital Rights, art. 7, 10 (G.A. Res. 2200 A[XXI] [December 16,
1966]); Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (U.N. Doc. Sales No. 1956 IV.4,
Annex [1958] [hereinafter cited as UN Standard Minimum Rules]); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 5 (G.A. Res. 217A [III] [December 10, 1948]). Draft Body of Principlesfor the Protection
of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (A/34/146, Annex [September 11, 1979])
is under circulation to member states for comments. United Nations materials at times are cited
in American prison litigation. See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D.
Conn. 1980); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123, 131 n.21 (1981).
8. U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, RE-
PORT ON CORRECTIONS (1973) [hereinafter cited as NAC CORRECTIONS].
9. 10 UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORREC-
TIONS ACT, (Approved Draft, 1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
10. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ACA-ACI]; STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL
DETENTION FACILITIES (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ACA-ALDF; STANDARDS FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES (1979) [hereinafter cited as ACA-ACA]. See
also note 312 infa.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAILS (Dec. 16, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as DOJ]. See also changes in the preamble, 46 Fed. Reg. 39515 (Aug. 3, 1981).
The National Sheriffs Association issued a set of seven monographs in 1974 governing local jail
administration, which are available from the ABA, 1250 Connecticut, Suite 320, Washington,
D.C. 20036.
[Vol. 59:1
LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS
than the word "rights", of prisoners was not casual or heedless. It was, in-
stead, a statement of philosophy that the purpose of the ABA is not to pro-
vide an advance guard in a drive to expand prisoner rights beyond those
now recognized by courts and legislatures, but to delineate the position of
prisoners in relation to free citizens, on the one hand, and governmental
authority, on the other. That is the thrust of standard 23-1.1:
Prisoners retain the rights of free citizens except: (a) as specifically
provided to the contrary in these standards; or (b) when restric-
tions are necessary to assure their orderly confinement and interac-
tion; or (c) when restrictions are necessary to provide reasonable
protection for the rights and physical safety of all members of the
prison system and the general public.'
2
This restates in essence the constitutional principles enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court.'3 Standard 23-1.1 sets out a general philoso-
phy which, however, is subject to qualification by the language of more spe-
cific standards.
B. Reception, Classiftcation, Assignment, and Transfer
Classification is necessary in any prison system having more than one
general holding facility. A failure to provide a diversity of classifications
itself violates modern notions of penal administration.14 There are at least
three bases for categorizing correctional facilities:
1. Security Classifications
Traditionally, facilities in the United States have been categorized as
maximum, medium, and minimum security institutions, without any partic-
ular standards according to which a designation can be made. The opera-
tive issue, from the standpoint of individual prisoners, is the extent to which
freedom of movement is controlled within a facility. On such a basis one
may perceive, in decreasing order of severity, administrative segregation,
maximum custody, close custody, medium security, minimum security, and
community status.' 5 Unless facilities are categorized, rational assignment of
individual prisoners is difficult to achieve.
2. Classification According to Objective Personal Characteristics
To some extent everywhere, separate facilities are provided for adults
and young offenders, male and female offenders, pre- and post-adjudication
detainees, and civilly and criminally incarcerated persons. 16 Classification
12. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-1.1.
13. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544-48 (1979); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct.
2392, 2400 n.13 (1981).
14. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4399; ACA-ACA, supra note 10, §§ 25, 27.
15. E.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 791.4401(3) (1977). The discussion to ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4401, recommends at least three degrees of custodial control for inmates. The
MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 4-402, contains somewhat different criteria: each facility or portion
of a facility should be given a security classification based on the extent of perimeter security,
freedom of movement of confined persons within a facility, nature of programs in a facility, and
the extent of regimentation of confined persons within a facility.
16. See, e.g., DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 9.03-.05; ACA-ACA, supra note 10, §§ 2, 11-13, 16, 26;
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under such a system is objective and mechanical; the primary limitation i's
that no discriminatory use can be made of external factors, particularly race,
religion, sex, age, or handicapped status.
17
3. Classification Based On Individualized Treatment Needs
Penal legislation determines the extent to which prisoners are to be pro-
vided programs tailored to fit individual needs. If offender rehabilitation is
the principal or a significant objective of a criminal justice system, and deter-
rence of future criminal conduct and segregation or incapacitation are of
minimal significance, then substantial financial and personnel resources will
be devoted to "treatment" of offenders.' 8 In contrast, if rehabilitation
largely has been abandoned as a goal of a prison system and incarceration
for a determinate or relatively fixed term is either punishment to deter crime
or a means of segregating dangerous persons from society,' 9 then subjective
personal characteristics of individual prisoners will play a relatively small
role in penal administration, and classification largely will turn on factors in
(1) and (2) above.
4. Administrative Procedures Affecting Classification
Correctional standards are more concerned with administrative proce-
dures affecting classification than they are with criteria for classification gen-
erated in substantive law. Granted that conceptual limitation, there are
several important dimensions of prisoner claims and protections in the set-
ting of classification:
Time of classiftatton. Classification should be conducted as soon after a
prisoner has been received in a prison system or facility as is possible in light
ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4332; ACA-ALDF, supra note 10, § 2-5354-5355. A "Central
Monitoring Case" (CMC) system instituted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons imposes stricter
controls over some prisoners than others because of their criminal careers. Attacks have been
made on assignment to such a status without a prior administrative hearing, with varying re-
sults. Compare Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1980) (no hearing required) with Bryant
v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 1075 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (hearing required).
17. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.14; DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.02; MODEL ACT, supra note 9,
§ 4-111; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4340; ACA-ALDF, supra note 10, § 2-5356; see also U.N.
Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 7, R. 6(1). This is federal constitutional doctrine. Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979); Finney v.
Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Glover v. Johnson, 510 F. Supp. 1019
(E.D. Mich. 1981).
18. This is the clear objective of U.N. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 7, R. 67(b), 69; see
also id. R. 8 ("necessities of their treatment"), 59 ("individual treatment needs of the prison-
ers"). The ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES STANDARDS, supra note 1, ch.
18, particularly §§ 18-2.1, -4.1, embody a similar approach even though deterrence and segrega-
tion loom larger in the current standards than they did in the first edition. See, e.g., id §§ 18-2.5,
-3.2.
19. Current controversies over determinate or presumptive sentencing are reflected in re-
cent works, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); P. O'DONNELL, M.
CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISH-
MENTS (1976); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); UNITED
STATES NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SEN-
TENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? (Summary Report March, 1978).
[Vol. 59:1
LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS
of the need to accumulate data appropriate to a classification decision. 20
Although the ABA standard recognizes some flexibility in completing classi-
fication,21 it recommends a thirty-day period which corresponds to other
standards covering the matter.
22
Place of dassfftcation. None of the standards attempts to regulate the lo-
cation of classification. It can be done at a central diagnostic facility and
probably must be accomplished in that way if courts are not empowered to
designate facilities to which convicted prisoners must be sent. After a first
classification and assignment have been made, each institution then has a
mechanism either for placement at a level of custody and programming
within that institution or, if for a designated period a prisoner is assigned the
highest security category within the institution, for reclassification and reas-
signment after an appropriate time has elapsed. Further transfers within a
prison system are subject to central administrative control. 23 The ABA Stan-
dards properly are silent on what is a purely administrative matter.
Classifwatton procedures. The ABA Standards are not silent as to proce-
dures pursuant to which classification decisions are reached. American stan-
dards generally contemplate an active role for prisoners during classification
which contrasts, favorably in the author's view, with the U.N. Standard Mi-
mum Ru/es 2 4 and practices in many other nations in which prisoners play a
passive, receptive role.
Due process of law does not mandate that classification or reclassifica-
tion be conducted according to procedures required for major disciplinary
proceedings, 25 even though prisoner misconduct may have impelled admin-
istrative review. 26 Consequently, the ABA Standards,27 like other rules and
20. At reception and classification, a legal basis for confinement must be documented, e.g.,
DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 8.02,.04, .05; ACA-ALDF, supra note 10, §§ 2-5099, -5344 and complete
records must be maintained on all prisoners subject to appropriate audit controls. ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, §§ 2-4115--4117.
21. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.4(a) brackets the figure thirty, indicating scope for
flexibility.
22. DOJ, supra note 11, § 9.07 recommends four weeks and MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4-
408(c) thirty days.
23. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4400 (discussion), suggests only that there should be "spe-
cific procedures relating to inmate transfer . . . from one institution to another."
24. U.N. Standard Mfinmum Rules, supra note 7, R. 69 ("a programme of treatment shall be
prepared for him"). Interviews by the author with prison administrators in Japan and the
People's Republic of China confirm that in those nations prisoners have no positive role to play
in the determination of work or educational programs in which they are required to participate.
25. See text accompanying notes 273-94 infra.
26. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976);
Goodnow v. Perrin, 421 A.2d 1008 (N.H. 1980) (even though transfer was to federal prison in
Pennsylvania). However, if some prisoners are allowed a hearing before a change in program
assignment, a failure to grant such a hearing to all prisoners within an eligible class may deny
equal protection. Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978). A state system of course is free
to institute a hearing system under its own law, In re Westfall, 102 Cal. App. 3d 328, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 462 (1980), and this may engender an entitlement to an administrative due process hear-
ing under federal doctrine. Garcia v. De Batista, 642 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1981); Bills v. Henderson,
631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980); Dickerson v. Warden of Marquette Prison, 99 Mich. App. 630,
298 N.W.2d 841 (1980).
27. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.4(a)-(d).
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standards,28 contemplate that procedures be as informal as possible. How-
ever, explanations must be given to prisoners about the classification process,
the options open to them, and the criteria by which decisions are reached.
The initial classification recommendations must also be communicated to
prisoners and to a classification committee. Although some lawyers and
others deeply concerned about prisoner rights have maintained that even
initial classification decisions should be adversary in nature, including par-
ticipation by counsel for prisoners desiring representation, 29 an emerging
consensus holds that adversarial proceedings are inimical to proper classifi-
cation and reclassification. The use of adversarial proceedings reflects an
"over-lawyering" which has characterized many dimensions of social welfare
administration in the United States during the past two decades.
Nevertheless, standards governing prisoner status must take account of
the possibility of abuse of discretion by classification officials. The Standards
provide an initial check through a routine review by a classification commit-
tee of preliminary classification decisions, 30 and then allow a formal classifi-
cation hearing at the request of a prisoner dissatisfied with a provisional
classification or reclassification decision.3 ' No special provision is made for
further administrative or judicial review of classification matters, because
the Standards envision grievance procedures based on a broad array of pris-
oner complaints.
32
Rre/assiftation. Initial classification determinations cannot be allowed
routinely to stand intact without further evaluation throughout a prisoner's
period of incarceration. The approach of the Standards is to require routine
periodic review at a recommended interval of six months and to allow pris-
oners to impel classification hearings if they are dissatisfied with refusals on
the basis of a document review to revise an earlier classification.33 No provi-
sion is made in the ABA Standards for interim review at the request of a
prisoner, unlike some other standards.
34
28. DOJ, supa note 11, § 9.02; MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 4-408; ACA-ACI, supra note
10, §§ 2-4400, -4403, -4407.
29. See, e.g., LSOP (Tent. Draft No. 1), supra note 4, at 455-58, § 3.5 and commentary;
MODEL Acr, supra note 9, § 4.412(a)(1)-(iii).
30. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.4(e)-(f. A similar approach is taken in DOJ, supra note 11,
§§ 9.02, .09, .10; ACA-ACA, supra note 10, §§ 32-36; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4400, -
4405-4407; see also MODEL AcT, supra note 9, §§ 4-408, -412, -413.
31. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3 .4 (g) governs the troubling matter of the impact of pending
detainers on classification. It provides that no consideration should be given to detainers pend-
ing more than a recommended six month period, on which there has been no action by the
requesting entity despite a prisoner demand. Other detainers may be considered but should not
be given controlling weight in assigning security classifications.
32. LSOP, supra note 5, §§ 23-7. 1(d)(vii); see text accompanying notes 210-26 infra.
33. Id, § 23-3.4(c), (e).
34. DOJ, supra note 11, § 9.08 (12 month interval, or more frequently as needed; inmates
may request reviews of their progress and status, and request changes in program assignments,
at any time); ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4407 (discussion indicates that inmates should be
allowed to initiate reviews at any time to determine the extent of their progress and the effec-
tiveness of their programming).
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C. Circumstances of Confinement
Prison conditions "may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized meas-
ure of life's necessities," and so can "be cruel and unusual under the contem-
porary standard of decency" 35 developed by the Supreme Court under the
eighth amendment. Nevertheless, "to the extent that [prison] conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offend-
ers pay for their offenses against society."' 36 Granted such a limited scope of
constitutional control over prison circumstances, criminal justice standards
have a very substantial role to play in establishing criteria by which legisla-
tors and correctional administrators should govern penal institutions and by
which courts can determine issues of constitutional adequacy.
Norms in light of which correctional facilities are accredited or in-
spected must be precise and incorporate by reference health and safety stan-
dards embodied in administrative regulations, inspection codes, and the
like. 37 The drafters of the ABA Standards recognized in this context that it is
inappropriate for the ABA to parrot, and particularly to endeavor to im-
prove upon, detailed criteria in other standards governing matters like insti-
tutional size and location, cell or dormitory dimensions, lighting, ventilation,
toilet and bathing facilities, and laundry facilities. Administrators, legisla-
tors, and judges wishing detailed norms can find them in correctional stan-
dards. Consequently, the Standards set forth only general concepts essentially
congruent with contemporary constitutional precedent. 38
Thus, correctional institutions should meet health, sanitation, fire, and
industrial safety codes applicable to private residential facilities or public
buildings like schools and hospitals, as well as any state standards directly
governing correctional facilities. 39 Although correctional administrators
bear a principal burden in practice to see that compliance is constant, they
cannot be given sole responsibility. Therefore, the Standards call for regular
inspections by qualified inspectors independent of the facility or agency un-
dergoing inspection. 4° In contrast to correctional standards, the ABA is di-
rectly concerned about enforcement of health and safety standards and calls
for the same enforcement sanctions, including abatement, and procedures
35. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399 (1981). See also Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
36. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
37. See, e.g., DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 2.01-4.16; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4127--4175.
38. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.13. NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, § 2.5 takes a like
approach.
39. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.13(a)(i)-(ii). Section 6.13(c) lists heating and ventilation
systems to maintain humane comfort, natural and artificial light in living quarters sufficient to
permit reading, an adequate balanced diet, adequate, clean and functioning private toilet and
other facilities to maintain personal cleanliness, freedom from excessive noise, clean clothing
and bedding appropriate to the season, and varied opportunities for daily physical exercise and
recreation. A cross-reference is included to medical care. See text accompanying notes 46-60
infa .
40. Id § 23-6.13(a)(iii). The preference, expressed through bracketed material, is for in-
spections at least annually, the frequency expressed also in DOJ, supra note 11, § 3.01 and ACA-
ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4255 (sanitation and health), -4162, -4164 (fire and related safety facili-
ties must be certified as in code compliance by independent qualified sources, and inspected
annually). Accreditation standards require daily or weekly inspections by qualified administra-
tors of each institution. Id §§ 2-4163, -4248.
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governing other facilities subject to public regulatory codes.4 1
Some standards express a clear preference for single-occupancy cells
over dormitory quarters,42 although clearly that is not a constitutional
minimum standard. 43 The ABA Standards align basically with that position,
in that prisoners in other than residential (community corrections) facilities
"should have the opportunity to have their own separate living quarters of
adequate size."'44 However, some inmates clearly prefer communal living if
quarters are adequately supervised. The standard provides specifically for
staffing and other means of supervision sufficient for that purpose. 45 Safety-
related surveillance poses a conflict with inmate claims to privacy. The Stan-
dards can do no more than to urge that inmates not in separate living
quarters be given at least some opportunity daily for personal privacy.
There is no bar intended, however, against the use of closed-circuit television
surveillance of either single- or multiple-occupancy quarters to ensure pris-
oner safety and compliance with institutional safety and health regulations.
The ABA takes no position for or against disciplinary detention 46 as
long as it is specifically provided for through adequately disseminated insti-
tutional rules and does not violate the principle of parsimony because dis-
proportionate to the seriousness of misconduct for which it is a sanction.
47
If, however, prisoners are placed in a restrictive category and specially
housed, whether by way of disciplinary segregation or special administrative
classification, they are not to be deprived of whatever is needed to maintain
mental and physical well-being, including books or other reading matter,
mail, physical exercise, items for personal care and hygiene, medical care,
41. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.13(a)(iv).
42. NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, § 2.5(1); ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4129; cf. id
§ 2-4131 (multiple occupancy rooms must house not less than 3 nor more than 50 inmates;
facilities are specified in detail). DOJ, supra note 11, § 2.02 provides that single-occupancy cells
must house only one inmate.
43. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
44. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.13(b).
45. Inmates have a constitutional claim to protection against physical or sexual assaults by
other inmates, Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759
(1981); Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397 (Ist Cir. 1979); Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978), and therefore institutions must have enough staff to ensure
inmate safety. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). Assaults by staff members
also must be prevented. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
46. Accreditation standards use the term segregation to encompass administrative segrega-
tion (based on a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, or other inmates or to the security or
orderly running of an institution), protective custody (designed to safeguard inmates either at
their request or according to a determination that they are in jeopardy), and disciplinary deten-
tion. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4214 and discussion; see also DOJ, supra note 11, ch. 11. On
administrative procedures required for transfers to administrative segregation, see Parker v.
Cook, 642 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1981); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980); Bono v.
Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980); Dickerson v. Warden of Marquette Prison, 99 Mich. App.
630, 298 N.W.2d 841 (1980). Whether solitary confinement constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment turns on the circumstances as well as the duration of such detention. Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978); Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. May 12, 1981); Chavis v.
Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1981); Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). See genera/ly
NAT'L ASs'N OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION OF PRISONERS: DUE
PROCESS ISSUES (1979).
47. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.1; see text accompanying note 266 tnfra.
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light, ventilation, regular diet, and visiting or oral communication opportu-
nities with other persons. Conditions cannot unnecessarily cause physical or
mental deterioration.
48
D. Medical Care and Dehve of Health Servi'ces
Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners consti-
tutes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 49 forbidden by the eighth
amendment. Because inadequate delivery of health services has been promi-
nent in prisoner litigation, the ABA Standards address basic concepts in some
detail, although not to the same extent as do the American Medical Associa-
tion50 and accrediting agencies. 5'
The basic constitutional standard is restated in section 23-5.1(a). 52 No
effort is made to specify the qualifications of those who provide medical care
in prisons, beyond requiring that they possess those qualifications expected
of medical care personnel performing like functions in the free community.
5 3
Unlike the Model Act,54 the Standards embody no right of prisoners to resort
to private medical care at personal expense, but neither do they condemn it
under the broad language of section 23-5.2(a). Although there can be no
unjustified sex discrimination under the Standards,55 it is appropriate to pro-
vide suitable prenatal and postnatal care for women prisoners.
56
48. Id. § 23-6.14(d). Accord, DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 11.07-.24; ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
§§ 2-4221--4237. The prohibition against physical or mental deterioration restates a constitu-
tional standard. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759
(1981); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 310 (D. N.H. 1977).
49. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976)). The right includes emergency treatment, Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d
Cir. 1974), and covers physical conditions requiring medical treatment, Cotton v. Hutto, 540
F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1976); Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974); Robinson v.
Jordan, 494 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974), psychiatric needs, Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th
Cir. 1977); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1977), and dental care, sd at
1217; Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1235 (D.V.I. 1976); Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F.
Supp. 757 (D. Md. 1975), afJ'dsub noa. Stokes v. Brown, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).
50. STANDARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN PRISONS (1979); STANDARDS FOR HEALTH
SERVICES IN JAILS (1979).
51. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4271--4322.
52. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.1 (a).
53. Id § 23-5.1(b). Institutional hospitals must meet the same standards as licensed gen-
eral hospitals. Id § 23-5.1(c). ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4284 requires appropriate state or
federal licensure. The discussion to DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.06 notes that requirements of the
United States Public Health Service Commission Corps or the Office of Personnel Management
govern employment in federal institutions. Use of unlicensed, inadequately trained inmates as
sole providers of health care falls below minimum constitutional standards, Ramos v. Lamm,
639 F.2d 559, 576 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); Williams v. Edwards, 547
F.2d 1206, 1215-18 (5th Cir. 1977), but if qualified professional staff is present there seems to be
no objection under either constitutional principles or the Standards to using inmates as orderlies
and the like, as long as they do not control scheduling of health care appointments or access to
health care services, or have access to surgical instruments, syringes, needles, medications, and
health records. Set DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.37; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4288; AMA STAN-
DARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN PRISONS 133 (1979). LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.6 prohibits
administration of drugs by inmates under any circumstances.
54. MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4-105(c).
55. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.14; see also Glover v. Johnson, 510 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D.
Mich. 1981).
56. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.7(a); see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.49. LSOP, supra note 5,
§ 23-5.7(b) contemplates the possibility of nursery facilities in institutions so that inmate
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Adequate health care under the Standards requires that prisoners be
given a comprehensive medical, psychiatric, and dental examination within
a short time after admission to a correctional facility, 57 at regular intervals
thereafter, 58 and upon release from confinement. 59 Maintenance of profes-
sionally adequate health records also is indispensable to proper health pro-
tection. The Standards contemplate records compiled according to accepted
medical standards, maintained in a confidential and secure manner during
confinement and for a recommended five-year period following discharge.
60
Prisoners possess the same rights to accept or reject health care as do
citizens generally. Therefore, the Standards6 1 recognize that prisoners may
decline either examination or treatment unless (a) it is required by court
order,62 (b) a responsible physician reasonably believes it necessary to detect
or treat communicable diseases or otherwise to protect the health of other
persons, 63 or (c) the condition is emergent and treatment is necessary to pre-
mothers may keep their children for at least a reasonable time pending longer-range custodial
arrangements. Other standards, e.g., DOJ, supra note 1I, § 5.49; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-
4333, go no further than to recommend prenatal counseling concerning child placement; DOJ,
supra note 11, § 5.49 recommends arrangements for childbirth off institutional premises. There
is no right, apparently, to insist on retaining infants for a time within an institution. Wain-
wright v. Moore, 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. App. 1979) (interpreting statute). It may be that women
prisoners cannot be required to give up their children without valid supporting reasons other
than incarceration. Apgar v. Beauter, 75 Misc. 2d 439, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (inter-
preting statute).
57. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.3(a), (b)(i) (recommended within two weeks after admis-
sion); see also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 5.15-.16; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4290-4291. Pre-
conviction detainees also should be given a thorough physical and dental examination upon
personal request if confinement will last more than two weeks. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.3(c).
58. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.3(b)(ii) (recommended maximum interval of two years). See
also DOJ, supra note 1I, § 5.45; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4302 (discussion recommends
annual examinations for inmates over 50, and biennial examinations for those younger than 50).
There must of course be independent medical care and diagnosis available at any time, and
regular daily sick calls to meet prisoner needs, a matter independent of routine medical exami-
nations. LSOP, supra note 5, §§ 23-5. 1(a), -5.2. If care and, presumably, adequate diagnosis
cannot be provided within a prison facility or system, a prisoner patient must be transferred to a
civil health facility with the needed facilities. Id § 23-5.1(a). Under no circumstances can cor-
rectional personnel impede or unreasonably delay a prisoner's access to medical care. Id § 23-
5.2.
59. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.3(b)(iii) (if the most recent examination was more than a
year before), a practice recommended in the discussion to ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4302.
60. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.4; see also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 5.38-41; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, §§ 2-4318--4321. Confidentiality of records generally is dealt with in LSOP, supra note
5, § 23-6.11; see text accompanying notes 188-93 thfta.
61. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.5; see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.51; ACA-ACI, supra note
10, § 2-4313.
62. Prison administrators were held to be empowered to compel dialysis treatment for a
prisoner whose refusal to undergo treatment was a protest to gain a transfer to a minimum
security institution. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979).
Otherwise, there is probably no constitutional claim to order treatment for adults because they
would be better off for it. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Lang v. City of Des Moines, 294 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1980) (cannot
force treatment for alcoholism during jail incarceration).
63. Healthy prisoners' constitutional rights are infringed if reasonable steps are not taken
to safeguard them against communicable diseases of other inmates. Freeman v. Lockhart, 503
F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974) (double-ceiling with known tubercular inmate); Lareau v. Manson,
507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980) (failure to screen incoming jail inmates for communicable
diseases); Hines v. Anderson, 439 F. Supp. 12, 23 (D. Minn. 1977) (inmates with contagious
diseases to be segregated).
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vent permanent and serious injury to the inmate-patient's health. A corol-
lary to this is that inmates should not be made the subjects of nontherapeutic
experimentation of any kind, even though ostensibly with informed, volun-
tary prisoner consent. 64 The Standards, however, recognize the existence of a
somewhat more difficult problem if experimental therapeutic treatments are
used with prisoners.6 5 Presumably, private citizens can agree to participate
for a fee or otherwise in any sort of experiment that is not immediately life-
endangering and that otherwise is acceptable within medical and goven-
mental guidelines. Prisoners, in contrast, are not allowed to agree to partici-
pate in nontherapeutic experiments because of a doubt that anyone confined
or otherwise subjected to substantial governmental controls is free from in-
ducements, subtle or otherwise, to consent. Under the Standards, however,
prisoners can agree to participate in a therapeutic medical program not in
general civilian use, as long as it has been approved as medically sound and
in conformance with generally accepted medical standards,66 and is based
on voluntary and informed written consent. 6 7 Under such an approach,
prisoners can consent to individualized treatment even though the treatment
regimen is at the time in a somewhat preliminary or experimental phase and
thus not routinely available to the general population. It must be stressed,
however, that no apparently healthy prisoner can be allowed under the Stan-
dards to volunteer as a control.
Pharmaceuticals must be under strict control and supervision both to
see that they are appropriately administered as medical treatment and to
forestall illicit access. This is stressed in the Standards6 8 as in counterpart
statements of principle. 69 Ultimate responsibility for pharmaceuticals must
lie with a physician in charge of institutional medical care, and only medical
care staff should dispense prescription medications except in an emergency
when custodial personnel may administer them at the direction of medically
trained staff.
7 0
64. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.8(a); DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.50; ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
§ 2-4314.
65. LSOP, supra note 5, 23-5.8(b)-(e); a substantially similar position is taken in DOJ, supra
note 11, § 5.51 and Canadian Correctional Service, Guidelines Covering the Professional Con-
duct of Health Professionals in the CCS $ 25 (mimeo, current but undated).
66. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.8(b) (i), (c) (based on review by a committee established by
law to evaluate the program's medical validity). This procedure is required under federal regu-
lations as well. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301-.306 (1980).
67. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.8(d). Informed consent requires advance information of (a)
the likely effects, including possible side effects, of a procedure; (b) the likelihood and degree of
improvement, remission, control, or cure resulting from a procedure; (c) any uncertainty as to
benefits or hazards of a procedure; (d) existing reasonable alternatives to a procedure; and (e)
an ability on a prisoner's part to withdraw from a procedure or regimen at any time. Id. § 23-
5.8(e). Written consents should be reviewed by an independent committee including prisoners
and ex-offenders which interviews a participating prisoner personally, id, § 23-5.8(d); specific
judicial approval following an adversary hearing is required in instances of psychosurgery, elec-
trical stimulation of the brain or adversive conditioning. Id § 23-5.8(b)(iii).
68. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.6.
69. Accreditation and inspection standards are in much greater detail than LSOP. DOJ,
supra note 11, §§ 5.34-.37; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4317. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-
4306-4307 provide for detoxification programs for chemically dependent inmates.
70. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.6 also contains a flat prohibition against administration of




Prison inmates do not lose their rights as citizens to hold whatever reli-
gious beliefs they wish. 7 This constitutional right is restated in the Stan-
dard r. 72 Difficulties arise in and out of prison, however, over the extent to
which the practice or exercise of religion can be regulated or subjected to
sanctions. Certainly, the free exercise clause of the first amendment 73 pro-
hibits loss of livelihood based on practice of religious beliefs; 74 the basic issue
in prisons is the extent to which a penal environment requires restrictions on
religious practices, as opposed to beliefs, not valid in the free community.
The position of the Standards is that any religious practice may be engaged in
if consistent with orderly confinement and institutional security.
75
Although one may question the logic of the position, courts have ruled
that the first amendment establishment clause 76 is not violated through ap-
pointment of chaplains and religious counselors in prisons at public ex-
pense, 77 a principle which presumably extends to chapels, religious
furnishings and other amenities. Nevertheless, the first amendment coupled
with fourteenth amendment equal protection requires that there be no dis-
crimination among religious groups, a principle restated in the Standards.
78
As long as new religions were relatively rare phenomena in society they
posed no special difficulties for prison administration. During the past gen-
eration, however, American correctional officials have been confronted by
religious groups, formal recognition of which they resisted until forced to
comply by the federal courts. Landmark decisions flowed from efforts by
adherents of the Black Muslim (now World Community of Islam) movement
to gain freedom of worship, diet, and dress in prisons; the status of that
group as a recognized religion is clearly established today. 79 More recently,
71. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
72. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(a), and see id § 23-1.1 and text accompanying note 13
supra. See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.08; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4336.
73. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
74. Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981) (free exercise infringement when Jeho-
vah's Witness was denied unemployment compensation after quitting because of an involuntary
transfer to a foundry department producing tank turrets, and all other departments within the
company also were engaged in weapons production); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(unemployment benefits could not be denied a worker discharged because she would not work
on the sabbath); ef Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws could be
invoked against those whose religious beliefs required them to refrain from work on Saturday
and who wanted to engage in business on Sundays in compensation). See also Frank v. State,
604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (Athabascan Indian could not be convicted of violating game laws
for killing moose out of season for use in religious potlatch ceremony).
75. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(b). This restates the general principle of § 23-1.1; see text
accompanying note 13 sra.
76. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
77. Theriault v. Silber, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428
F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970).
78. LSOP, supra note 5, §§ 23-6.5(h) (resources and facilities should be equitably allocated
according to the proportion of prisoners adhering to each faith), -6.15 (no discriminatory treat-
ment based solely on religion).
79. See, e.g., Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep't of Correctional Services, 529 F.2d 272 (2d
Cir.), cert. drned, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve, 479 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Del.
1979); Bryant v. McGinnis, 463 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. N.Y. 1978).
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a prison-generated religion, the Church of the New Song (CONS), has gen-
erated substantial litigation. What seemingly began as a frivolous effort to
harass prison officials has gathered adherents both in and out of prisons and
therefore has gained a limited measure of recognition.8 0 Other religious
groups involved in current legal controversies include a Christian-oriented
homosexual entity, the Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community
Churches,8 the Native American Church,82 and even satanism.83 The
Supreme Court is not generally receptive toward elaborate tests in light of
which bona fide religious belief or status is to be ascertained. 84 Thus, ac-
creditation standards have ceased essaying judgmental criteria for prison ad-
ministrators.8 5 For similar reasons, the ABA Standards eschew a black-letter
definition of religion.
8 6
Consistent with constitutional precedent, the Standards provide that
prisoners should be allowed diets of nutritious food consonant with their reli-
gious beliefs and opportunities to observe special religious rites, including
fasting and special dining hours 3n major holidays generally observed within
their religion, subject to the usual concerns of institutional order and secur-
ity.87 Prisoners should also be allowed freedom to use of modes of dress or
appearance, including religious medals and other symbols, as long as these
do not interfere with identification and prisoner security. 88
80. Remmers v. Brewer, 529 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1976); Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390
(5th Cir. 1974); but ste Church of the New Song v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayers'
Money in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 620 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1980) (res judicata applied to
district court ruling in another circuit that CONS is not a bona fide religion).
81. Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
82. Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 733-34 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (holding not affected
by subsequent appeals on procedural matters).
83. Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976) (district court should not have
dismissed satanist prisoner's claims on pleadings; factual hearings required).
84. In Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1430 (1981), the Court noted that "determi-
nation of what is a 'religious' belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate
task"; "[clourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that
he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and
precision that a more sophisticated person might employ."
85. The first edition of ACA-ACI,supra note 10, § 4304 (discussion) and ACA-ALDF,supra
note 10, § 5278 (discussion) admonished that "the number of persons who practice the religion,
the newness of the religion or the absence from the religion of a concept of Supreme Being
should be irrelevant in determining what constitutes legitimate religious practices." Se also
NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, § 2.16. The current ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4462 dis-
cussion states only that "it is the responsibility of the institution to ensure that all inmates are
able to voluntarily exercise their constitutional right to religious freedom when this freedom
does not interfere with the order and security of the institution," the substantial equivalent to
LSOP § 23-6.5(b). The discussion to DOJ, supra note 11, § 15.01 continues a standard that "[a]
presumption of legitimacy attaches to newly formed religions, but the presumption may be
rebutted by conduct which demonstrates that the religion is not authentic or that the religious
group is not acting in good faith."
86. The Standing Committee thought it unnecessary to continue an admonition in the first
tentative draft, LSOP (Tent. Draft No. 1), supra note 4, at 508, § 6.3(g), that such issues should
be resolved by competent courts, not correctional authorities.
87. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(c). Less direct reference to "facilities" and "symbols" is
found in DOJ, supra note 11, § 15.01; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4468 uses the formulation of
"opportunities to adhere to the requirements of [prisoners'] . . . respective faiths." Representa-
tive constitutional precedent includes Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); Aziz v.
Le Fevre, 500 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. N.Y. 1980); Schlesinger v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 612 (M.D.
Pa. 1980); Finney v. Mabry, 458 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
88. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(f); freedom of personal grooming generally also is stated
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A corollary to freedom to engage in personal religious practices is free-
dom from pressure to participate in religious activities.8 9 A greater problem
in practice flows from routine solicitation and preservation of information
about religious affiliation in prisoner files, because of its importance to ad-
ministrative matters like issuance of passes to participate in scheduled reli-
gious activities, eligibility for special diets, and approval of requests for
special visits by religious counselors. Maintaining such records throughout a
period of incarceration does not violate the first amendment as long as pris-
oners have an avenue to change religious affiliation on the basis of whatever
showing is reasonably required by correctional authorities. 9° However, ac-
tive consideration by classification committees or paroling authorities of re-
corded participation in religious activities might well amount to a subtle yet
substantial pressure to adhere, or to appear to adhere, to orthodox religious
beliefs and practices. Hence, the ABA position is that only "directory" infor-
mation, i.e., an initial or amended indication of religious affiliation necessary
to administrative activity, is to be retained concerning prisoner religious
activities. 91
The Standards embody the premise that all prisoners, even those under
disciplinary and other special management, should have access to religious
counseling, which appears to be a constitutional right.9 2 Conversations with
religious counselors, intended to be confidential, fall within a provision else-
where in LSOP urging creation of an evidentiary privilege for all counselors
covering information other than that about a contemplated crime, unless
disclosure is required by court order.
93
F. Labor, Education, and Habih'iation
A history of exploitation of convict labor during the nineteenth century
and antipathy on the part of the burgeoning labor union movement toward
uncompensated or minimally compensated prison labor, generated almost
universal state statutory prohibitions against prison enterprises not related
in § 23-6.8, subject to the general concerns of § 23-1.1. Constitutional decisions on the matter
include St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980) (restrictions sustained as reasonable);
Burgin v, Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.
1975); Wright v. Raines, 457 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Kan. 1978); Maguire v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp.
637 (D. Conn. 1975).
89. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(d); see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.08; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4334. Prisoners cannot consttutionally be exposed to proselyting activities or be
forced to attend religious services against their personal desire. Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d
503 (8th Cir. 1980); cf. Aziz v. LeFevre, 500 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. N.Y. 1980) (not improper to ban
organized religious activities in exercise area used by other prisoners).
90. An absolute refusal to allow notation of a change in affiliation might well violate the
first amendment. Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1971). Individuals may be
required to establish a bona fide belief in a religion, Ron v. Lennane, 445 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn.
1977), subject to Supreme Court criteria laid down, e.g., in Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct.
1425 (1981); see note 84 supra.
91. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(e).
92. Id § 23-6.5(g). See also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 15.01-.02; ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
§§ 2-4465, -4469. See, e.g., Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 863-64
(4th Cir. 1975); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973); Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468,
130 A.2d 881 (1957).
93. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.11 (c).
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directly to institutional maintenance (including production of foodstuffs) or
to requirements of governmental agencies. Federal law today prevents state
prison labor products from being shipped in interstate commerce.94 This
legislation swiftly eradicated the abuses which engendered it, but also pro-
duced questionable consequences: public needs could not justify full em-
ployment for large prison populations; to a constantly increasing extent, the
skills (if any) acquired in prison industries had few applications to civilian
industry, particularly when budgetary restraints precluded acquisition of
"state of the art" machinery and equipment; and artificial pricing of goods
for governmental and institutional use constituted a constant drain on cor-
rectional budgets to the detriment of habilitation programs viewed by penal
administrators as more beneficial than prison industrial programs. These
problems have been overcome through work-release and work-study pro-
grams sponsored by local or regional industries, though only to a limited
extent, since they benefit only a relatively small number of younger
prisoners.
Another significant factor has been a decline in the prestige of the reha-
bilitative principle. Prisons are increasingly thought of as places for punitive
treatment designed to deter and for segregation from society through a fixed
term. Consequently, prisoners should not be forced to participate in pro-
grams which will improve them, but only in activities relating to cleanliness
and order, food service, maintenance, and production of goods for public
use. 95 Nevertheless, whether habilitated or deterred, almost all prisoners re-
turn to communities where they must support themselves as an alternative to
recidivating. There is increasing advocacy, therefore, of a reintroduction of
private industry in prisons under conditions appropriate to forestall exploita-
tion of prison labor for private gain. 96 It was against that background that
the first tentative draft of the Standards97 and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
the fourth tentative draft98 urged the aspirational goal that prisoners should
have access to fully remunerative employment and receive substantially the
same workers' benefits as their counterparts in free society. But prisoners
should be required as well to pay costs and contributions like those to which
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1976); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
299 U.S. 334 (1937); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1977). Federal prison indus-
tries are authorized by 18 U.S.C. §§ 4121-4128 (1976). See generally NAC CORRECTIONS, supra
note 8, § 16.13; G. HAWKINS, THE PRISON, ch. 5 (1976); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRECTION, 325-27 (2d ed. 1973).
95. LSOP, rupra note 5, § 23-4.1; DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.10; cf ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
§ 2-4334 (inmates must accept work assignments, enrollment in basic education programs, med-
ical and dental care mandated by statute, and participation in other programs ordered by the
sentencing court or required by statute).
96. Congress in 1976 added a new subsection (c) to 18 U.S.C. § 1761, see note 94 supra,
allowing the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to conduct up to seven pilot
projects in which prisoners could receive full pay for industrial work, subject to a liability for
deductions up to 80 percent of gross pay for deductions including federal and state taxes and
fringe benefits, as well as a contribution of between 5 and 20 percent to a victim compensation
fund. As of August 1981, LEAA had funded programs in Arizona, Kansas, and Minnesota.
The remaining four projects are expected to be authorized by November 1981. Letter to author
from George H. Bollinger, III, Acting Administrator, LEAA (August 26, 1981).
97. LSOP (rent. Draft No. 1), upra note 4, at 458-65, §§ 4.1-.4 and commentary.
98. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS §§ 23-4.2-.5
(Tent. Draft, No. 4, 1980).
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free world workers are subject, including a reasonable sum to a corrections
system to meet the costs of maintaining them. Because of substantial opposi-
tion to such a concept in the ABA House of Delegates, however, those sec-
tions and a counterpart section governing compensation for injuries or
death 99 were withdrawn by the Standing Committee from House considera-
tion and consequently do not form a part of the Standards as ultimately
approved.
To recapitulate, the position of the Standards is that prisoners may be
compelled to keep their quarters clean and to participate in other activities
essential to institutional security and order, including cleaning, sanitation,
food service, maintenance, and prison industries producing goods for govern-
ment use.' 0 0 Prisoners should expect no compensation for maintaining the
cleanliness and orderliness of personal living quarters, t' but should be given
compensation for other work, properly performed, adequate to permit com-
missary purchases and to allow accumulation of limited funds toward re-
lease. 0 2 If prisoners want to participate in other programs and activities,
including those which can contribute to self-improvement and education,
they can and should be encouraged to do so, but are not to be compelled.
10 3
Although there is no specific mention of compensation for death or injury in
the ultimate version of the Standards, prisoners have a claim to a healthful
place in which to live10 4 and to institutional compliance with industrial
safety codes applicable to counterpart facilities in the free world. ' 0 5 Even if
the Standards were silent on the matter, the constitutional case law is clear




100. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-4.1. Pretrial detainees should not be required to engage in
programs or activities not related to institutional security and order. Id § 23-4. 1 (a).
101. Id § 23-4.1(a).
102. Id § 23-4. 1(b). Federal courts will not intervene to eliminate wage differentials among
classes of prisoners. MeCray v. Fauver, 28 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2484 (D. N.J. 1981).
103. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-4.2. Prisons are not bound under equal protection to provide
work release programs in all institutions of the same category. Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d
138 (3d Cir. 1981). The MODEL ACT, supra note 9, §§ 4-701-706, recommends a voucher
system under which prisoners may apply for or otherwise earn voucher credits to be used solely
for the "purchase" of rehabilitation services. Some state prison systems also use a parole or
performance contract plan under which prison residents can enter into agreements guarantee-
ing release by a fixed date if the contracting residents conform to all contract terms and attain
all contract objectives which almost always are treatment oriented. Set, e.g., id. § 4-701 com-
mentary; MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 791.7725 (1977).
104. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.9. See also Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
105. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.14(a)(i).
106. E.g., Haworth v. State, 60 Haw. 557, 592 P.2d 820 (1979); Green v. State Corrections
Dep't, 386 Mich. 459, 192 N.W.2d 491 (1971); Reid v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 54 App. Div. 2d 83, 387 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1976). Federal prisoners have a claim to compen-
sation under 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1976); 28 C.F.R. §§ 301.1-.16 (1980); Sturgeon v. Federal Prison
Indus., 608 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1979) (prisoners first must exhaust administrative remedies, and
Federal Tort Claims Act relief is not an alternate remedy); Berry v. Federal Prison Indus., 440
F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Some states bring prisoners within a workers' compensation
system. Meredith v. California Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 777, 567 P.2d
746, 140 Cal. Rptr. 314, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1977). Prisoners may be dismissed from
industrial assignments because of failure to comply with applicable rules. McMath v. Alexan-
der, 486 F. Supp. 156 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
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G. External Contacts
Communications to which prisoners are parties merit broad first
amendment protection, in part because free members of society also are in-
volved. 107 Therefore, as the Standards restate, limitations on prisoners' com-
munication rights should be the least restrictive necessary to serve the
legitimate interests of institutional order and security and protection of the
public.108 Prisoner communications tend to fall within certain clearly de-
fined categories.
1. Courts
Prisoners, like citizens generally, must have untrammeled access to
courts on all matters, criminal and civil. 10 9 Correctional authorities, there-
fore, are under a duty not only not to impede prisoner efforts to bring mat-
ters before the courts, but also to take reasonable steps to facilitate prisoner
access to the judicial process. Thus, for example, prisoner work schedules
cannot be set so that it is difficult or impossible for inmates to prepare
needed documents or to engage in legal research."10 Subject to reasonable
regulations based on institutional safety and security, prisoners should be
allowed to keep legal documents and materials in their cells."' Authorities
also ought to see that prisoners have access to reasonable amounts of supplies
in connection with litigation." 2 These judicially delineated rights are re-
stated and to some extent elaborated upon in the Standards.'
13
The primary principle is that governmental authorities have a responsi-
bility to assure free and meaningful access to the judicial process. Access
must be without regard to whether an otherwise judicially cognizable issue
relates to the legality of conviction or confinement, asserts legal rights
against correctional or other governmental authorities, relates to civil legal
problems, or amounts to a defense against prosecutions or actions in which
107. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974).
108. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6. 1(a). Constitutional doctrine seemingly allows restrictions
on correspondence with other prisoners because no free citizen is affected by prison controls.
Heft v. Carlson, 489 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Thomas v. State, 285 Md. 458, 404 A.2d
257 (1979) (interprison mail can be examined and incriminating contents preserved as evi-
dence). Prison authorities perhaps may establish lists of authorized correspondents for each
prisoner. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 210-12 (8th Cir. 1974). However,
for such concepts to be invoked under LSOP § 23-6. 1(a), a showing would be required that no
less restrictive conditions are adequate to forestall an identified threat to institutional order and
security.
109. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Erparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Ramos v.
Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
110. Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th
Cir. 1966); Jordan v. Johnson, 381 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich. 1974), ajd, 513 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1975).
111. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975). Cf Mahler v. Slattery, 489 F.
Supp. 798 (E.D. Va. 1980) (prisoner engaged in 62 pendingpro se cases had no right to keep 23
cartons of case files in his cell).
112. Access to a typewriter is not a constitutional right, however, because pro se prisoners are
allowed to file handwritten petitions. Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 166 (D. Colo. 1979),
modiftedon other grounds, 629 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cet. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
113 LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-2.1. See atso DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 1.03, 12.07; ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, §§ 2-4022, -4323, -4378.
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prisoners are respondents." 14 As a corollary to this principle, prison authori-
ties cannot read, censor, or alter prisoner legal documents,"1 5 and cannot use
a prisoner's decision to seek judicial relief to affect adversely program status
within a correctional institution or opportunity for release. 116 Moreover,
correctional authorities should allow prisoners a reasonable amount of free
stationery and postage to communicate with courts," 1 7 and cannot intercept
any communication reasonably anticipated to be directed to a court unless
under court order or otherwise authorized by law. " 8 If written communica-
tions to courts are not effective under the circumstances, free telephone con-
tact with court officials should be permitted. 119 Prisoners should be allowed
to prepare and retain legal documents subject only to reasonable regulations,
dictated by considerations of institutional safety and scheduling, bearing on
time, place and manner of preparation and circumstances of retention. The
principle of least restrictive alternative is specifically advanced in this
setting. 120
The Poslconviction Remedies Standards '2 ' urge a single and comprehensive
remedial procedure which should have priority over other matters. 122 This
is supported in LSOP, which calls for prompt resolution of disputes involv-
ing legality, duration, or conditions of confinement.'
2 3
2. Public Officials
The right to petition government officials for redress of grievances is a
first amendment right.' 2 4 It is restated and implemented in the Standards
114. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-2.1(a), (b)(i).
115. Id § 23-2.1(b)(v). See also Expart Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Guajardo v. Estelle, 580
F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978).
116. LSOP,tepra note 5, § 23-2.1(b)(vi). On unconstitutionality of discipline based on seek-
ing judicial relief, see Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397 (lst Cir. 1979) (but not established on
facts); Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Cleggett v.
Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (solitary confinement for seeking legal redress of griev-
ances declared invalid). On other administrative sanctions against prisoner litigators, see, e.g.,
Hines v. Askew, 514 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1975) (allegations that prison authorities transferred a
prisoner and withheld medicine from him because he filed a Federal Civil Rights Act claim
stated a cause of action); Wren v. Carlson, 506 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (prisoner subjected to
harassment); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972); Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th
Cir. 1967) (parole board regulations delaying consideration of parole if person engaged in litiga-
tion declared invalid).
117. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1(e). See Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Ut. 1981).
118. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1 (d) (ii).
119. Id §23-6.1(0.
120. Id §§ 23-2.1(b) (iv), 2.3(b); cf ACA-ACI,supra note 10, § 2-4230 (access to legal materi-
als by inmates in segregation).
121. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, ch. 22.
122. Id §§ 22-1.1, -4.4.
123. LSOP, supra note 4, § 23-2. 1(b)(ii). The standard recommends that administrative
processes are presumptively unreasonable if not completed within 30 working days. It endorses
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies unless past practice or other facts demonstrate the futility
of an available process.
124. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 582 (10th Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981);
Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1976) (inspection for contraband, but no
censorship of mail to and from officials); LeVier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971)
(refusal to transmit mail to public officials, if established, would violate Federal Civil Rights
Act). In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6 (1977), the
Court noted that inmates were not prevented from communicating grievances to correctional
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through a prohibition against interception of communications to officials of
the confining authority, state and local chief executive officers, and legisla-
tors and administrators of grievance systems.' 25 The Standards confirm the




The sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal and quasi-criminal
cases' 2 7 carries with it the right of access to counsel during confinement so
that counsel may prepare for a constitutionally competent presentation of a
prisoner-client's case. Consequently, visual monitoring of attorney-client
conferences has been held to be an unreasonable interference with confiden-
tial attorney-client communications protected by the sixth amendment.
128
The contents of communications to and from counsel cannot be read but can
be visually inspected for presence of contraband.1 29 It is proper, however, to
require attorneys to confirm beforehand to prison authorities the existence of
an attorney-client relationship and to identify specific communications as
coming from them.13 0 Prison authorities are prohibited from defining prov-
iders of legal assistance by, for example, refusing to allow law student interns
or legal assistants employed by lawyers to interview prisoners in connection
with litigation. 131
Under the Standards, prisoners have the same liberty to retain and con-
sult private counsel on all legal matters as private citizens do. '3 2 Correspon-
dence and other communications between attorneys and prisoner-clients are
authorities: "With this presumably effective path available for the transmission of grievances,
the fact that the Union's grievance procedures might be more 'desirable' does not convert the
prohibitory regulations into unconstitutional acts."
125. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6. 1(d) (ii). Reasonable amounts of stationery and free postage
should be available for the purpose. Id § 23-6.1 (e). Visits with public officials should not be
counted against visiting periods and should be unlimited except as to time and duration. Id
§ 23-6.2(e). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.07; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4378.
126. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.6(b), but prisoners cannot practice intimidation against
other prisoners or persons in the process. This does not extend to a right to strike or take other
concerted action to affect institutional conditions, programs, or policies, id § 23-6.6(c), which
conforms to current Supreme Court doctrine. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
127. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); scope of the right on appeal is covered by Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
128. Case v. Andrews, 226 Kan. 786, 603 P.2d 623 (1979). Cf State ex rel. McCamic v.
McCoy, 276 S.E.2d 534 (W. Va. 1981) (pat-down search of lawyers improper unless institution
could show factual basis indicating attorneys create a security danger).
129. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974); Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010 (lst
Cir. 1979), cert. dened, 445 U.S. 963 (1980); Wycoff v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1978);
Crowe v. Leeke, 550 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1977).
130. Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978).
131. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Cf Perkins v. Wagner, 513 F. Supp. 904
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (authorities had to allow visits with codefendant wife as long as necessary to
establish a coordinated and adequate defense, subject to appropriate institutional security
arrangements).
132. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-2.2(c). For the scope of assistance to prisoners in the context
of administrative and other hearings within the correctional system, see text accompanying
notes 277-78, 291-92 inca.
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subject to interception only pursuant to court order or as otherwise author-
ized by law.' 3 3 Visits with attorneys should be free from limitations other
than as to time and duration and should not count against established visit-
ing periods for family and friends. '
3 4
A troubling issue has been provision by inmates of assistance to other
prisoners in the preparation of legal documents. The potential in such a
practice for exploitation of some prisoners by others is evident. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has held that if prison administrators do not make avail-
able or facilitate access to more professionally qualified sources of legal assist-
ance, they cannot punish or otherwise interfere unreasonably with inmates
who provide uncompensated assistance in legal matters.'
3 5
Access to adequate legal materials relates to representation by counsel
in that, as a constitutional matter, if competent legal assistance is not made
available to prisoners, prisons must provide them with basic legal research
materials. ' 3 6 The Standards take a "both-and" position on the matter. Cor-
rectional authorities should make educational services available even to pris-
oners who have access to legal services, either through special printed
materials or through a collection of standard legal reference materials bear-
ing on criminal law and procedure and cognate constitutional issues.
137
4. Correspondence Generally
Because communications rights of nonprisoners are affected directly,
the Supreme Court has ruled that censorship or other controls on correspon-
dence cannot be exercised unless prison officials meet a burden of showing
that their impositions advance "one or more of the substantial governmental
interests of security, order, and rehabilitation" and are no broader or stricter
than required for the purpose.' 38 Under that constitutional standard, as in-
dicated earlier, correspondence with legal counsel cannot be read but can
133. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1 (d)(i). Indigent prisoners should be allowed reasonable
amounts of stationery and postage for the purpose, id § 23-6.1 (e), and access to free telephone
services for calls to attorneys in connection with current litigation if correctional authorities
determine that written communications are ineffective under the circumstances. d § 23-6.1 (l).
See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.07; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4338, -4378.
134. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(e). See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); State cx re. McCamic v. McCoy, 276 S.E.2d 534 (W. Va.
1981), both eliminating restrictions on time and duration of counsel interviews. Cobb v. Aytch,
643 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981), held that preconviction detainees subject to transfer to a distant
state penitentiary where they could not readily contact counsel and witnesses had a claim to an
administrative pretransfer hearing.
135. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). For a discussion of alternative delivery modes
see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 831-32 (1977). Authorities can confiscate a check sent by
one prisoner to another in payment for such services. Henderson v. Ricketts, 499 F. Supp. 1066
(D. Colo. (1980).
136. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (dimensions of a minimum law collection are
described at 819 n.4); Jensen v. Satran, 303 N.W.2d 568 (N.D. 1981). The obligation to provide
state legal materials to a state prisoner transferred to federal custody in another state rests on
federal, not transferring state, officials. Goodnow v. Perrin, 421 A.2d 1008 (N.H. 1980).
137. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-2.3(a). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.05; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4326.
138. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974). Interception and copying letters
for purposes of a criminal investigation unrelated to institutional security considerations vio-
lated federal and state constitutional rights. State v. Sheriff, 619 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1980).
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only be inspected for contraband.1 39 Nor can correspondence with religious
counselors or functionaries be limited unreasonably. 140 Correspondence
among prison inmates, however, may be barred or regulated, 14 1 and authori-
ties may proscribe libelous or obscene contents 142 or material which clearly
is inflammatory and subversive of institutional discipline.'
43
The Standards provide that envelopes, packages, or containers sent to or
from prisoners may be opened and inspected to determine if they contain
contraband, with the limitation that communications reasonably antici-
pated to be between prisoners and their counsel may be opened and in-
spected only in an affected prisoner's presence.' 44 Written communications
are not to be read and oral communications intentionally overheard unless
prison administrators have received reliable information that a particular
communication may jeopardize public safety or the security or safety within
a correctional institution, or is being used to further illegal activity.'
45 If
communications are directed to counsel or specified persons or organizations
like courts, officials of the confining authority, state and local chief executive
officers, legislators, grievance system administrators, and paroling authori-
ties, there can be no interception without a court order or specific authoriza-
tion by law.
14 6
The era of closely controlling printed matter ordered or received by
prisoners has largely drawn to a close. The position of the Standards is that
limitations can be imposed on printed materials which otherwise can be
mailed lawfully 147 only if bottomed on the overriding considerations embod-
ied in section 23-1.1.1 4 The latter are broad enough to comprehend the
"publishers only" limitation on casebound books sustained by the Supreme
139. See note 129 supra.
140. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (listed a prohibition against correspondence with a
Buddhist counselor as an element of improper interference with first amendment rights).
141. See note 108 supra.
142. Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 431 U.S. 931
(1977); Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976).
143. Wilson v. Prasse, 463 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1972) (as long as authorities were not
motivated by racial or religious prejudice in evaluating material).
144. LSOP,ssupra note 5, § 23-6.1(b); the proviso was added by amendment during House of
Delegates consideration. See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.05; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-
4338, -4370, -4375-77.
145. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1(c); note 264 infza. See also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 12.05-
.06; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4375 and discussion.
146. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1(d). On provision of a reasonable amount of free station-
ery and postage to help indigent prisoners maintain ties with family and friends in the commu-
nity, set § 23-6.1(e); DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.08 (but reasonable limitations on postage
allowance may be imposed on inmates who abuse an unlimited postage allowance policy);
ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4371. There may be a constitutional dimension to this. Secretary
v. Allen, 286 Md. 133, 406 A.2d 104 (1979) (evidentiary hearing required on lawfulness of limi-
tation to seven paid first-class letters weekly). Under LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1 (1) pay tele-
phones should be available to inmates, a position also taken in DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.10 and
ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4379, but free calls for indigents are allowed only for communica-
tions with attorneys of record and officials of courts in which their current litigation is pending.
147. LSOP, supra note 5, § 
2 3
-6.1(g); see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.01; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4373. Libelous or obscene matter is not mailable. See note 142 supra.
148. See text accompanying note 13 supra. Cf DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.02 (no publication
is rejected solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social, or sexual, or




4 9 as well as subject matter which might facilitate assaults or es-
capes.' 50 Refusal to forward or deliver material presumably is a proper sub-
ject for grievance proceedings covering all forms of prisoner complaints.
15 1
5. Visitation
Almost all prison inmates eventually return to the free community.
Therefore, it is important to preserve as many family and community ties as
possible to encourage swift reintegration into society following release. In
many instances today this is accomplished through assignment to commu-
nity corrections centers and work or study release programs in which con-
trols are minimal. 152 The Standards recommend use of home furlough
programs to the extent they are consistent with community and institutional
security. 153
Nevertheless, for most prisoners a more important practical concern is
visitation at correctional facilities by family members and friends. Although
it has been implied that long-term prisoners cannot be denied visits if such a
deprivation will be detrimental to physical or mental health, 154 the more
relevant constitutional standard appears to be that there is no absolute right
to visits. 1 5 5 Consequently, reasonable limitations can be imposed on con-
tacts with casual acquaintances, 156 smuggling of weapons and contraband
149. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-53 (1979), embodied in DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.02.
See also Vodicka v. Phelps, 624 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1980); Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290 (7th
Cir. 1980) (sustaining requirement that nude and seminude photographs come from commer-
cial sources, not persons well known to prisoner); Rich v. Luther, 514 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. N.C.
1981); In re Smith, 112 Cal. App. 3d 956, 169 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980).
150. Cf MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 791.6603(3) (1977); MICH. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS DIR.
PD-DWA-64.03 (Feb. 1, 1976), restricting specific information about manufacturing weapons,
explosives, incendiary devices, poisons or dangerous drugs; clearly inflammatory writings in-
cluding but not limited to advocacy of disorder, violence or insurrection against correctional
facilities or personnel; material describing or showing acts of homosexuality, sadism, violent
sexual practice or unlawful sexual behavior; and detailed instruction in martial arts including
judo, karate, aikido, kung fu and similar techniques.
151. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(b)-(c). Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), re-
quired hearings before correspondence can be interrupted. This has been invoked in the setting
of control over incoming publications. Hopkins v. Collins, 547 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1977).
152. See NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, §§ 9.9, 16.14.
153. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(a); see a/so DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.16; ACA-ACI, upra
note 10, §§ 2-4387, -4419, -4455.
154. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 546-48 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (pretrial detention
facility).
155. [l]nstitutional considerations, such as security and related administrative
problems, as well as the accepted and legitimate policy objectives of the corrections
system itself, require that some limitation be placed on . . . visitations. So long as
reasonable and effective means of communication remain open and no discrimination
in terms of content is involved, we believe that, in drawing such lines, "prison officials
must be accorded latitude."
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974). Racial discrimination in according visitation privi-
leges denies equal protection. Thomas v. Brierley, 481 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1973). On visitation
restrictions affecting death row inmates, see Wilson v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 511 F. Supp. 750
(D. Nev. 1981).
156. Lynott v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1980) (authorities could bar visits by
women under circumstances suggesting their relationship to prisoner was not conducive to reha-
bilitation); Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 110 1, 1111-12 (N.D. Ga. 1976), af 'dsub noma. Ham-
ilton v. Bell, 551 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1977). There is obviously no protected claim of access to
consenting sexual partners from among prisoners of the opposite sex, Dodson v. State, 268 Ind.
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can be forestalled through reasonable security measures,' 5 7 and visitor attire
can be subjected to reasonable restrictions. 15  There is no right to conjugal
visits,' 5 9 although some authorities intimate that contact visits may be a pro-
tected right at least for preadjudication detainees. 160
The Standards adopt a position consonant with current precedent that
visits should be encouraged, subject to overriding concerns of institutional
and public safety and order, through provision of reasonable visiting hours,
including weekend and holiday times, for the convenience of visitors.' 6 1 No
specific mention is made of conjugal visits, but it is recommended that ex-
tended visits between prisoners and their families in suitable accommoda-
tions should be allowed those not on home furlough status, 162 which, in the
exercise of administrative discretion, could accomplish the equivalent to con-
jugal visitation. Visiting facilities should be informal and should allow op-
portunities for physical contact. 16 3 Under such circumstances, however,
visitors may be subjected to nonintrusive forms of personal search. 164 A
preference is expressed for minimum visits of one hour each, with a possibil-
ity of cumulating time allotments to facilitate longer visits. ' 65 This is impor-
tant when family members must travel long distances to visit a prisoner.
Prisoners in disciplinary segregation should have the same visitation rights as
667, 377 N.E.2d 1365 (1978), or of the same sex, People v. Coulter, 94 Mich. App. 531, 288
N.W.2d 448 (1980) (no constitutional violation in invoking sodomy statute against prisoners).
157. Magnetometers and like detection devices can be used in public buildings generally,
McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978), which presumably would extend to prison
facilities; hand-carried items also are subject to visual inspection. United States v. Kelley, 393
F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Okla. 1975); State v. Colby, 263 S.C. 468, 210 S.E.2d 914 (1975). On
submission to strip searches as a condition to visitation, see Wool v. Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928 (D.
Vt. 1981) (strip search requirement for visitor suspected of carrying contraband not unreasona-
ble when metal detectors could not detect contraband like drugs carried beneath clothing); In re
French, 106 Cal. App. 3d 74, 164 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1980) (could not suspend visiting privileges of
five women who refused strip searches not shown to be reasonably related to institutional secur-
ity). Before visitors can be subjected to other forms of search and seizure, adequate legal
grounds must exist independent of the fact they are visitors--stop-and-frisk or personal search
following a legal arrest being the most usual. State v. Custodio, 607 P.2d 1048 (Haw. 1980)
(strip search reasonable); State v. Hall, 292 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 1980).
158. Holdman v. Olim, 59 Haw. 346, 581 P.2d 1164 (1978) (female visitors could be re-
quired to wear suitable garments).
159. McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975). See also
n.156 supra. It was held unreasonable to deny contact visits between preconviction detainees
and their young children when suitable facilities were available to accommodate such visits. In
re Smith, 112 Cal. App. 3d 956, 169 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980).
160. Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69,
399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980); Wickham v. Fisher,
629 P.2d 896 (Ut. 1981); contra, Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 1759 (1981); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980); Inmates of Allegheny County
Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 373 (1st Cir. 1978).
On a need to show that protracted denial of contact visits likely will affect physical or mental
health, see Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
161. LSOP,supra note 5, § 23-6.2(b), cross-referencing § 23-1.1. Seealso DOJ,supra note 11,
§ 12.12; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4380-81, -4385.
162. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(c); see a/so DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.13; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4384.
163. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(c); see a/so DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.12; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4383.
164. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(d); see also ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4382.
165. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(e). Visits with counsel, clergy and public officials are not
to count against visiting periods and should be unlimited in number.
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those in the general prison population, subject only to considerations of insti-
tutional security and order. 166
Although for the most part prisoners should be allowed to receive
whomever they wish, subject to frequency limitations and scheduling re-
quirements, the Standards recognize that correctional authorities may dis-
qualify for good cause certain people as visitors. 167 Examples include abuse
of visitation regulations on earlier occasions' 6a and reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity may ensue.169 Exclusion of visitors is subject to prisoner
grievance proceedings. 1
70
Many if not most American prisons are remote from metropolitan cen-
ters from which the bulk of their inmates are sentenced. Regardless of
whether or not this poses a constitutional issue, t7 1 prison administrators
should do whatever they can to facilitate visits by providing local transporta-
tion and furnishing information about transportation alternatives.'
72
6. Visits by Media Representatives and Groups
It is implicit if not express in American constitutional decisions that the
right of prisoners to communicate with members of the public generally car-
ries with it a right to contact the press and other communications media, '
73
It is doubtful that the first amendment supports a direct claim by communi-
cations media representatives to initiate interviews with prisoners whom they
select, 1 74 although an absolute ban on access to penal facilities by the media
and public might produce a constitutional infringement. 175 The Standards
endorse a position that correctional authorities should accommodate media
and public group requests to visit correctional institutions, provided visits
are conducted so as to safeguard the privacy and dignity of inmates and
166. Id § 23-6.3; see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.14; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4227, -
4381.
167. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(d); stee also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.12; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4381 (discussion).
168. See Patterson v. WaIters, 363 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (wife earlier had passed
controlled substance to inmate husband).
169. Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F. Supp. 257 (D. Neb. 1971) (sister and sister-in-law believed to
have smuggled in pistol and ammunition later discovered in prison chapel).
170. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(d). In Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F. Supp. 257 (D. Neb.
1971), the court accepted as sufficient an administrative inquiry which concluded that female
relatives in fact had introduced a weapon into the facility, even though it had not been discov-
ered in the inmate relative's possession).
171. See Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d 1126 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981) (re-
versing district court order voiding assignment to mainland federal prison making it very diffi-
cult for family members to visit him); Goodnow v. Perrin, 421 A.2d 1008 (N.H. 1980)
(burdensome transfer to federal institution in another state, rendering it difficult to manage
family visits, was not cruel and unusual punishment).
172. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(0; DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.15; ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
2-4385 (discussion), -4386.
173. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), in disallowing a press claim to interview selected
inmates, noted the availability of communications and visitations between prisoners and press
representatives. Decisions indicating such a prisoner right to exist include Main Road v. Aytch,
565 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1976); Nolan v.
Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
174. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
175. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), contains dicta from which such a conclu-
sion may be inferred.
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promote institutional security and order.' 76 Conversations conducted under
such circumstances should be monitored only under emergency
circumstances. 1
77
H. Miscellaneous Claims or Rights
1. Prisoner Publications
The first amendment does not guarantee prisoners freedom to publish
intramural newspapers and the like,' 78 although administrators may well
consider that a helpful step toward maintaining inmate morale. If prisoner
publications are allowed, regulations controlling them are presumed
valid. 179 Some courts have ruled that administrative due process governs
official censorship of contents,'18 while others are satisfied with a more infor-
mal consultative approach.'"' Contents improper in incoming publications,
if proposed for internal dissemination,18 2 should be subject to censorship as a
reasonable exercise of power in the interests of institutional security and
discipline. '
8 3
The ABA position is that newspapers and other communications media
by and for prisoners should be encouraged within limits of resources and
facilities.' 8 4 The expectation is that prisoners themselves must bear the
costs, although naturally no bar is intended to use of public funds and facili-
ties for the purpose. Advance review of content is appropriate so that per-
sons or groups under attack can be given a contemporaneous opportunity to
reply, 18 5 and material can be excised which is not within first amendment
protection or otherwise not publishable because it constitutes a substantial
threat to institutional security.' 8 6 Objections to administrative interference
with prisoner communications media should be lodged under grievance ma-
176. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.4; see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.14; ACA-ACI, supra note
10, § 2-4339.
177. The provision cross-refers to § 23-6.1(c)-(d), which requires reliable information that a
particular communication may jeopardize public safety or institutional security or safety, or is
being used in furtherance of illegal activity; if counsel or certain public authorities participate, a
court order or authorization by law is necessary. See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra, 262
infia .
178. The Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal dimissed, 517 F.2d
1395 (1975).
179. Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979).
180. Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80 (D. Conn. 1981) (officials must make factual showing of
substantial risk of violence or disorder to censor article in prison newspaper); The Luparar v.
Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974); Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265 (D. N.H.
1972).
181. Pittman v. Hutto, 448 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1978), aftd, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979).
182. See notes 141-42, 150 supra.
183. Vodicka v. Phelps, 624 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1980); Blue v. Hogan, 553 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.
1977). This is the standard governing censorship of correspondence. Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974).
184. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.7(a). See aso MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 4-124; NAC
CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, § 2.15; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4459 (activities generally initi-
ated by inmates under staff supervision).
185. To the extent prison broadcasting stations are subject to FCC regulations an opportu-
nity for reply probably is necessary. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
186. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.7(b).
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chinery provided for elsewhere in the Standards.' 87
2. Confidentiality of Prisoner Records
The ABA is concerned,'8 8 as are accrediting organs,' 89 that prisoner
records and other institutional data compilations specific enough to enable
individual prisoners to be identified be held confidential unless: (a) a pris-
oner concerned consents; (b) the disclosure is made to an official or agency
requesting in writing that the material be available in connection with a
criminal investigation; (c) the material is solicited for statistical, research or
reporting purposes in a form adequate to forestall identifying particulars
concerning individual prisoners; or (d) disclosure is required by a valid
court order. The Standards also endorse a claim by prisoners to have access to
their files to inspect and copy information as long as it does not constitute
diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilita-
tion,'90 reveal sources of information obtained under a promise of confiden-
tiality,' 9 ' create a possibility of physical or other harm to any other person,
or jeopardize prison security if disclosed. 192 Prisoners believing that infor-
mation in their files or prison records to which they have been given access is
inaccurate should be allowed to request its amendment. 193
3. Voting
The fourteenth amendment by its terms permits states to forfeit the
right of convicted felons to vote. 194 Preconviction detainees not under a
187. Id §§ 23-6.7(c), -7.1. See text accompanying notes 210-26 infra.
188. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.11(a).
189. DOJ, supra note 11, § 21.18; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4120, -4125-26; ACA-ACA,
supra note 10, §§ 73, 78.
190. Cf decisions creating a psychotherapists' privilege against revealing information criti-
cal to a confidential therapeutic relationship. Allired v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976); In re
"B", 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978). The Standard urge a privilege for all information given
by prisoners to correctional employees serving in a counseling relationship unless the informa-
tion bears on a contemplated crime or disclosure is required by court order. LSOP, supra note 5,
§ 23-6.11 (c).
191. Cf a similar restriction under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Id
§ 552(b)(7)(D) states:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are:
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would ... (D) disclose the identity of
a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential in-
formation furnished only by the confidential source....
See Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1978).
192. LSOP, spra note 5, § 23-6.11. See also DOJ, supra note II, § 21.19; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4123.
193. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1 l(b). A prisoner has a constitutional right to clear a file of
material concerning affiliation with a political movement. Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F. Supp. 1162
(E.D. Va. 1980) (Black Liberation Army).
194. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Arbitrary legislative classifications, how-
ever, can deny equal protection. Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (equal
protection was denied when men convicted of battering their wives were disfranchised but not
wives similarly convicted of assaulting husbands); ef Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th
Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979) (no equal protection problem in allowing successful
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valid felony conviction must, however, be given opportunities for absentee
registration and voting.' 95 Nevertheless, whatever the federal constitutional
doctrine, the position of the ABA is that conviction should not work a depri-
vation of the franchise, whether through automatic operation of law or the
action or inaction of governmental officials.' 96 The Standards recognize a
practical political problem which can result if convicted felons are allowed
both to retain the vote and to establish voting residence in the locale of their
incarceration. A large voting prisoner population in a rural county might
well assert a controlling leverage in local government. Accordingly, prison-
ers should not be authorized to establish a voting domicile solely on the basis
of physical presence in an institution, but instead should be allowed absentee




Prisoners have absolute freedom to believe as they will' 98 and to express
their beliefs in writing to others.' 99 They have no absolute right to form
prisoner organizations and to engage in collective activity directed against
prison administrations. 200 Nor can they insist on opportunities to partici-
pate in activities of outside organizations not unreasonably viewed by correc-
tional authorities as inimical to prisoner rehabilitation or institutional
discipline and order.
20 1
The ABA standard20 2 adopts a somewhat more liberal stance than con-
state probationers to regain franchise while not extending the same benefit to successful federal
probationers resident in the state).
195. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); see Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973); cf
Tate v. Collins, 496 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Tenn. 1980).
196. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.4.
197. Id This is the position taken by some state courts. Dane v. Board of Registrars, 374
Mass. 152, 371 N.E.2d 1358 (1978); Emery v. State, 177 Mont. 73, 580 P.2d 445 (1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 874 (1979).
198. Jones v. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977); Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F.
Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1980).
199. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v. Oswald,
404 U.S. 1049 (1972). Correspondence and internal publications advocating prisoners' rights
and criticizing prison officials cannot be censored or banned. Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748,
760-61 (5th Cir. 1978); United States ex re. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975).
200. Jones v. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977). Prison authorities can ban
meetings by groups until the latter have been given official recognition. Preast v. Cox, 628 F.2d
292 (4th Cir. 1980).
201. Jones v. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, at 136. The Court noted, however, the
desirability of contacts with outside organizations and individuals who may aid prisoner reha-
bilitation and postrelease reintegration in society. In contrast, the California Supreme Court
has ruled that although prison union meetings can be prohibited in the reasonable interests of
institutional security, In re Price, 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979), state
legislation guaranteeing civil rights to prisoners forestalls a blanket ban against prisoner union
buttons worn by inmates, In re Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d 131, 599 P.2d 86, 157 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1979),
or correspondence from a paroled union officer to incarcerated union members. In re Brandt, 25
Cal. 3d 136, 599 P.2d 89, 157 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1979). It is not a first amendment violation to
allow volunteers from religious groups to visit jail inmates as long as their preaching is not
forced on uninterested inmates. Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980).
202. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.6(a). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.13; ACA-ACI, supra




stitutional precedent requires, in that it encourages lawful organizations and
their activities within prison confines, subject to considerations of public
safety and institutional security and order.20 3 The position is clear, however,
that the ABA does not endorse a right on the part of prisoners to strike or to




The ABA endorses a standard of privacy of living quarters for prisoners,
consistent with their security classification, 20 5 and freedom from sexual dis-
crimination.20 6 These provisions must be administered against the statutory
background of federal legislation forbidding sex-based discrimination and
requiring bona fide occupational qualifications for assignments based on
gender.20 7 Prisoner privacy cannot, therefore, be accomplished through a
ban against assignments of staff members to custodial supervision of inmates
of the opposite sex, 20 8 but instead must rest on special training on supervis-




Although it is not clear that due process requires a grievance mecha-
nism to resolve prisoner complaints, 2t0 establishment of formal grievance
procedures by legislative or administrative action 2 1 is most advantageous to
courts and administrators because thereafter a failure of prisoners to invoke
them means they have not exhausted available administrative remedies. Ex-
haustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to federal habeas
203. E.g., guards can be stationed at religious meetings. United States cx rel. Jones v. Run-
die, 453 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1971); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967). Participation by
nonprisoners should be encouraged. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.6(a). See also DOJ, supra note
11, § 19.01; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4455-56.
204. LSOP, supra note 5, §§ 23-4.2, -6.6(c).
205. Id § 23-6.14(b).
206. Id § 23-6.15.
207. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 104b, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1975). See Dothard v. Raw]-
inson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), on qualifications for employment as a correctional officer.
208. Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reform.,
612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
209. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
210. Some federal courts have incorporated such proceedings in comprehensive orders ad-
ministering state prisons or prison systems based on the Federal Civil Rights Act. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Perini, 455 F. Supp. 1241, 1252 (N.D. Ohio 1978), modifed, 477 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977). The first amendment right
of petition includes a right to file complaints with prison administrators, Stovall v. Bennett, 471
F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 1979), but does not cover group petitions which, in the reason-
able thinking of prison officials, may jeopardize institutional security. Nickens v. White, 622
F.2d 967 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980); In re Price, 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330,
158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979).
211. Recently established federal procedures are contained in 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-16
(1980); see 44 Fed. Reg. 62248-51 (1979). See also LSOP (Tent. Draft No. 1), supra note 4, at
579-82, commentary.
[Vol. 59:1
LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS
corpus,21 2 damage actions based directly on the eighth amendment, 21 3 ac-
tions under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 21 4 contempt actions alleging fail-
ure to comply with federal district court regulatory orders,21 5 or state
appellate review of administrative activity. 21 6 Grievance procedures also
may generate a comprehensive record reducing the scope of or eliminating
the need for federal district court hearings. 21 7 Although every effort should
be made to resolve prisoner grievances informally as far as possible, 2 18 the
ABA urges the adoption of grievance procedures to resolve complaints con-
cerning institutional policies, rules, practices and procedures. 2 19 These pro-
cedures should not serve as devices to review specific dispositions on the
merits by internal adjudicative bodies like parole, classification and discipli-
nary boards. 220 The intent of the Standards is that the latter determinations
be reviewable through normal administrative review mechanisms estab-
lished under a state administrative procedures act.
22 1
To facilitate and standardize grievance procedures, special forms should
be provided so that grievants may note briefly the nature of their com-
plaints, the administrators involved and the remedy sought.222 The essen-
tials of a fair grievance proceeding are recapitulated in the Standards:
223
(a) a written response to each grievance containing reasons for the decision;
(b) reasonable time limits within which a response must be given;
224
(c) advisory review of grievances; and (d) a method of resolving jurisdic-
tional issues. Grievances should be possible over a broad array of issues,
225
and prisoners should have adequate assurances against reprisals based on
grievance filings.
226
Correctional administration within an institution should be subject to
212. Antonelli v. Ralston, 609 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1979) (federal prisoner); Mason v. Ciccone,
531 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1976) (requirement does not serve to suspend the writ).
213. Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980).
214. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-85 (1976); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978). This
applies to actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) as well. Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986 (5th
Cir. 1981).
215. Taylor v. Perini, 455 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ohio 1978), modifmed, 477 F. Supp. 1289
(N.D. Ohio 1979).
216. In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921, 603 P.2d 35, 160 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1979); Dickerson v.
Warden of Marquette Prison, 99 Mich. App. 630, 298 N.W.2d 841 (1980).
217. Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
218. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(a).
219. Id § 23-7.1(b). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.11; ACA-ACI,supra note 10, §§ 2-4343.
Staff and inmates should participate in the design of grievance procedures. LSOP, supra note 5,
§ 23-7.1(d)(v).
220. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(b).
221. Id § 23-7.2(a). See also Frazee v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 248 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1976) (pa-
role revocation); Lawrence v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 88 Mich. App. 167, 276 N.W.2d
554 (1979) (major misconduct cases are "contested cases" reviewable in designated trial courts
under the state act); contra, Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1976) (major disciplinary
proceeding in federal prison system).
222. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(c). Use of standard forms may be made a condition to
availability of a grievance procedure. Mahler v. Slattery, 489 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Va. 1980).
223. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(d).
224. A recommended period is 30 working days; a failure to respond within that period
should be taken as a denial of relief. Id § 23-7. l(d)(ii). A different response time may be neces-
sary in emergencies. Id § 23-7.1(d)(iii).
225. Id §23-7.1(d)(vii).
226. Id § 23-7.1(d)(vi).
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inspection by administrative authorities at the departmental level who act
outside institutional staff structure and usual channels of management con-
trol.22 7 The approved edition of the Standards does not advocate establish-
ment of the office of a special correctional ombudsman or mediator as did
the first tentative draft.228 If such a functionary is established, however,
oversight jurisdiction should extend to receipt and investigation of prisoner
complaints.
229
II. CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE OF PRISONERS
A. Use of Force
Incarceration inevitably requires the use of force to maintain discipline,
security and order. Consequently, prison administrations should develop de-
tailed policies governing use of all levels of force and provide for their peri-
odic documented review and revision. 230 There are certain legal limitations
in light of which institutional policies must be administered. Prison adminis-
trators cannot use force of any kind, including chemical sprays and the
like,2 3' for purposes of punishment because that would violate the eighth
amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment. 232 A basic princi-
ple is that no more force may be used than is reasonably necessary to cope
with the particular circumstances. 233 Nondeadly physical force is the stan-
dard. Chemical devices are not to be used routinely and affected prisoners
must be given immediate physical examinations and medical treatment.
234
Deadly force, according to principles applied to law enforcement officers
generally,235 may be used only in necessary defense of prison personnel, in-
227. Id § 23-7.3(a). High-level departmental oversight is necessary even though other state
agencies have investigating or reporting authority on the pattern of the federal General Ac-
counting Office. Id § 23-7.3 and commentary.
228. See LSOP (Tent. Draft No. 1), supra note 4, at 574-78; MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 4-
201 and comment. It is, however, ABA policy that such systems ought to be established, a
policy which did not require restatement in the Standards. See 96 ABA REPORTS 541-42 (1971);
94 ABA REPORTS 119-21 (1969).
229. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.3(b).
230. Id § 23-6.12. More detailed guidelines than those in LSOP may be found, e.g., in
DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 6.17-.33, 21.08-.09; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4096-98, -4185-91.
231. Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th
Cir. 1979); McCargo v. Mister, 462 F. Supp. 813, 819 (D. Md. 1978); Donahue v. Maynard, 437
F. Supp. 47 (D. Kan. 1977). Institutions are not required constitutionally, however, to issue
regulations governing MACE and tear gas use. LeBlanc v. Foti, 487 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. La.
1980).
232. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971); Har-
rah v. Leverette, 271 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1980); Stateex re. K.W. & CW. v. Werner, 242 S.E.2d
907 (W. Va. 1978). However, an isolated attack by a guard is not punishment under the eighth
amendment; the latter requires action for a penal or disciplinary purpose authorized by a higher
prison authority. George v. Evans, 620 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1980); Harrah v. Leverette, 271
S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1980).
233. Necessary physical contacts by custodial officers are privileged. Picariello v. Fenton,
491 F. Supp. 1026 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
234. Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980) (power to use force against individual
prisoners is more limited than to quell general disturbances).
235. Quals v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d
Cir. 1975). Excessive force constitutes a Federal Civil Rights Act violation. Russ v. Ratliff, 538
F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denzid, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.
2d 969 (La. 1977).
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mates or other persons or in forestalling escape. In actual or threatened
emergencies, inmates can be physically confined to quarters until institu-
tional order is assured.2 36 Personal restraints like handcuffs, irons and strait-
jackets are to be used only if necessary to prevent individual prisoners from
escaping during transfer or injuring themselves or others.
237
The Standards essentially restate these principles. 238 In particular, in-
stances should be minimized in which physical or life-endangering force
need be invoked. 239 Deadly force2 4° can be used to prevent escape from
facilities used primarily to house felony convicts unless the employee using
that force actually knows either that the escaping person has not been
charged with or convicted of a felony involving violence, or that the escapee
is unlikely to endanger human life or inflict serious bodily harm on someone
if not prevented from escaping. If an institution houses misdemeanants or
preconviction detainees, deadly force necessary to forestall escape can be
used only if the user of the force knows there is a substantial risk that the
escaping individual will cause death or serious bodily harm unless prevented
from escaping, or believes in the exercise of on-site professional judgment
that lesser force would fail or endanger other lives. 24 1 Deadly force cannot
be used to prevent destruction of property or maintain institutional security
unless there is an independent basis in the law of the jurisdiction governing
self-defense or defense of others. 242 Whenever force of any sort is used, cor-
rectional administrators should require reports which should be promptly
reviewed for factual sufficiency, supplemented by additional factual investi-
gations if needed.
24 3
B. Search and Sezure
Imprisoned persons have a much reduced scope of constitutional protec-
tion against various forms of search and seizure, compared to citizens in free
society, because of supervening considerations of institutional security and
order and a need to prevent introduction of contraband substances into a
236. Saunders v. Packel, 436 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
237. Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir.
1979); Picariello v. Fenton, 491 F. Supp. 1026 (M.D. Pa. 1980). Drugs should never be used as a
restraining mechanism for security purposes. DOJ, supra note 11, § 6.18.
No due process administrative hearing is required to "lock down" a penal institution for
several months after a period of rioting. Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1980).
238. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.12(a). A corollary is that an appropriate array of control
devices and weapons should be provided within an institution, id § 23-6.12(b), and regularly
inspected, id § 23-6.12(c); care should be exercised in the assignment of staff to positions in
which force, including deadly force, may have to be used, and proper entry and ongoing educa-
tion must be provided for and participated in by persons receiving such assignments. Id
239. Id. § 23-6.12(a)(i).
240. Deadly force is defined to include "force that a trained and authorized professional
employee uses with the purpose of causing, or which he or she knows will create a substantial
risk of causing, death or serious bodily harm." Id § 23-6.12(a)(iii).
241. Id. § 23-6.12(a)(ii)(A)(2). Note that what is contemplated is a good-faith subjective
evaluation by the correctional employee concerned, not an objective reasonable person standard
as in orthodox criminal law.
242. Id § 23-6.12(a)(ii)(B). Unreasonable interpretations of circumstances would render
correctional employees criminally liable if death or physical injury of a prisoner or another
ensued. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04 (P.O.D. 1962), 210.4 (1981).
243. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.12(d).
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prison setting. 244 Therefore, there is no requirement that advance judicial
authorization be obtained before prisoner living quarters can be searched, or
sanitation or safety inspections conducted. Nor does the fourth amendment
require that prisoners be physically present during search of living quarters
or personal property.
245
The Standards expand the constitutional minima in some respects. No
special authorization of any sort is required for searches of areas of an insti-
tution other than prisoner living quarters, 24 6 and routine periodic visual in-
spection of prisoner living areas can be undertaken by correctional
authorities, without specific advance authorization, to confirm compliance
with health, safety and security regulations. 24 7 Both routine and random
shakedown inspections can be conducted without a special underlying cause
but should be authorized in advance by the chief or acting chief executive of
an institution. 248 If, however, an intrusive living quarters search is neither
routine nor random, but is focused on an individual, the ABA recommends
advance written authorization by a supervisor of the employees carrying out
the search, based on a reasonable belief that contraband 249 or other prohib-
ited material will be found.250 Immediate search can be made if a correc-
tional officer reasonably believes material which is sought would be disposed
of while the otherwise necessary prior approval is obtained.25t All searches
of prisoner quarters and possessions should be conducted so that damage to
property and invasion of privacy are kept to a minimum. 252 Written reports
should be prepared concerning all searches for which advance authorization
244. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); United States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.
1978); United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1977); Hudson v. State, 196 Colo. 211,
585 P.2d 580 (1978); State v. Dauzat, 364 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1978); Thomas v. State, 285 Md.
458, 404 A.2d 257 (1979). Guards searching for weapons and contraband after a riot acted
improperly in seizing and reading an inmate's diary, since they had no reasonable expectation
of finding evidence there about prisoner participation in the riot. DiGiuseppe v. Ward, 514 F.
Supp. 503 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). On the status of property of prisoners on work release status,
compare State v. Nunziato, 178 N.J. Super. 216, 428 A.2d 564 (1981) (work release supervisor
properly could conduct warrantless search of defendant's home, where he had permission to go
for lunch, because defendant was like prisoner rather than parolee), with Commonwealth v.
Gabrielle, 409 A.2d 1173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (locker at place of work release employment not
subject to warrantless search).
245. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979).
246. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.10(a).
247. Id § 23-6.10(b).
248. Id § 23-6.10(c).
249. The Standards do not define contraband in this context and other contexts like inspec-
tion of correspondence under § 23-6.1. The Supreme Court used a formulation of "money,
drugs, weapons, and other contraband," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), and state
courts have approved and applied statutory definitions like "any tool or other thing that may be
used to facilitate [escape] or any other thing which a person confined in official custody is pro-
hibited by statute or regulation from making or possessing," ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 756
(Supp. 1977); State v. Bishop, 392 A.2d 20 (Me. 1978), and "any article or thing which a person
confined . . . is prohibited by statute, rule, regulation or order from obtaining or possessing,
and whose use would endanger the safety or security of such institution or any person therein."
OR. REv. STAT. § 162.135(1) (1977); State v. Meyer, 283 Or. 449, 583 P.2d 553 (1978).
250. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6,10(d).
251. Id, proviso.
252. Id § 23-6.10(e). Intentional or negligent deprivation of prisoner property does not vio-
late the fourteenth amendment unless it is accomplished without due process of law, which is
not the case as far as the Federal Civil Rights Act is concerned unless there is no state tort
remedy available to prisoners. Parratt v. Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981).
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is required or which result in seizure of contraband or other forbidden mate-
rial. If property is taken, a copy of the report or a portion of it should be
given an affected prisoner as a receipt.
25 3
Physical searches of prisoners are indispensable in many situations, for
example, following transportation outside institutional confines or contact
visits. The Supreme Court found no constitutional infringement in visual
inspections of body cavities following contact visits,2 54 although there might
be an infringement of personal privacy if searches of that sort are not con-
ducted in private by custodial officers of the same sex.2 55 The Standards urge
detailed regulation of physical searches through institutional rules. Nonin-
trusive sensors instead of body searches should be used whenever possible.
256
Pat-down searches, however, are appropriate to determine whether prisoners
are carrying contraband or other prohibited material. 257 Strip searches and
visual inspections of body cavities ought to rest on articulable suspicion that
a prisoner is carrying contraband, etc. 258 Digital or instrumental inspection
of anal or vaginal cavities should be authorized in a written document from
the chief executive officer of an institution embodying a factual basis sup-
porting a reasonable belief that the prisoner in question is secreting contra-
band or other prohibited material there.259  The recommendations
concerning written reports and receipts apply in this setting also.
2 6 °
The monitoring of oral communications must rest on reliable informa-
tion that a particular communication may jeopardize the safety of the public
or the safety or security of a correctional institution, or is being used to fur-
ther illegal activity. 26 1 There may, however, be a statutory bar to monitor-
ing telephone conversations without the express permission of one of the
parties to the conversation or - valid court order.
262
253. LSOP, supra note 5, § 2 3 -6 .10(g). No receipt is required by the Constitution, however.
Thornton v. Redman, 435 F. Supp. 876 (D. Del. 1977).
254. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). In Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.
1980), the court expressed concern over strip searches of prisoners in administrative segregation
before and after noncontact visits.
255. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981). Cf Lee v. Downs, 470 F. Supp.
188 (E.D. Va. 1979) (male custodial officers controlling strong female prisoner while her cloth-
ing was removed did not act unreasonably under the circumstances).
256. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.10(o)(i).
257. d § 23-6.10(f)(ii).
258. Id § 23-6. 10(f)(iii). Such searches should be conducted by a supervisor in a private
place out of the sight of others, except that the prisoner may request the presence of another
available officer of the institution. Sims v. Brierton, 500 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Il1. 1980), held it
improper to require a prisoner to submit to anal cavity inspections after visits with a law student
intern aiding him in preparing a deposition, in the absence of a showing of abuse of regulations
by such interns.
259. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6. 10(f)(iv). Such searches should be conducted by a medi-
cally trained person, other than another prisoner, in the prison hospital or another private
place; a prisoner may request the presence of another available officer of the institution. Medi-
cally-trained personnel may object to being used for security rather than therapeutic purposes,
so that an institution may have to train custodial staff members in the necessary techniques. See
DOJ, supra note 11, § 6.13 (discussion).
260. LSOP, supra note 5, § 2 3 -6 .10(g); see note 253 supra.
261. LSOP, supra note 5, § 2 3-6.1(c); more stringent limitations govern communications
with counsel and public officials. Id § 23-6. 1(d).
262. Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979); contra, United States v. Paul, 614
F.2d 115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980) (distinguishing Walonir on the basis it was
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C. Disczp/hnagy Rules and Then- Enforcement
Penal statutes provide insufficient criteria for operation of prisons. De-
tailed rules and regulations are required incorporating sanctions for disobe-
dience. There are two dimensions to this: norms must be made known to
those regulated by them, as correctional officials cannot condemn without
prior notice what they find improper;263 and regulations must be specific
enough that inmates know what is prohibited. 264 Sanctions also should be
precise for each infraction.
The Standards urge correctional administrators to promulgate clear,
written rules governing prisoner conduct.2 65 Clarity requires a specific defi-
nition of offenses, schedules of minimum and maximum sanctions applicable
to each infraction, and specific criteria for disciplinary and classification sys-
tems. In particular, a principle of parsimony in sanctioning is advocated:
the least severe punishment appropriate to each infraction is all that should
be imposed. 266 It is essential that all prisoners receive personal notice of
rules and sanctions in a language they can understand, upon entry into an
institution. Supplementary oral explanations should be given if needed.
26 7
More legal problems have arisen from enforcement than from promul-
gation of disciplinary rules. Misconduct which also amounts to a crime
poses an especially sensitive problem. Prison discipline is not criminal pun-
ishment, so double jeopardy does not bar pursuit of both administrative dis-
cipline and criminal prosecution. 268 Nevertheless, investigative acts by
prison authorities, if violative of the fourth, fifth or sixth amendment, can
render evidence inadmissible and thus frustrate prosecution. There also is a
self-incrimination problem under such circumstances. Although prison
hearing officers and boards may consider adversely to prisoners a failure to
not shown there that the monitoring was related to prison security); Rodriguez v. Blaedow, 497
F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (prison officials could require all calls to be conducted in English
so that they could monitor calls, citing Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972) (ap-
proving monitoring of nontelephonic conversations)); People v. Myles, 62 Il1. App. 3d 931, 379
N.E.2d 897 (1978).
263. See State ex rel. Gillespie v. Kendrick, 265 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1980) (must publish jail
rules according to which infractions are determined and sanctioned).
264. Se Fichtner v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 285 N.W.2d 751, 759 (Iowa 1979) (prison rules
must be intelligible); ef Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (Court invalidated mail
regulations forbidding statements that "magnify grievances," "unduly complain" or "belittle
th[e] staff or our judicial system or anything connected with [the] Department of Corrections,"
or which contain "disrespectful comments" or "derogatory remarks").
265. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.1. See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.01; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4345. The first tentative draft of the Standards called for active prisoner participa-
tion in rule-making. LSOP (Tent. Draft No. I), supra note 4, at 572-73). The approved version,
however, goes no further than to endorse promulgation of disciplinary and other rules through
procedures established under an administrative procedure act, LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.2(a);
prisoners should be given notice of rules, id § 23-7.2(b), which in practice means under a state
act they will have an opportunity to submit objections or proposed changes before final rule
adoption.
266. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.1 (a)(i). A similar standard of proportionality appears in
DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.01.
267. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.1(b). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.02; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, §§ 2-4346, -4395. Institution personnel also must be conversant with rules, their ration-
ale and available sanctions. DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.03; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4347.
268. Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977); Pruitt v. State, 266 S.E.2d 779 (S.C.),
cert. dentid, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980).
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refute data showing a violation, 269 statements exacted from prisoners at offi-
cial instance are compelled and cannot be used by the prosecution during
subsequent criminal proceedings (other than perhaps for impeachment).
270
Accordingly, although prosecuting officers legally cannot forbid prison ad-
ministrators from investigating and punishing independently criminal in-
fractions of prison disciplinary rules, the Standards endorse the principle that
prison administrators should take the initiative of laying such matters before
local prosecutors so that a prompt joint determination can be made on
whether or how to proceed.2 7 1 In the interim, prisoners who may be or have
been prosecuted criminally can be confined to quarters or transferred to a
higher security classification.
2 72
Disciplinary proceedings, at least those which may result in loss or for-
feiture of good time credits and thus prolong confinement, 2 73 are subject to
several federal constitutional requirements. First, "advance written notice of
the claimed violation" 274 is required. Second, there must be a hearing at
which a prisoner respondent may "call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals."'275 Reasonable limits
may be placed on this claim to prevent repetitive statements or to s,. 'cguard
against a risk of reprisal or an undermining of authority. Such a hearing,
however, is not intended to be adversary in the same sense as a criminal
proceeding, so that prisoners have no right to confront sources of adverse
data, and prison authorities need not justify to a prisoner respondent their
decision not to summon a particular witness.
2 76
The Supreme Court refused to require representation by legal counsel
in such hearings. However, in instances of illiterate inmates or matters
269. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
270. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska
1980); cf. United States v. Garcia, 625 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 923 (1980)
(trial of prison inmates may make it imperative to shield identity of informers during pretrial
proceedings).
271. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.3(a). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.07; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4344. Prosecutors should reach a charging decision promptly; in the interim, cor-
rectional authorities should exercise care in continuing internal investigations and disciplinary
action lest the rights of public and the right of the prisoner to a fair criminal trial be infringed.
There is no responsibility, however, to suspend disciplinary proceedings.
272. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.3(b). A ninety-day maximum period for special handling is
recommended before formal charges are filed; after charging, special status may continue until
a criminal proceeding is concluded. After disposition of criminal charges, prisoners may be
reclassified and, if disciplinary proceedings were suspended during criminal proceedings, ad-
ministrative action may continue. Id § 23-3.3(c).
273. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 39 (1974); Williams v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980).
McDonnell applies to procedures resulting in loss of parole eligibility, State ex ret. Meeks v.
Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 289 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. App. 1980), and assignment to disciplinary
confinement, Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1981).
274. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563.
275. Id at 566; Williams v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980); Cruz v. Oregon State Peni-
tentiary, 48 Or. App. 473, 617 P.2d 644 (1980) (or officials can take witness request as a request
for an administrative investigation of prisoner allegations); State ex re. Irby v. Israel, 95 Wis. 2d
697, 291 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. App. 1980). Prisoners have been held to have a claim to discovery of
exculpatory materials by analogy to United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), and Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1981).
276. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1976).
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presenting complex issues on which an inmate, unaided, probably could not
collect and present data necessary for an adequate comprehension of the
case, there can be a claim to aid from another inmate or, if that is not al-
lowed, to adequate substitute assistance "in the form of help from the staff or
from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff."'2 77 This is so
even though the alleged misconduct also is criminal and the right to counsel
will attach in the course of ensuing criminal proceedings. 278
Decision makers must be independent of the officials or employees re-
sponsible for bringing charges.2 79 An adjudicator must prepare "a written
statement . . . as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the discipli-
nary action taken." 280 In an unusual situation, certain data may be omitted
from findings because of a concern for individual or institutional safety, but
if this is done an adjudicator should "indicate the fact of the omission" in the
findings. 28 ' Judicial review is not constitutionally required.
28 2
For the most part, the ABA Standards rest on this constitutional law.
They continue to differentiate between hearings for minor and major infrac-
tions, not essaying a black-letter test to distinguish them. 28 3 Other stan-
dards-generating bodies have abandoned the distinction because of the
practical administrative problems it presents.2 8 4 All disciplinary hearings
require written notice within a recommended seventy-two hours after an in-
cident, followed within a recommended twenty-four additional hours by
service of copies of any other written data a tribunal may consider.285 Hear-
ings should ensue within a recommended three days after notice.286 Respon-
dents have the right to be present and to speak in personal defense;28 7 they
also have the right to a written decision based on a preponderance of the
evidence, specifying reasons, promptly and in no event later than a recom-
mended five days after hearings. 288 Further review by the chief executive
277. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 570.
278. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 315.
279. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (transfer of mentally-ill prisoners; disciplinary
procedure summarized and applied by analogy); Piccirillo v. Wainwright, 382 So. 2d 743 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Harrah v. Leverette, 271 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1980).
280. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563.
281. Id at 565.
282. Riner v. Raines, 409 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1980).
283. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2passin. This builds on the federal constitutional doctrines
described in text accompanying notes 273-76 supra. No test is attempted because courts make
their own ad hoc determinations whether McDonnell el al. govern. McKinnon v. Patterson, 568
F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
284. DOJ, supra note 11, ch. 10; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, at 91 (introductory note). Minor
matters should be resolved informally if at all possible. DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.04; ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, § 2-4349.
285. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(i), (b). Se also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 10.05, .08-.11;
ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4351, -4357, -4359. Special prehearing detention is dealt with in
LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(e); DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 10.12-. 13; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-
4353.
286. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(ii), (b). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.12; ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, § 2-4359.
287. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(iii), (b). DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.14 and ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, § 2-4360 contemplate the same right unless respondent behavior justifies exclu-
sion (or under DOJ the right is waived in writing).
288. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(iv), (b). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.17; ACA-
ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4364-65.
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officer of the institution then should be available to an adjudicated respon-
dent within a relatively short period.289 All adjudicators must be
impartial.
2 90
The Standards incorporate the essence of the McDonnell representation
test. 29 1 Prisoner respondents should have access to legal advice and counsel-
ing in advance of hearings governing the length of imprisonment, but should
have no guaranteed right to representation by legal counsel during such
hearings.
292
In major disciplinary hearings respondents may request the attendance
of anyone in the "local prison community" with relevant information and
may examine or cross-examine such a person, subject only to limitation if the
data sought are cumulative. A respondent may be excluded during witness
examination if the physical safety of a person would be endangered by the
presence of a particular witness or a disclosure of the witness's identity.
29 3 If
disciplinary charges are not confirmed after hearings, all references to the
charges and their aftermath must be physically removed from files and the
fact they were brought cannot be used adversely to a prisoner in any way.
294
III. CIVIL DISABILITIES
Part VIII of the Legal Status ofPrsoners Standards covers civil disabilities,
a topic which might well have been lodged in the context of the Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures Standards,295 but was not. The ABA endorses a ba-
sic policy that, with rare exceptions, all laws or regulations subjecting con-
victed persons to collateral disabilities or penalties, or deprivation of civil
rights, should be repealed. 296 To the extent such collateral consequences of
convictions remain in force, no individual should be subjected to them unless
an administrative hearing is held beforehand to establish that they are neces-
sary to advance an important governmental or public interest. 29 7 Disabili-
ties should be imposed only for fixed periods, at the expiration of which an
affected citizen should have a claim to reconsideration of the appropriateness
of the penalty or disability.298 In either event, the burden should rest on
289. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(v); appeal should be lodged within a recommended
five days and resolved within 30, and enforcement of sanctions should be suspended during
appeal unless individual safety or security otherwise will be affected adversely. See also DOJ,
supra note 11, § 10.19; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4368 (and § 2-4366, calling for routine
review by wardens of all hearings and sanctions to assure conformity with policy and
regulations).
290. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(c). ,Se also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.09; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4361; note 279 supra.
291. See text accompanying notes 277-78 supra.
292. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(iii), commentary and proviso. Both DOJ, supra note
11, § 10.16 and ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4362 contemplate assistance by staff members
selected by prisoner respondents.
293. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(b). Set also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.15; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4363.
294. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(d). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.20; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4367.
295. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTIcE, szpra note 1, ch. 18.
296. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.1.
297. Id § 23-8.3(a)-(b).
298. Id § 23-8.3(c). Even during the initial stated period, an individual under disability
1981]
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those urging a disability to prove a need for it. 2 9 9 Collateral consequences
also can be forestalled or abrogated through expungement of convictions,




ABA advocacy of abrogating restrictions on voting rights based on pe-
nal convictions has been mentioned. 30 1 The ABA rejects as well the follow-
ing restrictions: loss of entitlements to initiate and defend civil actions under
one's own name; eligibility to serve on juries except during actual confine-
ment, probation or parole; power to execute judicially enforcible documents
and agreements; and status to serve as court-appointed fiduciary except dur-
ing actual confinement. 30 2 Nor should convicted persons lose their eligibility
to marry30 3 or to terminate marriage, 3° 4 be deprived of parental rights, in-
cluding the right to grant or withhold consent to adoption, or be disabled
from adopting children. 30 5 Property and financial rights, including vested
pension eligibility, should remain unaffected by criminal convictions, 30 6 and
efforts by insurance carriers to impose special premium rates on convicted
persons should be officially resisted unless a basis for such rate differentia-
tions is established before state regulatory agencies. 30 7 The Standards recom-
mend a maximum five-year period beyond which criminal convictions
should not be revealed by commercial reporting agencies providing data in
connection with credit or employment.
30 8
Loss of eligibility to engage in various occupations may well frustrate
whatever rehabilitation or deterrence has been accomplished through con-
viction and enforcement of penal sanctions. Therefore, the ABA position is
that barriers to employment because of criminal convictions must rest on the
existence of a substantial relationship between adjudicated criminal activity
and later employment. 30 9 Legislatures should prohibit unreasonable barri-
should be able to obtain relief by showing the disability no longer effectuates the governmental
interest for which it was imposed originally.
299. Id. § 23-8.3(d). If, however, an affected person alleges a conviction has unfairly af-
fected eligibility for private employment, he or she bears the burden of persuasion. See id. § 23-
8.8(a)-(b).
300. Id § 23-8.2.
301. See text accompanying notes 194-97 supra.
302. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.5.
303. Federal district courts disagree about the constitutionality of bans or limitations on
prisoners' eligibility to marry, in light of Zeblocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating
statute requiring court approval before parent subject to support order could remarry). Compare
Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105 (D. Nev. 1980) (limitation unconstitutional), with Wool v.
Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928 (D. Vt. 1981) (limitation valid). Most state authority sustains the
validity of such prohibitions. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Koerner v. New Jersey Dep't of Correction, 163 N.J. Super. 433, 394 A.2d 1262 (1978).
304. Conviction or confinement alone should not amount to abandonment for purposes of
divorce or child custody, and convicted persons should be given appropriate aid in protecting
their marital and parental status during confinement. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.6(b).
305. Id § 23-8.6(a).
306. Id § 23-8.7(a)-(b).
307. Id § 23-8.7(c).
308. Id § 23-8.7(d). Limited coverage of the problem is found in federal legislation, 15
U.S.C. §, 1681c(a)(5) (1976), but only if a credit line is for $50,000 or under or employment is at
an annual salary of $20,000 or less.
309. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.8(a). Factors bearing on employability include likelihood of
opportunity to commit similar future offenses, time elapsed since conviction, conduct following
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ers by both private 3 10 and public 3 1' employers against hiring criminal con-
victs. The extent to which removal of disabilities is accepted in a jurisdiction
is an index of the degree to which the concept of either rehabilitation or
measured retribution has gained public acceptance.
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE STANDARDS
Implementation of most of the Standards can be accomplished through
new legislation and rules of court governing criminal proceedings. For the
most part, revision machinery is either under the control of judges and law-
yers or receptive to recommendations from the legal profession. This is not
as true of changes in correctional administration, a field in which there has
been relatively little formal involvement by the legal profession and which
has come under serious judicial scrutiny only in the past decade or so. Es-
tablishing a functional role in correctional reform is much less easy for the
ABA to accomplish than in more directly legal fields.
It is unlikely as well that the ABA can gain a significant foothold in the
recent American phenomenon of accreditation of correctional institutions,
systems and programs. That process was launched less than a decade ago by
the American Correctional Association and is now the responsibility of the
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections. 3 2 The criteria for accredita-
tion have been established from within the world of corrections administra-
tion. The ABA Standards are unlikely to be referred to other than as
background against which accreditation panels can determine sufficiency of
compliance with the more generally phrased ACA Standards.
conviction, the circumstances of crime and offender and the likelihood such circumstances will
reoccur.
310. Id § 23-8.8(b). Protective legislation should cover denial of and discharge from em-
ployment; denial of fair employment conditions, pay or promotion; rejection of membership in
unions or other organizations affecting employment; and denial or revocation of licenses re-
quired for a profession or occupation. The latter also is covered in id § 23-8.8(0, which urges a
substantial relationship between the crime and the occupational activity at issue.
311. Id § 23-8.8(d). "Public employment" is defined in id § 23-8.8(e). Conviction may
justify forfeiture of elective or appointive office, held at the time of conviction, but should not
automatically bar eligibility for future elective or appointive public office. Id § 23-8.8(c).
312. Se generally COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS, ACCREDITATION:
BLUEPRINT FOR CORRECTIONS (1978); Sechrest, The Accreditation Movement in Corrections, 40 FED.
PROB. No. 4, (Dec. 1976). By the end of 1980, nearly 600 correctional facilities and programs
had received or were engaged in preliminary procedures required for accreditation. Commis-
sion on Accreditation for Corrections, 1980 Annual Report (1981). The ten volumes of ACA
STANDARDS, supra note 10, provide compliance criteria in reference to which accreditation is
determined. Applicant institutions or agencies, after being granted candidate status, first con-
duct an elaborate self-evaluation to determine probable compliance levels. They next request a
site inspection by a team of three or four professional consultants retained by the Commission.
The team prepares a comprehensive report on compliance status which then is reviewed by a
panel of five commissioners which meets with representatives of a candidate institution, consid-
ers appeals against audit team recommendations, and confers a three-year accreditation on
agencies in compliance with a stated number of standards. The entire commission serves as an
appeal body if objections are made to denial or deferral of accreditation. Agencies must present
for approval action plans covering standards with which they are in noncompliance. Recertifi-
cation requires repetition of the entire process of self-study, field audit and panel evaluation.
Although in its early years the accreditation process was financed chiefly through LEAA and




Consequently, a more limited scope for ABA implementation activity
may prove possible in the instance of LSOP than is true of all other stan-
dards except possibly the Urban Police Function Standards.3 i3 Its impact may
be twofold only. One is as a statement of policy by the ABA itself, so that
future activities of ABA committees, sections and divisions can be guided by
House of Delegates policy determinations. If the LSOP Standards merit revi-
sion, in the view of any ABA entity, the Standing Committee offers the
mechanism through which recommendations for changes in black-letter text
can be transmitted to the House of Delegates for consideration. The second
is to provide guidelines for courts in state or federal litigation attacking
prison or jail conditions. The ABA Standards are recognized by many correc-
tional authorities as relatively more detailed on legal issues and therefore of
greater intrinsic value as norms than the more succinctly phrased ACA Stan-
dards. They possess the cachet of the world's largest association of legal pro-
fessionals. Therefore, to the extent a jail, prison or prison system in fact
complies with the (minimum) recommendations set forth in LSOP, it is ex-
ceedingly unlikely that a court will find a deprivation of rights guaranteed
by the federal or a state constitution. To the degree a correctional facility or
program falls short of compliance, there is the risk that the ABA Standards, as
well as other standards and guidelines, will be invoked by courts in placing
legal restrictions on correctional administration. 3i 4 Thus, time may estab-
lish that the greatest leverage favoring use of LSOP by prison administrators
and legislators315 will stem from their use as criteria by courts engaged in
constitutional litigation.
313. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, ch. 1.
314. The ACA-ACI standards, supra note 10, occasionally have been cited in that way. See,
e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2397 n.8 (1981); Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 127
n.20, 128 n.22 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'on other grounds sub nor. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 727 (E.D. Okla. 1978); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123,
131 n.20 (Or. 1981). The DOJ standards are also cited in Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. at
2400, n.13, 2404 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a reference to Tentative Draft No. 1 of
LSOP, ste Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d at 131 n. 19, 132 n.22.
315. The Standards urge state legislators to implement their contents and provide sufficient
resources to ensure implementation of prisoners' legal rights. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.4.
[Vol. 59:1
UNITED STA TES V PA YNER: CLOSING A LOOPHOLE IN THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
STANDING REQUIREMENT
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule is restricted by a standing re-
quirement. Evidence which results from an illegal search or seizure cannot
be suppressed unless the constitutional rights violated are the defendant's;
violation of a third party's rights is insufficient.I In United States v. Payner,2 a
majority of the Supreme Court adhered to this requirement of standing even
though: (1) the Government's search and seizure clearly violated the fourth
amendment 3 and, under state law, probably constituted the crime of lar-
ceny; 4 (2) the Government was aware its action would violate state law and
the United States Constitution;5 (3) the Government's illegal search and
seizure was for the relatively insignificant purpose of gathering information
about suspected tax evasion;6 and (4) the Government deliberately circum-
vented the exclusionary rule by apparently instructing its agents to select
their victims prudently.
7
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) suspected in 1972 that American
taxpayers were illegally concealing funds in the Bahamas. 8 As part of its
investigation, the IRS devised a scheme to relieve a visiting Bahamian bank
vice president of the contents of his briefcase. 9 The IRS correctly theorized
that the briefcase's contents would lead to the names of Americans holding
Bahamian bank accounts not disclosed on their tax returns.10 A woman was
paid $1,000 to go out to dinner with the bank officer, who left the briefcase
at her apartment."t A paid informant and an IRS special agent entered the
apartment with a key the woman had provided and removed the briefcase. '
2
1. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S.
44 (1943); Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. L. REv. 493 (1952).
2. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. 447 U.S. at 747 n. 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F.
Supp. 113 (N.D. Ohio 1977)).
5. 447 U.S. at 742.
6. Id. at 728.
7. Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113
(N.D. Ohio 1977)).
8. 447 U.S. at 738 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 738-40. Justice Marshall implied that the $1,000 paid to the woman may have
been in part "for what occurred in the [woman's] apartment prior to the couple's departure for
dinner." Id. at 740 n.4.
12. Id. at 740-41. The IRS had earlier referred the special agent to a locksmith who made
a key to fit the briefcase lock. Id.
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IRS photography experts copied the contents, and the special agent replaced
the briefcase. The district court found that the operation, entirely approved
of by IRS supervisors, 13 "appear[ed] to satisfy a prima facie case of larceny
under Florida law."'
4
Jack Payner was subsequently indicted.1 5 The district court suppressed
the fruit of the illegal search and seizure, without which the Government
could not prove Payner "knowingly and willfully '" 6 falsified his tax return.
The district court recognized that Payner lacked standing to invoke the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule.17 The suppression order was based in-
stead on fifth amendment due process' 8 and on the federal courts' inherent
supervisory power.' 9 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the
basis of the supervisory power alone.20 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the supervisory power and fifth amendment due process could not sub-
stitute for fourth amendment standing.2 1 This comment, like the Supreme
Court opinion and the opinion for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, will
largely ignore Payner's fifth amendment implications 2 2 and will focus on the
case's significance as a barometer of the interplay between the exclusionary
rule standing requirement and the supervisory power of the federal courts.
The merits of the exclusionary rule itself will be discussed only to the extent
those merits are relevant to the supervisory power and to standing.
13. Id. at 739.
14. Id. at 746-47 n.12 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Ohio
1977)).
15. Jack Payner was one of those Americans who had not disclosed his Bahamian bank
account. Documents in the briefcase revealed a close association between the bank officer's
Bahamian bank and a Florida bank. Subpoenas issued to the Florida bank uncovered a loan
agreement in which Payner had pledged as security his funds in the Bahamian bank. Payner,
however, had stated on his tax return that he did not have a foreign bank account.
The indictment charged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) which provides that
"[wihoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements . . .
shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 447
U.S. at 728.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
17. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 125-26 (N.D. Ohio 1977), affdper curnam,
590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
18. The district court's fifth amendment argument was unprecedented. It stated flatly that
"[t]here is no standing problem in this case in regard to the Fifth Amendment Due Process
question." 434 F. Supp. at 129 n.65. Apparently standing was not a problem for the district
court because it believed that "the Court must furnish those persons who are the ultimate
targets with standing to raise the exclusionary rule in order to insure that some party is avail-
able to litigate the question of the Government's outrageously unconstitutional activity." The
defendant cannot invoke the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, however, so there is no rea-
son that he should be able to invoke a fifth amendment exclusionary rule since the policies
underlying both considerations presumably are identical. The district court implicitly acknowl-
edged that the purpose of its newborn fifth amendment exclusionary rule would be identical to
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule's purpose: deterrence. The court quoted extensively
from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, however, standing was not at issue.
19. 434 F. Supp. at 126-36.
20. United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
21. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
22. Set note 18 sqpra.
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I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE STANDING REQUIREMENT
In Jones v. United States,23 a narcotics case, the Court held that the de-
fendant had standing to object to evidence resulting from an illegal search,
even though the premises searched were not his, because he was legitimately
on the illegally searched premises.24 Jones represents the broadest reading of
the Court's general rule that fourth amendment rights are personal rights
that cannot be vicariously asserted, a rule later reaffirmed in Alderman v.
United States .25
The Alderman-Jones test of standing continued substantially intact until
Rakas v. Illinois.26 Justice Rehnquist's Rakas opinion replaced the legiti-
mately-on-the-premises test with the narrower test of whether the search and
seizure "infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to protect. '2 7 The question ultimately may be whether
the search offended the defendant's expectation of privacy. 28
In Rakas, Justice Rehnquist significantly changed the standing question
terminology, though, as he admits, probably not its substance.2 9 He pointed
out that standing, strictly speaking, relates to the concern that issues be
sharply focused by adversary proceedings. 30 The adversarial relationship be-
tween the defendant and the prosecution is ordinarily sufficient to contest
thoroughly the issue of whether there was an illegal search and seizure, be-
cause the defendant's liberty is likely at stake. The new terminology offered
in Rakas is that the search and seizure must have violated the defendant's
fourth amendment rights in order to avail him of the fourth amendment's
exclusionary rule.
3 1
II. THE MEANING OF THE SUPERVISORY POWER
In its broadest sense, the supervisory power may be described as the
23. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overuled in part, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) and in part,
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). See note 27 znfa and accompanying text.
24. 362 U.S. at 264.
25. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
26. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
27. Id. at 140. Rakas thus restricted one of the alternate holdings ofjones. The otherjones
holding was that the defendant had "automatic" standing where the possession required for
standing was the possession needed to establish an element of the offense charged. Automatic
standing was to prevent the government from contending that the defendant lacked the requi-
site possession for purposes of exclusionary rule standing, yet had possession for purposes of the
offense charged. Justice Rehnquist questioned whether the/onts rule of automatic standing still
lived. Id. at 135 n.4. Two days after Payner, the Court overruled theJones rule of automatic
standing. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
28. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring).
The defendant in Payner lacked standing because he had no "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in his Bahamian bank account. 447 U.S. at 732 n.4 (citing United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976)). The Court rejected the defendant's argument that Bahamian bank laws pro-
duced an expectation of privacy not present in Miller. Id.
29. 439 U.S. at 139-40.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 140.
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
federal courts' general power to supervise the administration of justice.3 2
Confusion arises, however, regarding the extent to which the power may be
exercised when courts parrot this vague description as if it were a definition.
Cases in which courts have wielded the power may be classified into four
categories.3 3 First, an appellate court occasionally will overturn a lower
court decision for prejudicial error but inexplicably contend it is exercising
its supervisory power.3 4 The resulting confusion is needless. An appellate
court surely can perform its primary function of review without conjuring up
apparitions like the supervisory power.
In a second group of cases courts have employed the supervisory power
to fashion rules for improving the quality of the judicial process.3 5 The aim
here is to foster fair and proper adjudication. The evolution of rules of evi-
dence is an example. Although the Constitution dictates a floor of minimum
safeguards beneath which the court shall not descend, the judicially devel-
oped rules of evidence are far above that minimum. Rules designed to im-
prove the judicial process normally do not define substantive rights. Instead,
they specify the procedure that experience has proven is most likely to pro-
duce accurate determinations. This second group of cases exemplifies what
may be dubbed procedural supervisory power.
The third set of cases deals with enforcement of constitutional provi-
sions.3 6 Some proscriptions in the Constitution are mere "thou shalt nots"
which fail to include an effective set of subsidiary rules to implement the
commandment. The fourth amendment is notorious in this regard.3 7 It is
important to distinguish those cases in which the rule asserted by use of the
supervisory power is itself a fundamental constitutional right from those
cases in which the rule asserted by use of the supervisory power is merely a
means to protect a fundamental constitutional right. The holdings of those
cases in which the rule itself is a constitutional right can be said to flow
directly from the Constitution. They are not exercises of the supervisory
power but are simply constitutional interpretations. Due process and free-
dom of speech cases are outstanding examples. The holdings of those cases
in which the rule is a means to protect a constitutional right are legitimate
exercises of the supervisory power. They are the substantive analogue to the
procedural supervisory power used in connection with improving the judi-
32. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943); Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 342 (1939).
33. The last three of these four categories are similar, but not identical, to the three catego-
ries described in Hill, The Bill of Rights andthe Supervisogy Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 193-94
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Hill].
34. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, reo'don rehear'ng, 483 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.
1973). In Burton, the appellate court initially reversed and remanded after finding prejudicial
error. Needlessly, it rested its decision to reverse on the supervisory power, not on its general
power to reverse for prejudicial error.
35. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (exclusion of confessions obtained
under duress); Hill, supra note 33, at 194-96, and cases cited therein.
36. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (enforcement of wiretapping stat-
ute); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (enforcement of fourth amendment prohibi-
tion against illegal searches and seizures); Hill, supra note 33, at 198-99.
37. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: 7he Exchsonaqy Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 621, 643-44.
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cial process.
38
Procedural supervisory power designs rules to achieve the goal of fair
and proper adjudication. Substantive supervisory power designs rules to
achieve the goal of enforcing the spirit of the Constitution. The key point is
that supervisory power, both procedural and substantive, is the basis for
rules of law that are not constitutionally mandated. Therefore, unlike rules
of constitutional interpretation, any supervisory power rule may be replaced
or eliminated. Because the supervisory power rules are the prophylaxes for
constitutional rights, not sacrosanct themselves, the courts should mold them
freely as conditions change and needs arise. Unfortunately, they are often
confused with the rules that are constitutionally mandated.
Confusing constitutional interpretation with the supervisory power does
not necessarily delay the development of constitutional law, but it does mis-
label the court's action. The effect of this mislabeling is that a rule based on
the supervisory power mistakenly becomes elevated to a rule of constitu-
tional law. Because courts are loath to revise an interpretation of the Consti-
tution, the rule lingers on long after it should have been revised. Less
confusion would result if courts forging new constitutional rights would ini-
tially declare that those rights have constitutional status. Rules created by
legitimate exercises of the supervisory power, those rules that merely enforce
already established constitutional rights, could then be subjected to more
rapid and responsive shaping over time by the Congress, the state legisla-
tures, and the courts themselves.
Most jurists and commentators do not doubt that the above three
strains of supervisory power, though often misnamed, exist. 39 Others disa-
gree, however. Chief justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in Payner,
stated that "[o]rderly government under our system of separate powers calls
for internal self-restraint and discipline in each Branch; this Court has no
general supervisory authority over operations of the Executive Branch, as it
has with respect to the federal courts."' 4 Does the Chief Justice mean to say
that the Court, in its effort to promote the Bill of Rights, cannot develop
rules of enforcement against government agents if those agents happen to
work in the executive branch? If the answer is yes, how does he justify the
exclusionary rule when the defendant does indeed have standing?
4 '
The Chief Justice may have had in mind the fourth possible exercise of
the supervisory power. This fourth category comprises cases in which courts
invent a rule which does not flow from, and does not purport to enforce, the
Constitution, and is not meant to improve the accuracy of the judicial pro-
cess. The rule is simply a judicial response to distasteful official conduct.
42
38. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
39. See Hill, supra note 33; Note, The &Spervv7 Power of the Federal Cozwts, 76 HARv. L.
REv. 1656 (1963). See also note 56 infia.
40. 447 U.S. at 737 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
41. Perhaps he does not. The Chief Justice has been a steadfast critic of the rule in any
form since long before he joined the Supreme Court. See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?,
14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964). Shortly after becoming Chief Justice, he again attacked the rule
and proposed in some detail a statutory alternative. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42. Hill, supra note 33, at 199.
1981)
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Here lies a real danger of boundless judicial lawmaking. The apprehension
of an uncircumscribed power of adjudication by judicial discretion is well-
founded. To date, fortunately, few if any courts have gone this far.
43
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AS AN EXERCISE OF
THE SUPERVISORY POWER
The effect of the exclusionary rule often hinges on the analysis of its
purpose and on the power of the courts to apply it. Aside from the above
outline, some authorities have advanced a type of supervisory power based
on what may be called the judicial integrity theory. 44 With regard to the
exclusionary rule, the argument is that illegally seized evidence must be ex-
cluded to protect the integrity of the judiciary, by preventing the courts from
becoming "accomplices" 45 to wrongful official acts. This rationale ap-
pears appealing, for it promotes the illusion that the rule does not interfere
with the prerogatives of other branches. As in civil litigation, the courts
merely withhold their facilities from those with "unclean hands."
46
The case which created the exclusionary rule4 7 was based on the judi-
cial integrity theory, and it was not until about the time the rule was applied
to the states that the deterrence theory appeared. 48 Presumably, the shift in
reasoning occurred because a theory of supervisory power exclusion that is
defended as necessary to maintain judicial integrity is quickly met at the
43. Id. at 200. Justice Frankfurter's broad language in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) is the nearest precedent for exercise of this fourth type of supervisory power. There he
spoke of the need to observe "canons of decency and fairness" as a due process requirement. Id.
at 169. By basing his holding on due process grounds it is evident the decision was actually a
constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, any precedential value of Rochin is diminished be-
cause it was decided before the exclusionary rule was imposed on the states by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). After Mapp, a Roch'n situation could be decided on the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule without resorting to due process.
Later, in Hampden v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), Justice Rehnquist asserted for
the Court that due process is relevant "only when the Government activity in question violates
some protected right of the defendant." Id. at 490 (emphasis in original). Justices Powell and
Blackmun were unwilling to join in such a rigid approach. They suggested that under some
circumstances, due process principles or the supervisory power could bar conviction. Id. at 495
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun apparently thought Payner presented those circum-
stances, for he dissented in Paner. Justice Powell apparently disagreed, for he wrote the Payner
opinion for the Court.
44. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S.
1, 14 (1956); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342 (1943).
45. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 345 (1943).
46. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Some writers have embraced the judicial integrity theory but only as a pretense for the
rapid development of constitutional law. See, e.g., Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts,
76 HARV. L. REV. 1656, 1666-67 (1963). Those writers would have the courts promulgate ten-
tative rules, which, if met with public acceptance, would become constitutional rights of due
process. Such an approach has at least three defects. First, the process would overtly
subordinate thejudiciary to the cry of popular opinion. Second, it is not certain that the growth
of constitutional law is or need be slow. Third, it does not follow that if the supervisory power is
to protect the integrity of the judiciary, then the principles it produces should become constitu-
tional rights of due process. The defendant, not the judiciary, is the object of due process. Any
benefits accruing to defendants out of a system designed to protect the judiciary would be hap-
penstance.
47. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 382 (1914).
48. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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state level with the response that state courts are free to establish their own
standards of integrity. Federal courts lack the power to impose subjective
levels of integrity upon state courts.
49
The judicial integrity rationale has always been unsound. Permitting
adjudication after official misconduct no more makes the court an accom-
plice to the misconduct than permitting the defendant to state his case
makes the court an accomplice to his crime. By closing the courthouse doors
when confronted with official misconduct, the judiciary does more than
avoid complicity; it affirmatively stymies law enforcement. It is a fantasy to
pretend that the judiciary, merely because it is a separate branch, is not an
integral and necessary component of law enforcement. Courts that simply
close their doors wrongfully decline to perform the function that is theirs
alone. In effect, they pass on the merits of the prosecution. 50
The judicial integrity theory notwithstanding, the exclusionary rule is
best justified as an exercise of substantive supervisory power. 5 1 It enforces a
constitutional directive; it is not a constitutional directive in itself. Mapp v.
Ohio, 52 according to some commentators, concluded the opposite-that the
rule was more than a product of the supervisory power. 53 If the rule is not
compelled by the Constitution, how could it be imposed on the states? The
answer requires consideration of the peculiar genesis of Mapp.
The court in the earlier case of Wolf v. Colorado5 4 reaffirmed that the rule
was not constitutionally mandated and, therefore, the states were free to en-
force the fourth amendment with methods of their choice. Unfortunately, in
the interim between Wolf and Mapp, most states failed to devise any enforce-
ment methods whatsoever. Exasperated by state indifference, the Mapp
Court finally insisted that the states adopt the rule. Analyzed in this light, it
is apparent that the exclusionary rule per se is not necessary to the fourth
amendment. Rather, it is necessary that the amendment be enforced. Wolf
appeared to issue a warning, which the states ignored, of the upcoming
Mapp decision.55 In summary: (1) Wolf necessarily read into the fourth
amendment a constitutional requirement of enforcement; (2) as an exercise
of its supervisory power, the federal courts chose to enforce the amendment
with the exclusionary rule; (3) the states were allowed to develop their own
enforcement provisions; and (4) Mapp imposed the enforcement provision
with which it was acquainted, the exclusionary rule, on the states when the
states failed to develop their own effective enforcement. The plurality opin-
ions of Mapp are garbled, but commentators and subsequent cases have sup-
ported the foregoing analysis of Wolf and Mapp .56
49. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50. See Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 (1932); Hill, supra note 33, at 205-07.
51. Se. text accompanying note 38 supra.
52. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
53. Allen, Federalism and he Foath Amenfhent A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
54. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
55. Set id.
56. Most of the commentators on the exclusionary rule have debated the merits of the rule
itself, not the power of the court to apply it. Geller, supra note 37; Burger, supra note 41; Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule tn Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665 (1970). It is noteworthy
that Judge Friendly remarked that no majority of the Supreme Court has ever held that the
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IV. THE SUPERVISORY POWER IN PAYNER
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court and Justice Marshall's dissent are
founded on different premises. Justice Marshall based his dissent on the ju-
dicial integrity theory,57 a theory upon which a majority of the Court has
not relied in a decade or more.58 Accordingly, standing is irrelevant to Jus-
tice Marshall because the taint on the judiciary is identical whether the evi-
dence was illegally seized from the defendant or from a stranger. The
defendant is the lucky beneficiary of a rule designed to protect the courts.
This comment rejects the judicial integrity rationale but, if embraced, Jus-
tice Marshall's analysis follows logically.
fourth amendment compels the exclusionary rule. United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.
1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting). Since Judge Friendly's 1968 Soyka opinion the Supreme Court
has, if anything retreated still further from any lingering notion that the rule is constitutionally
compelled. Shortly after Soyka, Justice White said for the Court that "[nleither [Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)] nor any others
hold that anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amend-
ment." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). Later the rule was called by
Justice Powell a "judicially created remedy . . . rather than a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Justice Blackmun's
opening sentence for the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) referred to "the
judicially created exclusionary rule .... " Id. at 434.
If the rule is not constitutionally compelled, it seems likely that it is a product of the super-
visory power, as broadly defined by Professor Hill and in this Comment. Hill, supra note 33, at
193. Another interesting explanation is that the exclusionary rule and other subsidiary rules not
required by the Constitution comprise the "Constitutional common law." Monaghan, Constitu-
htonal Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1975). But see Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidertng the
Constitutinal Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978). Professor Monaghan's Constitu-
tional common law differs from this comment's procedural and substantive supervisory power
mainly in name. The point is that a body of rules exists, which is specifically mandated by the
Constitution, but which can be imposed on the states to enforce the Constitution.
57. 447 U.S. at 747-48.
58. See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra. One would probably have to look all the way
back to McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), to find a Supreme Court decision rest-
ing exclusively on the judicial integrity rationale. The most lucid descriptions of the theory are
in the dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928). Cases decided shortly before and after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), relied on
both the judicial integrity and deterrence theories, see, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 106
(1960), or principally on the deterrence theory, see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965). Justice White, in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), declared that "[t]he
necessity for [standing] was not eliminated by recognizing and acknowledging the deterrent aim
of the rule." Id. at 174 (citing Linkletter and Elkins). The judicial integrity theory was alto-
gether abandoned in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). "For the first time, the
Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital function of the rule to insure that the
judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct." Id. at
360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (citing Calan-
dra). See Oaks, Studying the Exrcustonag Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 669
(1970).
One pair of writers has contrasted the majority and dissenting Calandra opinions as based
on the "fragmentary" and "unitary" models of government respectively. Schrock & Welsh, Up
from Calandra: The Exclusionay Rule as a ConsttutionalRequtrement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 255-60
(1974). Under the fragmentary model, the judiciary is seen as distinct from the prosecution and
law enforcement. Since the court's function is to find the truth, the out-of-court activities of
Government officials are immaterial. Illegally obtained evidence is admitted for its probative
value without approval or condemnation of the means by which it was obtained. Id. at 255-56.
By contrast, under the unitary model, the court is a part of the government. A wrong commit-
ted by Government agents becomes a wrong by the judiciary if the court permits the prosecu-
tion to enjoy the fruits of the wrong. Id. at 257-60. For an answer to the unitary model, see note
50 supra and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court continues the
trend which values the rule primarily for its deterrent function.5 9 The exclu-
sion of often highly probative evidence is the price paid to deny government
agents the incentive to violate the fourth amendment. The price is paid only
when the need to deter outweighs the general need to admit all relevant
evidence. 6° The Court might have paused for pedagogical reasons to draw
the line between constitutional rights and the supervisory power, but was
correct in stating that "[tlhe values assigned to the competing interests do
not change because the court has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power instead of the fourth amendment."
'6'
This comment has asserted that the exclusionary rule is and always was
a product of the supervisory power, despite its disguises.62 Ironically, the
district court circumvented the exclusionary rule standing requirement by
asserting outright the same authority that covertly created the rule: the su-
pervisory power. Analyzed in this perspective, the district court's supervi-
sory power argument, which was but one of several grounds for its holding,
must collapse. Moreover, Justice Powell's arguments that the competing in-
terests are unchanged by a supervisory power analysis and that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule "serves precisely the same purposes"' 63 are ob-
viously accurate. The only confusion is semantics.
Payner is an example of a district court that, faced with particularly
reprehensible official misconduct, avoided the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule and its attendant standing requirement by means of a trick in termi-
nology. The Supreme Court Justices, except perhaps the Chief Justice,64 did
not seem to dispute that the supervisory power exists. Justice Powell, though
he may narrow the scope of the power more than the dissenters would, none-
theless, conceded its existence. 65 The disagreement was whether the power,
whatever its name, should be exercised when an illegal search and seizure
violates rights other than the defendant's. In other words, the issue was the
familiar one of standing. The majority refused to permit new wording to
influence old law. Justice Marshall for the dissenters saw a need to carve out
59. Justice Powell said that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule ... is applied in
part 'to protect the integrity of the court rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the
defendant .... ' " 447 U.S. at 736 n.8 (quoting Justice Marshall's dissent in Payner, 447 U.S. at
746) (emphasis in the original). The judicial integrity interest apparently did not tip the bal-
ance of competing interests appreciably, because Justice Powell went on to state that "the inter-
est in preserving judicial integrity and in deterring such conduct is outweighed by the societal
interest in presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact." Id. The majority's footnoted
judicial integrity discussion may have been an afterthought to meet the dissent's argument, or
the majority may genuinely believe that the need to present probative evidence justifies tainting
the Court by making it an "accomplice" to the Government's misconduct. The majority's argu-
ment would have been more persuasive had it forthrightly disavowed the judicial integrity the-
ory, as in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See discussion in note 58 supra.
Oddly, Justice Powell cites Calandnz while also acknowledging the judicial integrity theory.
60. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
61. 447 U.S. at 736.
62. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
63. 447 U.S. at 736 n.8.
64. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
65. 447 U.S. at 736 n.8.
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an exception to the old law of standing. Neither opinion directly confronts
the rationale of the standing requirement.
The modern view, however, to which this comment conforms, is that
the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right. It is merely a judicially
created means to enforce the Constitution. 66 The defendant, therefore, does
not assert his constitutional right to exclusion of the evidence. Rather, the
defendant demands that the judiciary duly exercise its commitment to deter
illegal searches and seizures. The deterrence is nonexistent absent the pun-
ishment of exclusion. Neither "standing" nor the shibboleth of "personal
constitutional rights" 67 can justify restriction of the exclusionary rule to cases
where the search violated the fourth amendment rights of the defendant
rather than those of a stranger. The balance of competing interests should
not shift toward the prosecution when the defendant lacks standing, because
the rights of the particular defendant are not elements of the interests that
are balanced. Rather, the principal interest for exclusion is the need to deter
illegal searches generally. A rule for deterrence, unlike a rule for compensa-
tion, operates prospectively only, and for the benefit of an undetermined
class. It is irrelevant that the victim was not the defendant because the pur-
pose of the deterrence rule is to prevent future wrongs against other potential
victims, not to compensate for a past wrong against the present victim. To
withhold the exclusionary rule from all defendants except those who are vic-
tims deters illegal searches of defendants only. Limited application means
limited deterrence. It seems that the rest of the public is equally entitled to
protection by deterrence.68
CONCLUSION
Application of the unpopular and expensive exclusionary rule69 is re-
stricted by the rule that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search is
not excluded unless the defendant's constitutional rights were violated. The
restrictive rule has been, and probably will continue to be, inaccurately
called a rule of standing. 70 Whatever the rule's name, the restriction bears
no rational relation to the purpose of the rule or to the source of the power
66. See note 56 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 23-31 supra.
68. See Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seieure, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
342, 352-66 (1967).
69. The rule seems about to be swallowed by exceptions contrived to limit its application.
The independent source exception, which developed almost immediately after the rule itself,
permits the use of illegally seized evidence if the Government can show it would have obtained
the evidence through independent legal means. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The attenuation exception provides that fruits of an illegal search may be
admissible if the connection between the offered evidence and the illegal search is sufficiently
"attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
Illegally seized evidence may be used before a grand jury, United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974); for purposes of impeachment, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); in a
parole revocation hearing, United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1975); and for pur-
poses of sentencing, United States v. Schipan, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. dented, 401
U.S. 983 (1971). Justice Marshall views the Court's recent decisions as an orchestrated "ero-
sion" of the exclusionary rule. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 121 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
70. See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
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which created the rule. What is worse, the standing restriction invites delib-
erate official violations of a third party's fourth amendment rights, which is
exactly what happened in Payner. It is difficult to find logic or justice in a
judicial system which suppresses evidence gathered from a technically and
accidentally illegal search, such as when a warrant is defective, but admits
evidence flowing from a grossly and deliberately illegal search, such as when
government agents commit larceny.
Until courts or legislatures find substitutes for the exclusionary rule,
7 1
such paradoxes will persist. A broad application of the rule will continue to
discourage fourth amendment violations. Payner, however, removes the su-
pervisory power from the district courts' collection of devices with which to
avoid the standing requirement, at least when the government acts are no
more serious than larceny. It remains to be seen whether government con-
duct will descend still further to embrace worse crimes. 72 Unless other
fourth amendment remedies are fashioned, Payner may encourage another
step in that direction.
Glenn Kirwan Beaton
71. Because the rule is not constitutionally mandated, there is no constitutional objection
to replacing it. For a complete overview of the other remedies proposed, see Geller, supra note
37, at 689-722.
72. It has been suggested that the severity of the fourth amendment violation should be
material when determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule. See Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590, 609-10 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); Comment, Fruit of the Poironous Tree - A
Pleafor ReleoaniCnrira, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136, 1153 (1967).
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JENKINS V ANDERSON: THE FIFTH AMENDMENT FAILS TO
PROTECT PREARREST SILENCE
INTRODUCTION
In Jenkins v. Anderson,' the United States Supreme Court allowed the
prosecution to impeach the credibility of a criminal defendant's testimony
based upon his prearrest silence. It is argued here that the Court's analysis
was unsatisfactory and that a vital fifth amendment right has been sacrificed
for greater prosecutorial proficiency.
Dennis Jenkins was charged with first-degree murder and tried in a
Michigan state court. The defendant's evidence showed that on August 12,
1974, the defendant's sister and her boyfriend were robbed by Doyle Red-
ding and another man. The defendant, Dennis Jenkins, who was nearby,
followed the thieves to their destination and reported their whereabouts to
the police. The next day, the defendant stabbed and killed Redding. The
defendant did not immediately report the stabbing, but did turn himself in
to the authorities two weeks later.
2
At trial, Jenkins took the stand and, for the first time, related an excul-
patory version of the event. He testified that on August 13, 1974, he encoun-
tered Redding, who accused him of informing the police of the robbery.
Then, according to the defendant, Redding attacked him with a knife, and
in the ensuing struggle Redding was killed. At trial, Jenkins at all times
maintained that he acted solely in self-defense.
3
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the defendant the following
questions over the objection of the defendant's counsel:
Q. And I suppose you waited for the police to tell them what
happened?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Did you ever go to a Police Officer or to anyone else?
A. No, I didn't.
4
The prosecutor again referred to Jenkins' prearrest silence in the closing
argument. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to
ten to fifteen years' imprisonment. 5
After exhausting his state remedies, Jenkins sought a writ of habeas
corpus in the federal district court. He contended that his constitutional
rights were violated by the prosecutor's questions relating to his prearrest
silence. The district court denied relief and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 6 The United States Supreme Court
1. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
2. Id. at 232.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 233.
5. Id. at 234.
6. 599 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1979).
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granted certiorari. 7 The Supreme Court held that the use of prearrest si-
lence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility does not violate the fifth
or fourteenth amendments. 8
I. SILENCE PROTECTED: A REVIEW OF PRE-JENKINS LAW
The use of a criminal defendant's silence at and before trial is not a new
issue.9 Numerous Supreme Court decisions have dealt with adverse com-
ment by the prosecution on the defendant's silence at trial' ° and with the use
of post-arrest silence to impeach the credibility of a testifying criminal
defendant. 1
A. Adverse Comment
Since the 1965 case of Grin v. Caiforn'a,'2 the fifth amendment has
been held to insure that the silence of a criminal defendant may not be ad-
versely commented upon at trial' 3 because such comment would be an im-
permissible penalty imposed for exercising a constitutional privilege. 14 Just
as one may not be compelled to forfeit his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, an individual also has the right not to suffer any penalty for the asser-
tion of a constitutional right. In order to preserve fully the value of the fifth
amendment right to silence, adverse comment upon the assertion of such a
right must not be allowed.
This "penalty doctrine," first established in Grzffm, was explained and
narrowed in Mcautha v. Cahfornz' 15 and Chafjm v. Stynchcombe.' 6 The Mc-
Gautha Court ruled that the Constitution is not violated unless the compul-
sion of an election between constitutional rights "impairs to an appreciable
extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."' 7 Chajin recognized
that the Constitution does not forbid every government-imposed choice,' 8
and implied that the courts should consider whether the state has a legiti-
mate interest in the challenged procedure. 19
B. Impeachment
Prosecutors often attempt to impeach a defendant's credibility at trial
7. 444 U.S. 824 (1979).
8. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
9. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965);
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
10. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60
(1893).
11. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975);
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926). See alo Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391
(1957).
12. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
13. Id. at 615.
14. Id. at 614.
15. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vatated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
16. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
17. 402 U.S. at 213.
18. 412 U.S. at 32.
19. Id. at 30-33.
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by questioning him about his pre-and post-arrest silence. In Raffel v. United
States,20 the Supreme Court allowed the impeachment of a criminal defend-
ant based upon his silence at a previous trial. In Rafil, the defendant was
charged with violating the National Prohibition Act.2 I At his first trial, the
defendant elected not to testify despite the testimony of a government agent
that the defendant had made certain admissions to him prior to arrest.
22
When the first trial ended in a mistrial, Raffel elected to testify at his second
trial and denied making the purported admissions.23 On cross-examination,
he was asked why he had not testified at the first trial.
In allowing the impeachment, the Court stated that once a defendant
takes the stand, he completely waives his immunity of silence and may be
cross-examined like any other witness.24 The narrow holding 25 of Ra el was
that a defendant's fifth amendment immunity, asserted at a previous trial,
does not survive his appearance in a second trial so as to shield his previous
silence from comment.2 6 The Court found no justification in the underlying
fifth amendment policies for extending the defendant's immunity from testi-
fying beyond the trial in which the privilege is exercised.
27
Nearly a half century later, the Court again addressed the issue of im-
peachment by reference to a defendant's post-arrest silence. In United States
v. Hale,28 the defendant was arrested and convicted of robbery. At the time
of arrest and up until trial, the defendant remained silent and refused to
explain his possession of $158. He related an exculpatory version at trial,
and his testimony was impeached by prosecutorial remarks about his pretrial
silence. 29 The Court distinguished Rafel on its facts and relied instead on its
1957 decision of G7unewaldv. United States,30 which held that it was unlawful
to cross-examine a defendant about his fifth amendment invocation at a
prior grand jury hearing. The Court in Hale reversed the conviction by exer-
cising its supervisory power over the federal courts, holding that it was error
to permit cross-examination of the defendant concerning his silence during
police interrogation. 3 ' The Court ruled that any valid impeachment of
20. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
21. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (tits. I-II repealed by Liquor Law
Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, § 1, 49 Stat. 872 (1935)).
22. 271 U.S. at 495. At the trial a prohibition officer testified that he had searched a
drinking establishment. After the search Raffel admitted to owning the establishment. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 496-97.
25. The case came to the Court upon a certified question: "Was it error to require the
defendant, Raffel, offering himself as a witness upon the second trial, to disclose that he had not
testified. . . upon the first trial[?]" Id. at 496. The Court answered in the negative. Id. at 499.
26. Id. The holding of Rajdl is questionable in light of later cases. See text accompanying
notes 68-85 ifra. Various state cases have concluded that Raffit has been impliedly overruled or
so eroded as to lack authority. See, e.g., Raithel v. State, 40 Md. App. 107, 388 A.2d 161 (1978);
State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D. 1977); McFadden v. Page, 428 P.2d 338(Okla. Crim.
App. 1967); Commonwealth v. Jones, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 236, 327 A.2d 638 (1974); Dean v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 666, 166 S.E.2d 228 (1969).
27. 271 U.S. at 498-99.
28. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
29. Id. at 174.
30. 353 U.S. 391 (1957). For a discussion of Gruwewatd, see text accompanying notes 74-78
infta.
31. 422 U.S. at 181.
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prior inconsistent statements requires that the prior statement3 2 be inconsis-
tent with the testimony at trial.3 3 Failure to establish the threshold inconsis-
tency between the statements mandates that the prior silence be found
devoid of probative value and therefore excludable. 34 Silence, the Court
reasoned, is normally so ambiguous that it lacks probative force.
35
In Hale, there were so many alternative explanations 36 for the defend-
ant's silence that his silence established no inconsistency with his trial alibi.
3 7
Thus, any probative value that existed was outweighed by the possible
prejudicial impact. 38 The Court's decision rested on evidentiary grounds,
avoiding the constitutional issues. Such avoidance, however, was short-lived.
One year after Hale, the Court reached the constitutional issue of im-
peachment through the use of post-arrest silence in Doyle v. Ohio.39 Doyle
was arrested for selling narcotics and given his Miranda warnings. 4° At the
time of arrest and until trial, Doyle remained silent. At trial, he related an
exculpatory defense for the first time.4 ' The prosecutor asked him on cross-
examination why he had not told this story to the police.42 He was con-
victed by the state court, and the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve a conflict among the federal courts of appeals.43 The Court
held that the use of post-arrest silence to impeach the testimony of a defend-
ant who received the Miranda warnings at the time of arrest would be funda-
mentally unfair and a deprivation of due process.44 The Court reasoned
that post-arrest silence is "insolubly ambiguous" because the silence may be
an exercise of the Miranda rights recently communicated. 4 5 Moreover, the
Miranda warnings are an implied assurance to the arrestee that his silence
will not be used against him.
46
Significantly, the Doyle Court noted that silence at the time of arrest
may be inherently ambiguous apart from the effect of the Miranda warn-
ings.4 7 While the issue of post-arrest silence apparently was settled, what
remained unresolved was the constitutional validity of impeaching a defend-
32. Wigmore's definition of "inconsistent statement," incorporates behavior, which in-
cludes silence. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1040, at 1050 (J.
Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970).
33. 422 U.S. at 176.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See text accompanying notes 118-19 inifa.
37. 422 U.S. at 180.
38. Id.
39. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that a number of procedural safeguards
must be followed before the prosecution will be allowed to use statements made by a suspect
during custodial interrogation. Specifically, the Court noted that "[plrior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
41. Doyle maintained that he was buying the narcotics, not selling them. 426 U.S. at 613.
42. Id.
43. 423 U.S. 823 (1975). For a list of federal cases, see 422 U.S. at 173 n.2.
44. 426 U.S. at 618.
45. Id. at 617.
46. Id. at 618.
47. Id. at 617 n.8.
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ant's testimony by commenting on silence maintained pnor to the time of
arrest.
IL JNKINS v ANDERSON: THE PROTECTION FAILS
Because the defendant inJenkins asserted violations of his fifth amend-
ment and due process rights, the Supreme Court was forced to face the con-
stitutional issues posed by impeachment through the use of prearrest silence.
Although the majority noted that the fifth amendment protects a defendant
against comment by the prosecution when the defendant remains silent
throughout the trial,48 the Court relied on Rail to conclude that the use of
prearrest silence for impeachment of a criminal defendant does not violate
the fifth amendment. 49 The majority interpreted Rafl as standing for
the proposition that once a defendant elects to testify he may be impeached
with his prior silence.50 In a footnote, the Court indicated that this is true
even when the silence stems from an invocation of the fifth amendment
privilege. 5'
The Supreme Court next confronted the argument that the prosecutor's
impeachment of Jenkins' testimony was an impermissible burden on the fifth
amendment right to silence. Relying on the rules of McGautha52 and Chaf-
fin 3 and the holding of Raffl,M the Court found a legitimate state interest
in such impeachment (the Court's truth-finding function) 55 and no impair-
ment of the policies underlying the privilege.
56
In addressing the defendant's due process claim, the majority recog-
nized the common law rule that witnesses may be impeached by their prior
silence in situations in which an assertion naturally would have been
made. 57 The Court impliedly found that the assertion naturally should have
been made by Jenkins; its absence was inconsistent with his exculpatory tes-
timony and, as such, probative.5 8 The Court held that Doyle was not appli-
cable in this situation, because the due process violation in Doyle was a result
of governmental action which induced the defendant to remain silent.
5 9
Since Jenkins' silence took place before he was taken into custody and given
Miranda warnings, there was no governmental inducement and, therefore, no
due process violation.6" Finding no constitutional violation, the Court af-
firmed the Court of Appeals' denial of habeas corpus. Justices Stevens and
Stewart concurred.
6 '
48. 447 U.S. at 235 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
49. 447 U.S. at 235-36.
50. Id. at 235.
51. Id. at 236 n.2.
52. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). Set text accompanying notes 17-19supra.
53. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). See text accompanying notes 17-19 upra.
54. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
55. 447 U.S. at 238.
56. Id. at 236.
57. Id. at 239.
58. Id. at 240.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Justice Stewart concurred with the majority on all points except the fifth amendment
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Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, finding violations of due pro-
cess, of the privilege against self-incrimination, and of the right to testify in
one's own behalf.62 The dissenters maintained that an accused has an abso-
lute right to testify in his own behalf and a right not to incriminate himself
prior to trial. To force an individual to choose between such fundamental
guarantees would be a violation of the constitutional provision from which
those rights evolve. Thus, the impeachment evidence places an impermissi-
ble burden on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the right of an accused to testify in his own behalf.
6 3
III. THE BURDENS OF IMPEACHMENT
The Court's analysis injenkz'ns of the fifth amendment issue is incom-
plete. The majority's reliance upon the often-questioned Ral decision,
while omitting any meaningful discussion of the reasons for its resurrec-
tion,64 leaves in question the continued viability of the penalty doctrine as it
relates to the fifth amendment. A burden was imposed on the defendant
who, in effect, had to choose between providing self-incriminating evidence
to the authorities, and risking impeachment should he decide to testify at
trial. Nevertheless, the Court relied upon Rafel, a questionable 1926 case,
65
decided long before the advent of the penalty doctrine, to support its finding
that the policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination were not
appreciably impaired.
A. Proper Constructzon of Raffel
The Raffel decision was based on both evidentiary and constitutional
grounds. Having found the questioning of the defendant about his prior
silence valid for evidentiary purposes,6 the Court was forced to address the
defendant's fifth amendment claim. Noting that the safeguards against self-
incrimination are only for the benefit of those who do not wish to testify in
their own behalf, the Court looked to the policy underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination and found no reason to extend the immunity from
giving testimony to a testifying defendant.
6 7
The Court's retreat from Rafel began in 1943 with Johnson v. United
States.68 In that case, Johnson testified about amounts he received from a
issue. On the fifth amendment issue, Justice Stewart joined the separate opinion of Justice
Stevens. Id. at 245.
Justices Stevens and Stewart found no fifth amendment issue because the defendant was
under no official compulsion to speak. Justice Stevens' due process argument was based on his
dissent in DoYe, in which he maintained that the AMianda warnings did not contain an implied
assurance that the arrestee's silence would not be used against him. 426 U.S. at 620.
62. 447 U.S. at 245 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
63. Id. at 254.
64. In a footnote, the Court referred to the cases that seem to question Ra el: United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975); Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961); Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 477 U.S. at 237 n.4.
65. Se note 26 supra.
66. 271 U.S. at 497-99.
67. Id. at 498-99.
68. 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
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criminal syndicate from 1935 to 1937. When asked on cross-examination
about monies received in 1938, the defendant was allowed by the Court to
assert his fifth amendment privilege. Later, the prosecutor commented to
the jury upon the defendant's assertion of the privilege.
The Court began its analysis injohnson with the statement from Ral
that there is a difference between the rights of defendants who testify and
those of defendants who do not.6 9 The Johnson Court then cited Dean Wig-
more's treatise on evidence 70 for the rule that an accused's voluntary testi-
mony upon any fact is a waiver as to all other relevant facts. 7 I Thus, a
defendant who testifies has signified his waiver as to all facts "except those
which merely impeach his credit .. 72
The Court in Johnson recognized that a defendant who testifies waives
his immunity from giving testimony and that the waiver is total. Neverthe-
less, the Court stated that the total waiver applies only to the issues made
relevant by the defendant on direct examination and not to items used solely
for impeachment.7
3
The holding of Raffel was further restricted in Grunewald v. United
States .74 One of the defendants in Grunewald had previously refused, on the
basis of his fifth amendment privilege, to answer certain questions asked of
him by a grand jury. At trial, the same questions were asked of the defend-
ant on cross-examination and were answered in a manner consistent with
innocence. Subsequently, the prosecutor was allowed to bring out on cross-
examination that the defendant had asserted his fifth amendment privilege
as to these same questions before a grand jury.
The Court in Grunewald found that Raffil was not controlling under
these circumstances, 75 because Rafel does not apply unless the trial testi-
mony and the prior statement are inconsistent. 7 6 The Grunewald Court held
that there was no inconsistency between the assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege before a grand jury, and exculpatory testimony at trial in response
to the same questions. 77 Deciding the case on evidentiary grounds, the
Court expressly avoided the necessity of re-examining Raffel in light ofJohn-
son 78 and declined to reach the constitutional issue.
In Stewart v. United States,79 the Court again held that Rael did not
69. Id. at 195; Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. at 496-97.
70. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2276(2) (J. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
71. 318 U.S. at 195.
72. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 70, § 2276(2) (emphasis added).
73. 318 U.S. at 195-96.
74. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
75. Id. at 418.
76. The inconsistency in Raffel was that the defendant remained silent at his first trial in
the face of testimony that he had made an admission of guilt. This constituted a circumstance
in which it would have been natural to reply. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 175-76; Stew-
art v. United States, 366 U.S. 1; 5-6 (1961); 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 1042; Schiller, On
theJursprudence of the FiM Amendment Right to Silence, 16 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 204, 206 (1979).
77. 353 U.S. at 420-23.
78. Id. at 421. Four Justices would have overruled Rafet. Id. at 426 (Black, J.,
concurring).
79. 366 U.S. 1 (1961).
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apply to cases where there was no inconsistency between trial testimony and
statements made before trial. Stewart was charged with murder and
pleaded the defense of insanity. He did not testify at this first two trials, but
elected to testify at his third trial. On cross-examination, Stewart was im-
peached for his failure to testify at the previous trials. His testimony was
characterized by the Court as gibberish,80 consistent with his defense of in-
sanity. Thus, there was no "testimony" to impeach and any impeachment
was, therefore, solely of the defendant's demeanor.8 ' The Court held that
Rafel did not permit impeachment of solely demeanor evidence, and found
that there was no inconsistency between silence (at one trial) and taking the
stand at a subsequent trial.
8 2
The resulting view of Rafl is that impeachment based on the defend-
ant's prior silence is allowed only when there is an underlying inconsistency
between the testimony and the prior statement. The prosecution is not per-
mitted to impeach the defendant's testimony based on his prior silence solely
by questioning the defendant's demeanor. This view is reflected in United
States v. Hale,8 3 in which the impeachment of the defendant's testimony
based on his post-arrest silence was held invalid. The Court distinguished
Rafl, noting that the inconsistency in Rafel, the failure of the accused to
testify at his first trial in spite of uncontroverted testimony that he had made
an admission of guilt, was not present in Hale.8 4 Disposing of the case on
evidentiary grounds, the Court did not reach the constitutional issue and
again declined to re-examine Rail in light ofJohnson and Grit.85
B. Assertion of the Privilege
In general, citizens have a duty to report crime to the authorities.
86
This obligation is not diminished simply because the witness to a crime is
himself involved in illicit activities.87 The obligation to assist authorities,
however, is subordinate to the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.8 Generally, the privilege must be asserted by its claimant in
a timely fashion because it is not a self-executing right. 89 Any claim of privi-
lege must be presented to a tribunal for evaluation at the time disclosures are
sought.9°
An exception to the requirement that the claim be expressly asserted
has developed. The assertion need not be made where it would, in itself,
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 6.
82. Id. at 5.
83. 422 U.S. 171 (1975). For a discussion of Hale, see text accompanying notes 28-37supra.
84. Id. at 175. Se note 76 supra.
85. Id. at 175 n.4.
86. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980), and authorities cited therein.
87. Id. 445 U.S. at 558.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 559; Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1976); United States v.
Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 78-
79 (1965).
90. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. at 653-55.
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violate the claimant's privilege.9 ' When some coercive factor prevents an
individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his choice to remain si-
lent,92 the courts will forgive the usual requirement that the claim be
presented for evaluation in favor of a claim by silence. 93
Had Jenkins reported the alleged attack upon him by Redding, he
would have supplied valuable evidence linking himself to the incident. He
would have provided the police with evidence that he was in the right place
at the right time and would have actually admitted to killing the victim.
For Jenkins to have asserted the privilege, he would have had to explain to
the authorities that he was a witness to a crime and was electing to exercise
his privilege, thus alerting the police to the crime and making himself the
prime suspect. Jenkins, then, had a right to assert the privilege and fell
within the exception to the assertion rule, which excuses him from presenting
his claim and allows a claim by silence.
94
C. Penaly Doctrne
The fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination was
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and made applicable to the
states in Malloy v. Hogan.9 In so doing, the Court characterized the privilege
as "the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such
silence." 96 One year after Malloy, the Court in Gnfm v. Caiforma9 7 estab-
lished the rule that adverse comment by a judge or prosecutor upon a crimi-
nal defendant's failure to testify violates the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Such comment is an impermissible penalty be-
cause it "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 98
The proper scope and limits of the privilege are derived from an analy-
sis of its underlying policy justifications. 99 The fifth amendment is premised
on the assumption that our system of criminal justice is an accusatorial one,
not an inquisitorial one. 100 The privilege protects all persons from abuse by
the government of its powers of investigation, arrest, trial, and punish-
ment. °10 Second, the privilege is designed to deter inhumane treatment
whereby individuals are compelled by abusive tactics to provide self-incrimi-
nating evidence.' 0 2 The privilege also reflects society's unwillingness to sub-
91. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
92. 445 U.S. at 560 n.6; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
93. 424 U.S. at 658 n. 11; 390 U.S. at 50.
94. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
95. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
96. Id. at 8.
97. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
98. 380 U.S. at 614.
99. The purpose of the G'nim rule is grounded upon the whole complex of values that the
privilege represents. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 414 (1966).
100. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. at 7-8; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964).
101. Ratner, CGonseqnces of Exerctsng the Pnvilege Against Slf-lncimination, 24 U. CHI. L.
REV. 472, 484 (1957).
102. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55; see also E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 32, § 2251; Ayer, The Fth Amendment
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ject criminal suspects to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt.110 3 A fourth widely-noted policy underlying the privilege is that
the privilege contributes toward a fair balance between the state and the
individual by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him, and by requiring the government in
its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load.'14
Although the Raffel decision has been severely limited by subsequent
decisions,'0 5 its fifth amendment holding has never been expressly dis-
avowed. 10 6 Nevertheless, the Raf#l Court did not consider an argument
based upon a Gifin-type (penalty) rationale. Furthermore, the Court in Raf-
fel never addressed the fourth policy justification noted above, the require-
ment that the government shoulder the entire load. The majority inJenkzins
again failed to address this important policy, citing instead its discussion in
Raff#l of a defendant's right not to testify, for the proposition that no fifth
amendment right had been impermissibly burdened.1 0 7 By citing Raff#, the
Jenkins Court made the same omission as did the Court in Raffel. Thus, to
date, the Court has failed to employ the policy that the government must
shoulder the entire load in any application of the penalty doctrine.
The rules set forth by the Supreme Court regarding the penalty doc-
trine are rather general, allowing either a broad or a narrow view to be taken
in their application. Malloy and Grifm initiated the idea that the state vio-
lates a defendant's constitutional rights when it penalizes the defendant's
assertion of those rights.' 08 McGautha indicated that while "penalties" are
impermissible, some "burdens" on constitutional rights are lawful.10 9 The
fact that an individual must make tough choices among constitutional rights
does not constitute a penalty imposed on those rights."10 The burden be-
comes a penalty only when it "impairs to an appreciable extent any of the
policies behind the rights involved."" '' Chafn implied that the court should
consider the legitimacy of the challenged state action.' 
1 2
An application of the above rules leads to the conclusion that impeach-
ment of a criminal defendant's testimony based upon his prearrest silence, at
least in the circumstances of theJenkins case, violates the defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination. TheJenkins majority noted that the state had
at stake the important interest of ascertaining the truth.' I 3 This truth-find-
and the Inference of GutIfrom Silence: Griffin v. California After Fzfleen Years, 78 MIcH. L. REV.
841, 849 (1980).
103. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55; see also Ayer, supra note 102, at 849-
50.
104. Tehan v. Scott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at
55; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 70, § 2251, at 317. Ayer, supra note 102, at 849.
105. See text accompanying notes 68-85 supra.
106. Hale, Stewart, and Grunewald were all decided on evidentiary grounds using the
Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the lower federal courts.
107. 447 U.S. at 235-36.
108. See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
109. 402 U.S. at 217; Schiller, supra note 76, at 213 n.96.
110. Id. at 214. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
111. Id. at 213.
112. 412 U.S. at 30-33. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
113. 447 U.S. at 238.
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ing function of the courts is significant, and it can at least be argued that
impeachment may enhance this interest." t 4 It must be remembered, how-
ever, that the privilege against self-incrimination "is not an adjunct to the
ascertainment of truth.'' t5 The fifth amendment privilege protects more
important constitutional values which reflect the concern of society that the
individual be left alone."1
6
The question remains whether the impeachment through the use of
prearrest silence impairs any fifth amendment policy. 17 Certainly a burden
is imposed on the defendant if he refuses to come forward at the time of the
incident. His silence, which may be motivated by fear,' 18 an unwillingness
to incriminate another, or a reliance on the right to remain silent,'19 may
later be used to impeach his trial testimony should he offer an exculpatory
version of events. Thus, an individual involved in a possibly criminal activ-
ity must decide immediately (for any amount of silence would supposedly be
suspect) whether to remain silent and risk impeachment or to forego that
right and risk almost certain self-incrimination by providing evidence to the
authorities.
Requiring an individual to make such a decision, without the assistance
of counsel, tips the balance in favor of the state in its contest with the indi-
vidual.' 20 If government is to shoulder the entire load and leave the individ-
ual unmolested in the absence of independent evidence connecting him with
a crime,' 2 ' then impeachment for failing to provide the authorities with in-
criminating evidence appreciably impairs this fifth amendment policy.
The loss of such impeachment evidence would not overly burden the
prosecution. Impeachment evidence is, by nature, only used to assess the
defendant's credibility, and the Court has noted the probative weakness of
silence.12 2 Furthermore, the exercise of the privilege cannot be found indica-
tive of guilt or presumptive of perjury.' 23 Since the privilege serves to pro-
tect the innocent who, like Jenkins, otherwise might be ensnared in
ambiguous circumstances, 24 there is no reason to believe that only the
114. Id.
115. Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. at 416.
116. Id. See text accompanying notes 12-19, 95-104 supra.
117. In addition, thejenkins decision may induce defendants not to take the stand because of
the impact on the jury of impeachment evidence, thus hindering the ascertainment of truth by
depriving the court of the defendant's testimony. Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the
Erclustinary Rule, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 939, 944 (1967).
118. Jenkins was a black parolee, making fear a likely explanation for his silence.
119. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 177; Ratner, supra note 101, at 492-93; Schiller,
supra note 76, at 208-09; Note, Robeson v. State: Cross-Examination of Prearrest Silence, 67 CALiF.
L. REv. 1205, 1210-11 (1979).
120. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 70, § 2251.
121. Ratner, supra note 101, at 474.
122. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 617 n.8; United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. at 176-77.
Wigmore explains that "failure to assert a fact when it would have been natural to assert it,
amounts to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact." 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 32,
§ 1042, at 1056. Silence often is of little relevence because "the inference of assent may safely be
made only when no other explanation is equally consistent with silence." 4 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 32, § 1071, at 102.
123. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956).
124. Id. at 557-58. See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
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guilty will go free due to the loss of the impeachment evidence. The prosecu-
tor may still cross-examine the defendant on all facets of his exculpatory
version as brought out on direct examination. ' 25 Once the defendant testi-
fies, he must do so completely and without immunity. But the prosecutor
must not be allowed to make remarks which infringe upon a defendant's
constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
The impeachment of a criminal defendant's testimony due to his prear-
rest silence should have been found by theJenkns Court to be a fifth amend-
ment violation. Reliance by theJenkinr majority upon Ral was misplaced
because Ra,9l applies only when there is an underlying inconsistency be-
tween the trial testimony and the prior statement and because it failed to
consider an argument based on the penalty doctrine rationale. In Jenknr,
there was no underlying inconsistency between the prearrest silence and the
exculpatory version at trial.
Furthermore, Rail failed to address the fifth amendment policy that
the government must bear the entire burden in its contest with the individ-
ual. By relying on Ral for its conclusion that no fifth amendment policy
was impaired, theJenkbus Court also failed to address that issue. By proper
application of the penalty doctrine in conjunction with the fifth amendment
policy noted above, the Court should have concluded that impeachment
based on prearrest silence appreciably impairs that policy.
The penalty doctrine established the principle that impeachment evi-
dence is barred when such impeachment constitutes a penalty imposed upon
the prior exercise of the fifth amendment right of silence. 126 When a defend-
ant is compelled to make an election between constitutional rights, and the
policies underlying those rights are appreciably impaired, an impermissible
penalty exists. In its haste to slam the door on any further expansion of
earlier, more liberal decisions, the Court failed to provide a sound analytical
base for its holding.
Lary Brenman
125. Note, Robeson v. State: Cross-Examnation ofPreanrest S/enee, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1205,
1209 (1979).
126. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
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BASTARDIZING THE LEGITIMATE CHILD: THE COLORADO
SUPREME COURT INVALIDATES THE UNIFORM
PARENTAGE ACT PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY IN R.McG. v. .
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in the last decade has raised the legal
status of illegitimate children to equal that of legitimate children.' At the
same time, the Court has elevated the rights of unwed fathers2 and elimi-
nated much gender-based discrimination. 3 These three disparate constitu-
tional law trends coalesced in a ground-breaking Colorado Supreme Court
decision, R.McG V. J W 4 The combination produced a legally mandated
but socially explosive result. R.McG. invalidated Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA)5 provisions denying standing to any man seeking to establish his pa-
ternity of a child born to a married couple that acknowledges the child as
their own.6 Thus, for the first time, a child born legitimately to a husband
and wife can be bastardized by a man claiming to be the child's biological
father. This comment explores the rationale and the social ramifications of
the Colorado Supreme Court's decision.
I. THE FACTUAL SETTING
C.W. was born in mid-1976, at the time the mother, J.W., was having
an affair with the plaintiff, R.McG. The mother's husband, W.W., was
named on the birth certificate as the child's father and accepted the infant as
his legitimate child.
7
In early 1978, R.McG. filed a Declaration of Paternity in the Denver
Juvenile Court on behalf of himself and the child, against the mother and
her husband.8 The complaint alleged that R.McG. was the natural father;
1. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also the discussion of illegitimates'
rights, pp. 159-62 i7mfa.
2. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). Set also the discussion of unwed fathers' rights, pp. 162-64 infra.
3. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
667 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See aLro the discussion of men's and women's
rights, pp. 164-66 infra.
4. 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980).
5. Nine states have adopted legislation conforming to the Uniform Parentage Act. CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West Supp. 1979); CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (repl. 1978
& Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51-.74
(West Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -131 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
126.011 to .391; N.D. Cruvr. CoDE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (1979); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
26.26.010 to .905 (Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-7-101 to -126 (1977).
6. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-6-105, -107 (repl. 1978).
7. Affidavit of W.W. and J.W. in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, R.McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980).
8. Necessary parties under Colorado law include the child, the natural mother, and each
presumed father, as well as each man alleged to be the natural father who is subject to the
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that he was the only man who had had sexual intercourse with the mother at
any possible time of conception; that the mother admitted he was the natu-
ral father; and that blood tests were unable to exclude him as the natural
father.
The defendants denied R.McG.'s allegations and moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the ac-
tion under the UPA.9 In their motion for summary judgment, the defend-
ants relied on a UPA provision' 0 denying standing to all but the mother, the
legally presumed father-in this case, the husband, W.W.-and their lineal
descendants. Discrimination against third-party fathers is justified, the de-
fendants claimed, due to the compelling state interest in keeping family units
intact.'1  The husband's accompanying affidavit stated that he believed
himself to be the natural father; that regardless of the outcome of the suit, he
would continue to treat the child as his natural offspring; and that he had
the desire and ability to continue providing for the child's support, nourish-
ment, protection, and care.' 2 The mother filed a similar affidavit.'"
R.McG. opposed summary judgment, claiming that the denial of his
standing to bring the action violated his right to equal protection under the
United States and Colorado Constitutions and under Colorado's equal rights
amendment.' 4 In his affidavit opposing summary judgment, R.McG. fur-
ther maintained that the mother acknowledged his paternity in a sworn
codicil to her will and in correspondence, and that the child had visited with
him almost daily until she was one-and-a-half years old. 5
Before hearing the motion for summary judgment, the juvenile court
appointed a guardian ad litem for the child,' 6 and approved the plaintiff's
request that Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) blood tests be administered
to the parties.' 7 The test results showed a 98.89% probability of R.McG.'s
paternity.' 8 No results were obtained for the husband, because an initial
blood sample was defective and he refused to submit to further tests.
The juvenile court referee then rejected the plaintiff's constitutional
claims and granted the motion for summary judgment, holding that third-
party fathers have no capacity to sue under the UPA.' 9 The referee was
court's jurisdiction. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-110 (repl. 1978). For a definition of "presumed
father," see note 70 infra.
9. 615 P.2d at 668.
10. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-107(1) (repl. 1978).
11. Memorandum Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9,
10.
12. Affidavit of W.W. in support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.
13. Affidavit of J.W. in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1.
14. 615 P.2d at 668-69. Applicable provisions of the United States Constitution, the Colo-
rado Constitution, and Colorado's equal rights amendment are set forth in notes 24-26 mfra.
15. 615 P.2d at 668. In the codicil, J.W. swore that her present husband could not be the
father and that to the best of her knowledge R.McG. was the father. She requested that
R.McG. be appointed the child's guardian if she were to die while the child was still an unmar-
ried minor. Id.
16. As provided in CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-110 (repl. 1978).
17. As provided in CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-112 (repl. 1978) and § 13-25-126 (1973 &
Supp. 1980). 615 P.2d at 668.
18. See note 134 rnfla nd accompanying text.
19. 615 P.2d at 669.
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unwilling to allow the "turmoil and heartache" which would follow a judi-
cial declaration that the child was conceived of an adulterous relationship.
20
The referee's order was subsequently confirmed by the juvenile court
judge.2' The plaintiff appealed and the Colorado Court of Appeals trans-
ferred the case to the Colorado Supreme Court because of the constitutional
issues involved.
22
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment order
and invalidated the UPA's standing provisions. 23 The court held that under
the circumstances of this case, the UPA's failure to grant R.McG. the right
to sue for a determination of his paternity violated equal protection of the
laws, under the federal24 and state constitutions 25 and the equal rights
amendment to the Colorado Constitution.
26
II. THE BACKGROUND ISSUES
At common law, illegitimacy bore a tremendous stigma. The law made
every presumption27 in favor of legitimacy to protect children from that le-
gal and social void. Gradually, the courts and legislatures removed many of
the disabilities imposed upon those born out of wedlock. In R.McG., the Col-
orado Supreme Court took the final step by holding that a legitimate child
could be declared illegitimate.28 This step represented a giant leap from the
common law, but only a small step from recent United States Supreme
Court decisions.29 To understand the evolutionary nature of the step taken
in R.McG., the historical development of the rights accorded to three
groups--illegitimates, unwed fathers, and men and women--needs to be ex-
plored.
A. The Rights of Ilegilimates
1. Under State and Common Law
In the past, the child born to an unmarried mother fell into a legal void.
He was known at common law asfihus nulhius, "the son of no one," orh'us
20. Order of Referee Rogers, Apr. 23, 1979, Record at 156.
21. Order of Judge Lawritson, Oct. 9, 1979, Record at 190.
22. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-4-1 10(l)(a) (1973) provides for the transfer of cases to the Col-
orado Supreme Court.
23. 615 P.2d at 667, 671-72.
24. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
COLO. CONT. art. II, § 25.
26. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colo-
rado or any of its political subdivisions on account of sex." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29. Colo-
rado's due process clause, id. § 25, has been construed to include equal protection of the laws.
See Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963); Trueblood v. Tinsley, 148 Colo.
503, 366 P.2d 655 (1961); People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 (1921).
27. One of these presumptions is Lord Mansfield's Rule. See notes 128-133 tnfo and ac-
companying text.
28. Technically, under the Colorado UPA, the terms "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
should not be used since the statute does not use that terminology.
29. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 667 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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popuh', "the son of the people."30 He was considered a ward of the village
parish, and neither his parents nor anyone else was required to support him.
He could neither inherit from his parents nor be legitimated by them.
3 '
Christianity, with its emphasis on monogamous marriages, likewise rated
him a non-entity. 32 The first statute according some status to illegitimates
was the English Poor Law Act of 1576, which imposed on both parents a
duty of support. 33 The law was not drafted out of concern for the children,
whose legal status remained in limbo; rather, it was an effort to relieve the
parishes of the financial burden of caring for them.
3 4
2. Under United States Supreme Court Decisions
The United States initially adopted the common lawfiius nullius doc-
trine and accorded the illegitimate no rights.3 5 By the early 1960's, compas-
sion and social justice had brought about legislation in some states that
tempered the legal impact of illegitimacy and further equalized the rights of
children.3 6 But many inequities remained until the United States Supreme
Court began invalidating discriminatory state statutes in 1968. In that year
the Court held that a state may not create a right of action in favor of chil-
dren for the wrongful death of a parent, yet exclude illegitimate children
from such a right. 37 Subsequently the Court has held that illegitimate chil-
dren may not be precluded from sharing equally with other children who
recover workmen's compensation benefits for the death of a parent,3 8 and
that illegitimates are not to be denied the child's right to support from his
natural father.3 9 In Gomez v. Perez, 4° the Court emphasized that "a State
may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate chidren by denying
them substantial benefits accorded children generally."
'4'
More recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that some statutory
30. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 246, 190 N.E.2d 849, 856 (1963), cert. dtnied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964).
31. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 459 (1772).
32. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KRAUSE ]. Biblical aversion to the bastard predates Christ: "A bastard shall not enter into the
congregation of the Lord; even to his tenth generation .... " Deuteronomy 23:2.
33. S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.08, at 1-28, § 1.09, at 1-30 (4th
rev. ed. 1975).
34. Id.
35. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 485 (1772). At common law, the doctrine of
flils nullius
expresses no mere technical uncertainty as to the fatherhood of the bastard, but rather
the moral antipathy, inculcated by the Church, to the irregular intercourse of which
he was the fruit. The Common Law might take note sometimes of the maternal ties of
blood but refused to follow the Civil Law in making them a conduit for inheritable
rights, and conferring on the issue of irregular unions a quasi-legitimacy as regards the
mother.
W. HOOPER, THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY 27 (1911). See genfraly id. at 100-24; KRAUSE, supra
note 32, at 9-57.
36. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), crt. dtnia 379
U.S. 945 (1964).
37. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
38. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
39. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
40. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
41. Id. at 538.
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classifications are necessary to protect overriding state concerns, such as pro-
tecting estates from fraudulent claims by alleged illegitimate offspring.
42
Consequently, the Court has wrestled with the technical proofs of
parenthood that may be legally required.43 In a recent case, Lahi v. Lali,44
the Court by a five-to-four decision, upheld a New York statutory scheme
requiring that certain evidence of paternity exists before a natural father's
death, if his offspring seek to inherit intestate from him. The Court stressed
that only an important state interest justifies statutory discrimination against
illegitimates: "Although . . . classifications based on illegitimacy are not
subject to 'strict scrutiny,' they nevertheless are invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment if they are not substantially related to permissible state inter-
ests."
45
3. Under the Colorado Uniform Parentage Act
State legislation generally has not kept pace with the Supreme Court
decisions; substantial discrimination persists. 46 Two early uniform acts were
not well received and were withdrawn by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. 47 In a 1966 article, 48 Professor Harry D.
Krause of the University of Illinois College of Law sparked interest in a new
effort at uniform legislation. The result was the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) of 1973. Substantially similar legislation has been enacted by nine
states since 1975. 4 9 Colorado's version of the UPA went into effect in 1977.
Because the UPA has been adopted for only a few years in a small number of
states, little case law has developed.
The UPA's primary goal is to bring substantive legal equality to all
children regardless of the marital status of their parents. The concept is a
revolutionary one. 50
The substance of the UPA is expressed in the first two sections. First,
the Act defines the parent-child relationship as "the legal relationship ex-
isting between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which
the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations."'" Sec-
ond, the Act specifies that the parent-child relationship includes both
mother-and-child and father-and-child relationships, and extends equally to
42. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
43. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 US. 347 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971).
44. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
45. Id. at 265.
46. Setga,,raly KRAUSE, supra note 32, at 297-305. See also Wills, Paterniy Statutes: Thwart-
ing Equal Protectionfor Illegitimates, 32 U. MIMi L. REv. 339 (1977).
47. The Uniform Illegitimacy Act of 1922 and the Uniform Paternity Act of 1960, 9A
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 579 (1979). Note the names of the three acts, which changed as
society's consciousness was raised-from "Illegitimacy" to "Paternity" to "Parentage."
48. Krause, Bn'ngt'ng the Bastard into the Great Soa'ty: A Proposad Unifom Act on Lqgitimaty, 44
Tax. L. REV. 829 (1966).
49. See note 5 supra.
50. 9A UNIFORM LAws ANNOTED 580 (1979).
51. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-102 (repl. 1978).
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every child and to every parent, regardless of the parents' marital status. 52
The remainder of the Act deals primarily with standing requirements.
Before R.McG., a man who claimed parental rights faced differing standing
and statute of limitation rules, depending on whether the child had a "pre-
sumed father" as defined by the Act. 53 R.McG. challenged the validity of
these separate classifications.
B. The Rights of Unwed Fathers
1. Under State and Common Law
When American states adopted the common law doctrine offhzus nul-
laus, the unwed father5 4 was treated as having, at most, a moral obligation to
provide support s.5  He owed no legal duty; he received no visitation rights.
56
The first changes in the law imposed duties of support, in an effort to relieve
welfare rolls, but conferred no attendant rights.57 More recently, legitima-
tion statutes have allowed the natural father to alter the child's status by
openly acknowledging him, and thence to acquire visitation, and even cus-
tody, rights.
58
2. Under United States Supreme Court Decisions
The United States Supreme Court first recognized an unwed father's
parental rights in Stanley v. Ilh'nos,59 a 1972 decision. Under an Illinois stat-
ute, minor illegitimate children automatically became wards of the state if
their mothers died. Although Stanley had never formally legitimated his
children, he had always acknowledged them as his own and had lived with
the mother intermittently over a period of eighteen years. In ruling the stat-
ute unconstitutional, the Court held that before a custody decision is made,
due process entitles the unwed father to a hearing on his fitness as a parent.
6 °
The Court decided the statute made an impermissible, irrebutable presump-
tion that all unmarried fathers are unsuitable. 6 1 The statute also violated
52. Id. §§ 19-6-102, -103.
53. See note 70 bnJ#a nd accompanying text.
54. All fathers who are not married to their child's mother are termed "unwed fathers."
They may also be called "non-marital fathers." The term "putative father" is often used inter-
changeably, but should be restricted to its definition: "the alleged or reputed father of an ille-
gitimate child." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979). Thus R.McG. is technically
not a putative father because his child is legitimate. He is more correctly called a "claiming
natural father" or a "third-party father." These latter two terms were used by the court in the
instant case, but do not adequately express R.McG.'s status in relation to the mother's husband.
The fact that the law has no precise term for such would-be fathers indicates how new these
rights really are. This author favors coining the new term "extra-marital father" for a man who
claims to be the natural father of a child born to a married couple when both the mother and
her husband acknowledge the child as their natural offspring.
55. Note, Father ofan Ilegitimate Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1072
(1966).
56. Id
57. See genera/ly W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 8 (3rd ed.
1978).
58. Id.
59. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
60. Id. at 649.
61. Id. at 656-57.
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the equal protection rights of such fathers, because other similarly situated
parents i iere accorded the opportunity for a hearing.
62
Stant,.y produced much academic and legislative debate over the proper
extent of these newly found rights. Some commentators interpreted the deci-
sion narro 'ly as a procedural due process case which required only notice
and a hear ig before parental rights could be terminated. 63 Others inter-
preted it br -.dly as a substantive due process case requiring unwed fathers
to be given ihe same rights as all other parents.64 The debate was illumi-
nated--but vot resolved--by subsequent cases. Six years after Sanley, in
Quilloin v. We cotl,65 the Court, utilizing the "best interests of the child" test,
upheld the in ioluntary termination of an unwed father's parental rights af-
ter notice ant a hearing.
6 6 
More recently, in Caban v. Mohammed,
6 7 
the
Court, in reaff -ning the rights of unwed fathers who have established a
substantial relat onship with their children, used equal protection analysis to
strike down a Nw York adoption statute which set different standards for
unwed mothers . nd fathers. 68 Quilloin lends support to the procedural due
process interpretation of Stanley, while Caban supports the substantive due
process analysis.
3. Under the Colorado Uniform Parentage Act
After Sany and its progeny, there was no longer any doubt that the
Supreme Court included responsible unwed fathers when it declared that
parents have a basic right to their natural children.
6 9 
However, the UPA
was based on a wholly different premise.
The UPA set up two categories of fathers with different rights: first,
"presumed natural fathers" who were married to the child's mother at the
time of conception, or who performed some overt act of acknowledgement
later; second, all other fathers.
7 0 
If a child had a presumed father, another
man could assert his paternity only if he had the written consent of the pre-
62. Id. at 649.
63. See, e.g., Comment, Limiting the Boundaries of Stanley v. Illinois, 57 DEN. L.J. 671 (1980).
64. See, e.g., Comment, The Unwed Father's Rights in Adoption A~roceedings: A Case Study and
Legislatwve Critique, 40 ALB. L. REv. 543 (1976).
65. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
66. Id. at 256.
67. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
68. Id. at 391.
69. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children were deemed essential in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); they were considered among the "basic civil rights of man"
in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). For a good review of these and other cases,
see Note, Unwed Fathers: An Analtical Swrey of That Parental Rights and Obhgawons, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1029. See also Comment, Equal Protection and tae Putative Father: An Analysis of Parham v.
Hughes and Caban v. Mohammed, 34 Sw. Lj. 717 (1980).
70. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (repl. 1978). The UPA presumptions are complex.
Briefly, a man is presumed to be the natural father if he meets one of the following five condi-
tions: 1) The child is born or conceived during the father's marriage to the mother; 2) the
child is born or conceived during the father's cohabitation with the mother, after an attempt to
marry ceremonially, even though the marriage could be invalidated; 3) the child is born before
the father's marriage to the mother, and the father files a written acknowledgment of paternity,
or is voluntarily named as the father on the birth certificate, or is obligated to support the child
under a written voluntary promise or by court order; 4) the father receives the minor child into
his home and openly holds him out as his natural child; 5) the father files a written acknowl-
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
sumed father, or if the presumption of paternity had been rebutted by some-
one else. 7 ' Standing to rebut the presumption was granted only to the
presumed father, the natural mother, and their lineal descendants. 72 Thus,
if the mother was married, an unwed father was realistically unable to prove
his paternity without the concurrence of one of the legal parents. Whenever
there was a harmonious family unit, as was the case in R.McG., an extra-
marital father could not establish his rights under the UPA.
73
This dual scheme was a deliberate move by the drafters, who sought to
protect the legitimacy of children born in wedlock.74 Although it reflected
an appropriate state interest in maintaining the integrity of family units, it
quite obviously discriminated against certain unwed fathers.
C. Equal Rights for Men and Women
1. Under State and Common Law
Western society's patriarchial culture has traditionally imposed signifi-
cant legal and social disabilities on women. Women were long forbidden to
vote and were denied educational and employment opportunities.7 5 English
law treated a married woman particularly badly-her husband controlled
her property, her contracts, her debts, her will, and her testimony.7 6 The
first women's movement, in the mid-19th century, resulted in married wo-
men's property acts in many states, which granted all women the right to
contract, to bring suit, and to sell their property. 77 Even these seemingly
innocuous rights did not gain nationwide acceptance, however. As late as
edgment of paternity with the court which is not disputed by the mother. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-6-105 (repl. 1978).
71. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-105(1)(e), -105(2) (repl. 1978).
72. Id. § 19-6-107. Before the UPA was adopted in Colorado, fathers had no statutory
right to establish their paternity. Standing was granted only to mothers, guardians, and local
welfare agencies. Id. The Colorado UPA gave standing to certain categories of fathers. Id. See
People ex rel. L.B. 29 Colo. App. 101, 482 P.2d 1010 (1970), afd, 179 Colo. 11, 498 P.2d 1157
(1972), appeal dismissedmemn., 410 U.S. 976 (1973).
73. In the R.McG. case, the court dismissed the action without prejudice, to preserve the
child's right to bring suit at a later time. However, the court denied a motion by the guardian
ad /em to continue to pursue the suit because this would allow the claiming father to accom-
plish indirectly what he could not accomplish directly. Order of Judge Lawritson, Oct. 9,
1979, Record at 190. Hence, it is also unlikely that courts will allow putative fathers access
under the UPA through a suit brought by a descendant.
74. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 594 (1979); Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM.
L.Q. 1 (1974). The views of Krause, the Act's reporter-drafter, were clear even before the Act
was formulated:
In the best interests of the child born illegitimately to a mam'ed mother, pursuing its
true paternity would not be indicated, unless the mother's husband has disavowed
paternity. For the same reason (protection of the family) that continues to support the
presumption of legitimacy of children born to a married mother, an illegitimate fa-
ther's claim to his child born 'legitimately' to a married mother should not be heard-
unless the mother's husband has disavowed paternity or consented to the legitimation
of the child by its actual father.
KRAUSE, supra note 32, at 97 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion recognizing the inherent
inequity of the policy, see Note, The Uniform Parentage Act. What It Will Meanfor the Putative Father
in Ca/iformia, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 191 (1976).
75. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
76. See generally W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 5 (3rd ed.
1978); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3(c) (9th ed. 1975).
77. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
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1977, Alabama still forbade married women to convey or to mortgage their
real estate without the consent of their husbands.7"
The nineteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, passed
in 1920, gave women equal voting rights; full constitutional equality, how-
ever, awaits passage of the equal rights amendment. The proposed twenty-
seventh amendment, which states that "[elquality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex," has sparked bitter controversy and has yet to be ratified by
the requisite number of states.
79
2. Under United States Supreme Court Decisions
For many years, the United States Supreme Court used a two-tier ap-
proach to judge the validity of statutes challenged under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Most statutes, falling into the
traditional "lower tier," were required merely to bear some "rational rela-
tionship" to a legitimate state end and were invariably upheld.80 The "up-
per tier" test, which required justification by a "compelling state interest,"
was imposed upon statutes restricting fundamental rights and creating sus-
pect classifications such as race.8 ' Statutes subject to the latter tests were
most often invalidated, because they failed to fulfill the "strict scrutiny" re-
quirement that there be a compelling government interest unable to be
achieved by less restrictive alternatives.
8 2
Until recently, gender-based statutes were generally upheld because
they were subjected only to the lower tier, rational relationship test.8 3 In
1971, however, the Court radically changed its position in Reed v. Reed,
8 4
where it invalidated a statute which gave preference to men over women as
administrators of decedents' estates. Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richard-
son,85 four members of the Court voted to elevate gender to the status of a
suspect classs, but the idea never gained majority support. Instead, what has
emerged is a strong, middle-tier standard under which many discriminatory
schemes have been invalidated. The new "substantial relationship" test re-
quires that gender classes serve important government objectives, that their
purpose be both identifiable and substantial, and that the distinction be rea-
sonably structured so that all persons similarly situated are treated alike.
8 6
78. The Alabama statute was ruled unconstitutional, over a scathing dissent, in Peddy v.
Montgomery, 345 So. 2d 631 (Ala. 1977).
79. Three more states are needed to ratify the amendment before the June 30, 1982 dead-
line. NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1981, at 24, col. I.
80. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
81. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
82. Set, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
83. See, rg., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), omnded, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
84. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
85. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
86. E.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Orr v. Orr. 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Se Comment, Equal Protection and the "Aiddle Ter" The
Impact on Women and Illegitimater, 54 NOTRE DAM E LAW. 303 (1978).
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Initially, the Court seemed unwilling to apply this middle tier, height-
ened scrutiny to strike down statutes that discriminated against men rather
than against women. 87 Recent cases have shown a more even-handed ap-
proach, unless the challenged statute is clearly an ameliorative measure
aimed at correcting past discrimination.m The 1979 Caban v. Mohammed8 9
decision, which rested on gender-based equal protection grounds, exemplifies
the more recent trend. In Caban, the Court found the statute to be another
example of overbroad generalizations in gender-based classifications, the ef-
fect of which is to discriminate impermissibly against unwed fathers while
according rights to similarly situated mothers. 9° This undifferentiated dis-
tinction, the Court maintained, does not bear a substantial relationship to
the state's asserted interests.
9
1
3. Under the Colorado Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
Colorado's ERA states that equality of rights under the law cannot be
denied on account of sex.92 The amendment, which became part of the state
constitution in early 1973, was first applied in People v. Green. 93 Although the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the rape statute challenged in that case,
the court ruled that the ERA requires application of the strict scrutiny test
to all such gender-based statutes. 94 Thus, in Colorado, gender-based classifi-
cations challenged on equal protection grounds must meet the strictest judi-
cial test.95
III. THE INSTANT CASE
The Colorado Supreme Court's three opinions in R.McG. clearly reflect
the three currently popular legal viewpoints regarding the right of unwed
fathers to seek parental rights to a legitimate child. The majority, utilizing
equal protection analysis, found that the statute was invalid because it im-
permissibly discriminated between natural mothers and claiming natural fa-
thers. 96 The concurring opinion analyzed the father's rights in terms of
procedural due process safeguards. The dissent found both arguments over-
ridden by the compelling state interest in fostering harmonious legal family
units.
87. Eg., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
88. Eg., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (granting rights to unwed fathers);
Orr. v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating statute requiring only husbands to pay alimony);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating statute prohibiting beer sales to males under
21 and females under 18).
89. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Cahan was the first unwed father case to face directly the equal
protection issues. The Court in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), had refused to con-
sider gender-based issues raised in the brief because they were not in the jurisdictional state-
ment. Id. at 253 n.13.
90. 441 U.S. at 394.
91. Id.
92. See note 26 supra.
93. 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973).
94. Id. at 28, 514 P.2d at 770.
95. Ad.
96. See note 54 supra.
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A. The Majoriy: Equal Protection Rights
Justice Quinn's majority opinion first recognized the important state
interest involved in preserving family harmony,97 and then proceeded to
weigh that interest against the UPA's gender-based classification, under the
intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny used in Caban v. Mohammed.98
Here, the court found that the challenged UPA provision created more than
a difference in treatment; it created diametrically opposite treatments.9 9 A
natural mother can sue a non-spousal father for paternity and disrupt the
father's family harmony, even if, as in this case, he is married to someone else
and has other children. Claiming natural fathers, on the other hand, are not
allowed to disrupt a married mother's family harmony by suing her to claim
parental rights. According to the court, such a gender-based classification is
precisely the kind of overbroad generalization invalidated in Caban and in
Stanley.10 The court distinguished Quilloin v. Walcott 0 by noting that the
father in that case had never sought custody yet was still accorded a full
hearing. 102
Although the UPA states that all its presumptions are rebuttable by
clear and convincing evidence, 10 3 the court noted that for fathers like
R.McG. (even with a threshold showing of 98.89% probability of his pater-
nity), the presumption in favor of the mother's husband is actually irrebut-
table because such extra-marital fathers are precluded from suing.
According to the majority in R.McG., such a presumption is impermissible
under the Stanley doctrine. 1°' Equal protection doctrines under both the
United States and Colorado Constitutions 10 5 mandate equal judicial access
for natural mothers and claiming natural fathers. Justice Quinn concluded
that since the statute failed to satisfy the intermediate level of judicial scru-
tiny, it also failed to satisfy the stricter judicial scrutiny demanded by the
Colorado equal rights amendment, 10 6 and by People v. Greene .
1 07
The majority rejected the defendants' due process right of privacy
97. 615 P.2d at 670.
98. The standard used in Cahan is as follows:
[The unquestioned right of the State to further these desirable ends by legislation is
not in itself sufficient to justify the gender-based distinction .... Rather, under the
relevant cases applying the Equal Protection Clause it must be shown that the distinc-
tion is structured reasonably to further these ends .... [Siuch a statutory classifica-
tion 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v. Irgtnta, 253 U.S.
412, 415 [(1920)].
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 391.
99. 615 P.2d at 671.
100. Id.
101. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
102. 615 P.2d at 671.
103. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105(2) (repl. 1978).
104. The court quoted Stan!ky for the proposition that "when that procedure forecloses the
determinative issues . . . [and] explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formali-
ties, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and
child." 615 P.2d at 671.
105. See notes 24, 25 supra.
106. 615 P.2d at 672.
107. 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973).
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claims, stating that the interest they might have in protecting their family
harmony was no greater than the interest of R.McG. in establishing his pa-
ternity, and the interest of the child in determining his or her biological
parentage. 10 8 The court recognized that continuing the action could disrupt
the mother's marriage and negatively influence the child's life; however, the
court also acknowledged that the best interests of the child are not necessar-
ily the same as those of the legal parents, and that these interests are ex-
tremely difficult to determine. 10 9
Thus, the majority held that if a natural mother is allowed to sue for a
Declaration of Paternity in cases where the child has a presumed father, a
claiming natural father must be given the same opportunity.°10 The court
reversed the lower court's summary judgment and remanded the case to the
juvenile court. ' 1
B. The Concurrence.- Due Process Rights
Justice Dubofsky's special concurring opinion relied on due process, in
treading a middle path between the majority and the dissent. She stated
that the legislature may give preference in paternity proceedings to a
mother's family unit in which the child resides, without violating equal pro-
tection guarantees."12 This permissible preference, however, does not justify
the statute's strong presumption of legitimacy. Due process requires that
putative fathers have access to the courtroom, since Stanley held that a fit
natural father has a due process right to maintain a parental relationship
with his- illegitimate child.
1 13
In order to determine the unwed father's due process rights, Justice
Dubofsky weighed the unwed father's expressions of interest in the child
against the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the family unit.,t
4
Had the father not made continuing efforts to maintain contact and support
the child, the state's interest would have prevailed:
108. 615 P.2d at 672. The opinion cites Caban,Stanlqy, andInre Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532
P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, cert. denitd, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975). The Lisa R. case held CAL.
EVID. CODE § 661 (West 1966) constitutionally defective because it denied the use of the courts
to an unwed father seeking to establish his parenthood of a minor child whose legal parents had
died. The California Supreme Court found this denial of access to be unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious, as well as a violation of due process rights. 13 Cal.3d at 651, 532 P.2d at 133,
119 Cal. Rptr. at 485. Subsequently, the state legislature replaced the statute with a UPA
provision granting standing to a wide range of persons, including putative fathers. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7008 (West Supp. 1981). See Comment, In Re Lisa R.-Limittng the S&ope ofthe Conclusise
Presumption Doctine, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 377 (1976); Note, In Re Lisa R., 3 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 212 (1975).
109. 615 P.2d at 672.
110. Id.
111. On remand the Denver Juvenile Court entered a Declaration of Paternity in favor of
R.McG., following a stipulation to that effect by the mother and the presumed father. R.McG.
v. J.W., No. P-20082 (Den. Juv. Ct. Order, May 1981).
112. 615 P.2d at 672-73 (Dubofsky, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 673. The concurring opinion also recognized Lira R., as persuasive authority for
this proposition. See note 108 supra.
114. The due process cases on which Justice Dubofsky relied are Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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But here, where R.McG. has no alternative remedy to protect his
interest as the child's natural father, I think we must find that he
has standing to assert those interests in a court proceeding. Other-
wise, his constitutional right to due process of law in order to pro-
tect his basic right to conceive and raise his child has been
denied. 115
C. The Dissent: Overridng State Interests
Justice Lohr's dissent found both equal protection and due process ar-
guments outweighed by the compelling state interest in fostering harmonious
marital relationships and strong family ties.'1 6 The dissent began by quot-
ing the purposes of the Colorado Children's Code 1 7 (of which the UPA is a
part): to serve the best interest of the child and to strengthen the family.' 18
Justice Lohr maintained that UPA presumptions of paternity faithfully im-
plement these declared legislative purposes which must be liberally con-
strued under the statute. 1 9
Justice Lohr, addressing the equal protection issue, stated that no prior
court has ever extended the Stanley doctrine to find that a man other than
the mother's husband possessed an interest in determining the parental sta-
tus of a child born in wedlock.' 20 The dissenting Justice, noting that adul-
tery is still a crime in Colorado, stated, "it requires more imagination than I
can summon to find any legitimate expectation of a legally recognized rela-
tionship based solely on the blood ties between the child conceived of an
adulterous relationship and the natural father of that child."'
12 1
According to the dissent, the appropriate judicial standard for testing
R.McG.'s claims is the lower tier, rational relationship test, under which the
challenged classification would prevail. 122 For example, when family rela-
tionships become so disintegrated that someone within the family wishes to
challenge the husband's paternity, the legislature could reasonably deter-
mine that no useful purpose would be served by preventing that person from
doing so.123 Justice Lohr rejected the majority view that the challenged clas-
sification was gender-based, since both sexes are among persons able to sue
in paternity proceedings. Therefore, he declined to apply the higher level of
scrutiny demanded for gender-based statutes' 24 and, further, found it unnec-
115. 615 P.2d at 673-74 (Dubofsky, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 674-75 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 674; CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-1-102 (repl. 1978 & Supp. 1980). For cases imple-
menting these policies, see R.M. v. District Court, 191 Colo. 42, 550 P.2d 346 (1976); People ex
rel. M.M., 184 Colo. 298, 520 P.2d 128 (1974). Se also People ex retl. S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110,
553 P.2d 82 (1976).
118. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(i)(a), -102(l)(b) (repl. 1978).
119. 615 P.2d at 674 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 676.
121. Id.
122. Id. The two Colorado cases upon which Justice Lohr relied are Mosgrove v. Town of
Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1, 543 P.2d 715 (1975) and People ex rel. L.B., 179 Colo. 11,498 P.2d
1157 (1972), appeal dismissed mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973).
123. 615 P.2d at 676 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 677. Justice Lohr stated that if he were to utilize the substantial interest test, the
classification would still survive. Id.
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essary to apply the Colorado equal rights amendment. 25
Turning to the concurring due process arguments, Justice Lohr applied
the same balancing test as Justice Dubofsky had, but he reached the opposite
result, finding that public policy considerations outweighed the private in-
terests of the extra-marital father in this case.' 2 6 To Justice Lohr "the im-
portant criteria would be the duration and quality of the relationship of the
parties, not the probability that the third-party father could in fact prove
paternity."1
27
IV. THE SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The presumption that a child conceived during a lawful marriage is
legitimate is one of the oldest and strongest presumptions in Anglo-American
law.1 2 8 It was long supported by an evidentiary rule which rendered a hus-
band and wife incompetent to rebut the presumption by testifying that they
had not engaged in sexual intercourse at the time of conception. The pre-
cept became known as Lord Mansfield's Rule after the English peer articu-
lated it in a 1777 ejectment case, declaring that "decency, morality, and
policy" required that husbands and wives be barred from bastardizing their
offspring. '
29
Some American states continue to employ a conclusive presumption of
legitimacy. For instance, in 1967 a California appellate court held that a
mixed race child born to a Caucasian woman was the legitimate child of the
mother's Caucasian husband.' 30 Other state laws contain a rebuttable pre-
sumption of legitimacy, yet make rebuttal quite difficult.' 3 1 Colorado re-
jected Lord Mansfield's Rule in 1959, but continues to uphold the strong
presumption of legitimacy.13 2 Just four months before the R.McG. decision,
in fact, the Colorado Supreme Court held that children with married par-
ents enjoy a strong presumption of legitimacy and should be able to rely on
it absent a paternity challenge by the presumed father.
133
R.AMcG. has not destroyed the traditional presumption of legitimacy in
Colorado, but has severely weakened it. The presumption still exists; how-
ever, any extra-marital father-indeed, probably any interested person-
may now attack it.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 677-78.
127. Id. at 678. Justice Lohr referred to Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban, in which the
latter stated, "[plarental rights do not spring full blown from the biological connection between
parent and child. They require relationships more enduring." 615 P.2d at 678 n.9 (citing
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
128. In In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930), Justice Cardozo said the presumption
could not fail unless common sense and reason are outraged by it. For a good general discus-
sion, set Note, Evidence-Incompetery of a Husband and Wife to Testif as to Nonaccess so as to Bastard-
ize a Child, 6 GA. ST. B.J. 448 (1970).
129. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1257-58 (K.B. 1777).
130. Hess v. Whitsitt, 257 Cal. App. 2d 552, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967). Accord, In re Marriage
of A., 41 Or. App. 679, 598 P.2d 1258 (1979).
131. E.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 91 Mich. App. 602, 283 N.W.2d 809 (1979).
132. Vasquez v. Esquibel, 141 Colo. 5, 346 P.2d 293 (1959). See also Beck v. Beck, 153 Colo.
90, 384 P.2d 731 (1963); Lanford v. Lanford, 151 Colo. 211, 377 P.2d 115 (1962).
133. A.G. v. S.G., 609 P.2d 121 (Colo. 1980).
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Such an attack today has a much greater chance of success than ever
before. Just a few years ago, a true natural father in R.McG.'s situation
probably would have lost his case, even if he could have obtained standing
to bring the action to trial, because he could have mustered little scientific
evidence to rebut the strong presumption of legitimacy. The blood tests then
available were often inconclusive and only excluded certain fathers; they did
not definitely establish paternity. Today, however, the new HLA tissue test-
ing procedure has made it possible to determine paternity much more accu-
rately. In approximately 90% of blood samples tested, the HLA procedure
either absolutely excludes the tested party as the father, or rates his
probability of paternity at over 90%.134 Such evidence should be sufficient
to rebut any presumption except a legally conclusive one. The Colorado
Supreme Court was obviously influenced by what it called R.McG.'s
"threshold showing of 98.89% probability of paternity."' 135
Thus, before HLA testing existed, the rebuttable presumption of legiti-
macy acted as an almost insurmountable barrier to extra-marital fathers.1
36
Today, the presumption is more readily rebuttable. That is one reason
R.McG. is so significant.
Many people, like the dissenting Justice Lohr, fear that the R.McG. de-
cision will have a serious adverse social impact.' 37 The defendants, in their
appellate brief, stated that "the cost of abstract truth is dear when con-
trasted with the damage to.the child and his or her family ... .
Others, such as this author, believe that the decision was legally impera-
tive regardless of the costs, and that those costs will not be excessive. Society
must always pay a price for its freedoms. The price in this instance may be
the destruction of some family units. However, many of those units would
be destroyed by their complicated parental situation, even without the inter-
vention of the legal process. Also, it should not be assumed that many extra-
marital fathers will use this new avenue simply because it is now open to
them. Only the most persistent and concerned claiming fathers are likely to
pursue an action which may destroy their own family units and will, if suc-
cessful, require substantial support obligations.
R.McG. believed that the law should not protect outmoded fictions. He
maintained in his appellate brief that in the past, fictional presumptions
were needed for the orderly support of society's children because at that time
it was impossible to prove paternity. "But to try to foist such fictions on a
134. Comment, Patenity Testing with the Human Leukocyte Antigen System: A Medicolegal Break-
through, 20 SANTA CLARA LAw. 511 (1980). The HLA system was developed in 1964 at the
University of California at Los Angeles (U.C.L.A.) School of Medicine, for the purpose of
matching tissues precisely to minimize the possibility of organ transplant rejection. U.C.L.A.
now has a large HLA paternity evaluation program, where the R.McG. tests were carried out.
States were slow to recognize the new technology, but as early as 1976 the American Medical
Association and American Bar Association recommended use of the HLA test. SeeJoint AM.A-
ABA Cwde/ines: Present Status of Strologis Testing in Proens of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247
(1976). Since then, most states which have considered the matter have accepted HLA testing.
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1173 (Sept. 16, 1980).
135. 615 P.2d at 671.
136. See note 54 supra.
137. 615 P.2d at 676.
138. Memorandum Brief in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9.
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family in 1979," he said, "is a destructive anachronism.
'139
Every child has a right to know his or her biological heritage. 140 In
addition to the obvious medical and economic considerations favoring such
knowledge, many people, including the author, believe that the child has an
essential right to the truth simply because it is the truth. In constitutional
terms, the child has a substantive due process right to his own per-
sonhood. 141
American society is no longer composed of neat nuclear units of biologi-
cal families. Many children live with adults who are not their biological
parents. 142 If children can adjust to stepfathers, adoptive fathers, live-in fa-
thers, intermittent fathers and absent fathers, they can adjust to having two
fathers, both of whom want them-a biological one with visitation rights
and a "psychological" one with whom they live. If R.McG. is successful in
establishing his parenthood, the child, one hopes, will be loved, supported
and cared for by two fathers. Surely in today's world that is not such an
adverse result.
Ltnda Shoemaker
139. Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at
10.
140. In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 551, 210 N.W.2d 865, 871 (1973). Note also
the increasingly militant stands taken by adult adoptees in search of their biological roots, e.g.,
Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979).
141. Craven, Personhod" The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 702.
142. Many academicians have argued that the rights of the natural "biological" parent are
less important than those of the "psychological" parent to whom the child is attached. Muench
& Levy, Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 FAM. L.Q. 129 (1979).
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